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Foreword 
 
Economic policy impacts are at the heart of Macroeconomic research. Two major examples of intensely 
debated issues are the role of fiscal policy in countering business cycles and the intermediate variables 
policy must target in order to promote economic growth. 
But the Macroeconomic impacts of policy do not depend exclusively on what the policymaker 
does. Those impacts depend also on how policy is implemented and on who implements it. The political 
party to which the policymaker belongs, the credibility associated to the policy action being 
implemented, or the political composition and strength of the future policymaker may crucially 
influence the way economic agents react to policy or to the policymaker.  
Such reactions determine, in turn, important financial- and real-market decisions. This thesis 
explores three of them: the choice of the country to host an international capital investment, the entry 
into export market, and the evolution of stock market investments. 
The first chapter theoretically explores and empirically tests the channels through which 
international capital flows react to economic policy and to governments’ political profile. A game 
theoretical model is built, rationalizing the hypothesis that left-leaning cabinets implement higher 
taxes and higher public expenditures and that minoritarian or coalition cabinets react less actively to 
productivity shocks. The model predicts a negative reaction by capital flows to left-leaning cabinets and 
an uncertain reaction to both minorities and coalitions. These and other model predictions and 
features are tested on a set of 23 OECD democratic countries, in the period 1960-2008.   
The second chapter performs a theoretical discussion on how the distinctive credibility and 
irreversibility associated to the introduction of the Euro may have led to an extraordinary export-
market entry promotion. The real options approach is used to understand how exchange rate volatility 
may induce firms to wait before entering the export market – entry hysteresis. The model developed 
combines uncertainty around future exchange rates, sunk entry costs, entry decision preceding the 
realization of the future exchange rates, and irreversibility of the entry decision.  
The third chapter applies a analyzes stock market volatility behavior around cabinet 
democratic elections. Three OECD countries are studied – Japan, U.K. and Germany – in the period 
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1960-2008. Potential volatility-regime changes are empirically identified using a regime-switching 
ARCH model (SWARCH).  
The first and third chapters use a pioneer dataset characterizing the political profile of the 
democratic cabinets governing the countries studied. This dataset was built by the author, by gathering 
research literature, institutional sources and political encyclopedia.       
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Capital, cabinets and taxes: 
political and policy determinants of 
financial flows 
 
Rúben Branco 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
International capital flows hold a notable economic relevance within OECD countries, showing clear 
reactions to economic policy and to governments’ political profile. This study explores these impact 
channels and tests them empirically. A game theoretical model is built, rationalizing the hypothesis 
that (a) left-leaning cabinets implement higher taxes and higher public expenditures and that (b) 
minoritarian or coalition cabinets react less actively to productivity shocks. The model predicts, thus, a 
negative reaction by capital flows to left-leaning cabinets and an uncertain reaction to both minorities 
and coalitions, depending on how efficient their inaction is – trade-off between productivity-boosting 
and policy uncertainty/“noise”. Model predictions are tested to on a set of 23 OECD democratic 
countries, in the period 1960-2008. The hypothesis that left-leaning cabinets set higher taxes finds 
empirical support. This policy divergence is more intense in the context of single-party cabinets, 
suggesting that coalitions may be associated to fiscal policy inaction/blending. Consistently, equity 
inflows react positively to single-party right cabinets. FDI net flows react negatively to majoritarian 
cabinets and positively to budget deficits, signaling sensitivity to environment stability and fiscal 
stimulus. Oppositely, equity inflows react positively to majoritarian cabinets (potentially more active 
in countering negative GDP shocks) and negatively to budget deficits and public expenditure 
(potentially anticipating higher taxes). The magnitude of the direct impacts of political profiles on 
capital flows range from 0.3 to 4.7 GDP percentage points (0.5–2.5 standard deviations of the respective 
sample flows). Reactions to fiscal policy are attenuated when left or right cabinets are in office. 
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1. Introduction 
 
International capital flows hold a notable and increasing economic relevance throughout the world, 
especially within OECD countries. These flows show clear reactions to economic policy, which, in turn, 
is correlated with government’s political profile. This study aims at understanding how this impact 
channel operates, testing the implied reactions by capital flows to cabinets’ political profiles.  
Since the late 80’s, both Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Portfolio Equity (equity) net 
inflows show an increasing weight on each destination economy’s GDP and on its domestic Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation (GFCF). FDI grew from a weight of 1–2% (2–9%) on GDP (GFCF) in 1977, to 
weights of 4–14% (15–75%) in 2010. In the same period, equity grew from weights of 0–0.1% on both 
GDP and GFCF to weights of 0–15% and 0–91%, respectively (see Figures A1–A4, in Appendix). Figures 
1–4 show that this growing relevance by international capital flows is distinctively more intense within 
the OECD1.  
These capital flows react to intense political events. An example took place in Italy, 1998: on 
October 9, the Government headed by Romano Prodi collapsed after losing a confidence motion in 
Parliament by one vote. Prime-minister Prodi called this motion after the Communist Refoundation 
(CR) party had withdrawn its parliamentary support to the Government, due to disagreements over the 
1999 Government budget. CR did not integrate the cabinet, but its support granted the cabinet a 
parliamentary majority. After a failed and turmoil-generating attempt by Prodi to form a new cabinet, 
a new Government was formed under Presidential invitation and Massimo D’Alema’s leadership, 
gathering left-wing parties and a centrist party created a few months earlier. The early signs of 
inexperience by the new Government were followed by additional sources of political unrest: a 
continuing high level of party system instability – four new parties and one party merge –, the collapse 
of a constitutional reform, a referendum against proportionality in electoral law, the passing of three 
highly sensitive bills and the failure by a long-lasting parliamentary commission to reach highly 
expected institutional reforms.  
 
                                                 
1 Data from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. Gross fixed capital formation includes land improvements; 
plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. See Table A1 in Appendix for definitions 
of capital flows. 
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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Notes: Classes of countries defined by the World Bank. Simple averages by country group, in percentage points. 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
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On the one hand, the fall of Prodi’s Government made Italy transition from its “second-longest-
serving government in the post World War II era” (Keesing’s World News Archives) to more than three 
and a half years with (two) caretaker cabinets; on the other hand, this fall ended a coalition 
Government whose parliamentary majority was supported by an outside-cabinet agreement with the 
CR, giving rise to an executive that proved capable of effectively ending the budget deadlock.2    
Figure 5 shows very diverse performances by FDI and equity inflows after this political event: 
FDI inflows grow 164% between 1998 and 1999, picking up to a positive trend terminated only in 2008, 
with an average yearly growth of 35%; equity inflows fall 131% between 1998 and 1999, starting a 5-year 
period of consecutive net outflows. 
As the episode above also suggests, fiscal policy may be source or consequence of dramatic 
political events, (in)directly triggering capital flows’ reactions. Consider now the case of Greece, 2007: 
on October 1, a new cabinet took office, headed by Prime-minister Karamanlis; in December, the IMF 
acknowledges the need for further challenging fiscal consolidation on the Greek public budget, in 
order to comply with the ongoing European Commission’s excessive deficit procedure3; at the same 
instance, IMF classifies the 2008 revenue target set by the new Government as ambitious, due to the 
considerable efforts it required, expressing also concern that the quality of the 2008 expenditure 
adjustment falls short; in IMF’s view, the 2010 balanced-budget target would require further revenue 
enhancing measures and determined efforts to better control primary current spending.  
Figure 6 shows Greek tax revenue, public expenditure and budget balance in GDP percentage 
points. Greek fiscal policy in 2008 was characterized by tax revenue decrease (0.1 GDP p.p.), public 
expenditure increase (3.0 GDP p.p.) and budget balance divergence with respect to the balanced-budget 
target (decrease in 3.1 GDP p.p.). In May 2009, IMF explicitly states that “fiscal consolidation cannot 
be postponed”, projecting a budget deficit widening and encouraging further deficit-reducing steps 
“without delay”4. More specifically, the IMF recommends “a coherent multiyear fiscal plan to place 
                                                 
2 Sources for political episodes described are Keesing’s World News Archives (www.keesings.com) and the European Journal 
of Political Research 36: 317–325, 1999. 
3 Such considerations were made public through the Preliminary Conclusions of the IMF Mission to the 2007 Article IV 
Consultation; such consultations are made in the context of requests to use IMF resources, as part of discussions of staff 
monitored programs, and as part of other staff reviews of economic developments – see 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2007/121007a.htm for details on this particular report.  
4 Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission to the 2009 Article IV Consultation. 
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debt on a downward path” and “an annual adjustment of about 1.5 percent of GDP in permanent 
measures beginning in 2010”. Confirming IMF’s prospects, the year would end with an even larger 
deficit widening of 5.8 GDP p.p. driven by new revenue decrease and expenditure increase. 
In this context of anticipated contractionary fiscal policy, FDI inflows to Greece fall by 92% 
between 2008 and 2010. As Figure 7 illustrates, this decrease is much more intense than the decrease 
observed, in the same period, in the sum of FDI inflows to the OECD high-income countries5 (33%) or 
to the subset of these countries that belong to the EU (34%)6. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Country Statistical Profiles 
Notes: The net lending of the general government is the balancing item of the non-financial account for Government 
sector and is equal to the difference between total revenue and total expenditure. A negative figure indicates a deficit. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
                                                 
5 As defined by the World Bank (World Development Indicators). 
6 FDI inflows decrease more in 2008-2010 in Greece than in 2007-2010 in the OECD set (52%) or in the OECD-EU subset 
(62%).  
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Figure 8. Tax revenues, Public expenses, Budget balance and Public debt, in GDP percentage points, 
compared with Partisan ideology (country-averages, 1960–2008) 
 
Source: Fiscal data from OECD Economic Outlook No. 86; political data collected by the author – see Section 3.1 for 
references and details.  
Notes: Party is originally in daily frequency and each of the fiscal policy variables are originally in yearly frequency. 
All the variables are averaged country-wise, for the period 1960-2008. First the political variable is averaged to yearly 
frequency (into country-year observations) and, secondly, all the variables are averaged country-wise for the whole 
period, considering, for each plot, only the observations for which the respective political and fiscal variables are non-
missing. Due to its outlying status, Norway is omitted in the graph comparing Budget balance to ideological index. 
 
But politics may impact capital flows also in times of relative political stability, if the 
government’s political profile determines the fiscal policy pursued. Figure 8 compares an index of 
cabinet ideology – party – ranging from zero (left) to 1 (right), to several fiscal policy variables – Tax 
revenues, Public expense, Budget balance and Public debt – measured in GDP percentage points7. All 
the variables are averaged for the period 1960–2008, for each of 23 OECD countries8. The figure 
suggests that countries with party closer (on average) to 1 – frequent right-leaning cabinets – hold 
lower public revenue, lower public expenses and lower budget balance. Regarding the corporate tax 
rate9 (measured in percentage points), a similar correlation is suggested – see Figure 9 (variables built 
similarly to Figure 8).  
                                                 
7 Fiscal data definitions may be found in Section 3.1 below. 
8 These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,  Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. 
9 Basic combined central and sub-central (statutory) corporate income tax rate given by the adjusted central government 
rate plus the sub-central rate (OECD Tax Database). 
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Figure 10 repeats the exercise in Figure 9 restricting to the sub-sample of majoritarian single-
party cabinets. Within this sub-sample, a much clearer correlation appears, associating countries 
where single-party cabinets are very frequently right-leaning to lower corporate tax rates.     
Given all these interrelations between fiscal policy and cabinets’ political profile, ordinary 
democratic politic/policy events, like elections or fiscal policy actions, may impact capital flows 
differently, depending on the policymaker’s political profile. The heterogeneity amongst OECD 
countries, both in terms of policy and politics, accentuates the relevance of the impact channels 
discussed above. Figure 11 revisits the comparison between public expenses and the ideological index, 
already presented in Figure 8, but now with a visual distinction between two sets of countries: 
European (solid circle) and Asia-Pacific (hollow square). Except for New Zealand, Asia-Pacific OECD 
countries in the sample show more pronounced rightward ideological leaning and relatively low level 
of public expenses. 
 
 
Figure 9. Corporate tax rate (in percentage points) compared with Partisan ideology (country-averages, 
1960–2008) 
 
 
 
Source: Fiscal data from OECD Tax Database; political data collected by the author – see Section 3.1 for 
references and details. 
Notes: Party is originally in daily frequency and corporate tax rate is originally in yearly frequency. All 
the variables are averaged country-wise, for the period 1960-2008. First the political variables are averaged 
to yearly frequency (into country-year observations) and, secondly, all the variables are averaged country-
wise for the whole period, considering only the observations for which the respective political and fiscal 
variables are non-missing.  
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Figure 10. Corporate tax rate (p.p.), compared with Partisan ideology (majoritarian single-party cabinets, 
country-averages, 1960–2008) 
 
 
 
Source: Fiscal data from OECD Tax Database; political data collected by the author – see Section 3.1 for 
references and details. 
Notes: Majsing is originally in daily frequency and fiscal policy variable is originally in yearly frequency. 
Majsing is a dummy variable signaling days with a majoritarian single-party cabinet in office. First the 
political variable is averaged to yearly frequency (into country-year observations) and, secondly, is 
averaged country-wise for the whole period, considering only the observations for which the political and 
fiscal variables are non-missing. Countries with few observations are excluded. 
 
 
Figure 11. Public expenses in GDP percentage points, compared with Partisan ideology (country-averages, 
1960–2008) 
 
 
Source: Fiscal data from OECD Economic Outlook No. 86; political data collected by the author – see 
Section 3.1 for references and details. 
Notes: Party is originally in daily frequency and public expense is originally in yearly frequency. All the 
variables are averaged country-wise, for the period 1960-2008. First the political variable is averaged to 
yearly frequency (into country-year observations) and, secondly, both variables are averaged country-wise 
for the whole period, considering only the observations for which both variables are non-missing. 
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Figure 12. Budget balance in GDP percentage points, compared with Coalition status (country-averages, 
1960–2008) 
 
 
Source: Fiscal data from OECD Economic Outlook No. 86; political data collected by the author – see 
Section 3.1 for references and details. 
Notes: Party is originally in daily frequency and public expense is originally in yearly frequency. All the 
variables are averaged country-wise, for the period 1960-2008. First the political variable is averaged to 
yearly frequency (into country-year observations) and, secondly, both variables are averaged country-wise 
for the whole period, considering only the observations for which both variables are non-missing. 
 
 
Figure 13. Majority status and Partisan ideology in Italy (yearly, 1960–2008) 
 
 
 
Source: Political data collected by the author – see Section 3.1 for references and details. 
Notes: Each political variable is averaged to yearly frequency (into country-year 
observations). Solid line follows chronological order. 
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Figure 12 presents the comparison between average public balance and average coalition status 
for two sets of countries, visually distinguished: Nordic European countries10 (solid circle) and South 
European countries11 (hollow square). Nordic countries hold clearly higher budget balances (almost all 
hold average surpluses), when compared to the average budget deficits by Southern countries; moreover, 
Nordic countries tend to have higher frequency of coalition cabinets than Southern countries. 
OECD countries present political heterogeneity not only cross-section – note that country 
averages are widely spread along political axes in the plots above – but also over time, within each 
country. Figure 13 shows the example of Italy. 
The aim of this study is to discuss and test the hypothesis that these cross-country and over-time 
shifts in political profiles generate reactions by capital flows and/or influence the way capital flows 
react to fiscal policy changes. 
Cabinet’s political profile may produce such impacts by inducing specific expectations about 
future policy. Oatley (1999) presents empirical support to the partisan-driven differences in fiscal 
deficits in the period 1970-1994. Under fixed exchange rates, leftist governments tend to produce higher 
deficits and lower surpluses than rightist ones. 
Such expectations may, in turn, give rise to non-intuitive reactions to fiscal policy. Following 
the arguments in Bertola and Drazen (1993) and in Tavares (2004), contractionary policy may produce 
expansionary effects, if it induces sufficiently strong expectations of future policy shifts in the opposite 
direction. This way, decreases in permanent spending may induce decreases in the present discounted 
value of expected taxes, increasing private wealth and leading to a boom. Conversely, increases in taxes 
may lead to increases in output either because the path of taxes over time is smoothed or by solving 
uncertainty over the future course of fiscal policy. Moreover, deficit cuts can raise household wealth 
through a decrease in interest rates, by lowering the sovereign default risk. Therefore, either by solving 
uncertainty or by leading to a boom, budget cuts and tax increases may attract private capital – 
particularly in contexts of high public debt, in which private investors are particularly sensitive to 
public finance solvability. 
                                                 
10 Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. 
11 Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. 
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Section 2 develops a game theoretical model exploring (i) how the cabinet’s political profile may 
determine the economic policy pursued and (ii) how the expectations over economic policy associated to 
each political profile may determine capital flows’ reactions to electoral results, even before fiscal 
policy is implemented. The model rationalizes the hypothesis that (a) left-leaning cabinets implement 
higher taxes and higher public expenditures, and that (b) cabinets with parliamentary minoritarian 
support or composed by a coalition of parties react less actively to productivity shocks. Hypothesis (a) 
produces a predicted negative reaction by capital flows to left-leaning cabinets. Hypothesis (b) produces 
an uncertain reaction by capital flows to both majorities and coalitions. This hypothesis is in line with 
the theoretical results in Spolaore (2004): in a spectrum of promptness of action, a “cabinet” system, in 
which one agent autonomously chooses policy, produces more frequent and immediate action by 
policymakers than a “checks-and-balances” system, in which a “leading” agent is submitted to others’ 
veto power, or a “consensus” system, in which all agents involved must agree before policy is chosen. 
Parliamentary minorities are associated to “checks-and-balances” and coalitions to “consensus”. The 
impact of each of these political traits on capital flows depends on how efficient is the inaction they 
produce: veto powers may hamper productivity-boosting measures and generate policy uncertainty, but 
autonomous decision may lead to excessive policy “noise”.    
Section 3 describes the empirical test to assumptions and predictions of the model, both around 
elections and throughout political mandates. Results are presented and discussed. 
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2. The model 
 
2.1.  Game structure 
 
Consider a two stage game with two players: Cabinet and Investors. In the beginning of the first stage, 
there is an inherited level of public debt  ∈ 0, + ∞	 and an initial capital stock level 
 ∈ 0,+∞	 
in the economy.  
The first event is the election of the Cabinet, corresponding to a movement by Nature. After the 
election, Investors... 
 
a) ... receive a signal â ∈ 0,1	 about the new Cabinet’s ideological type  ∈ 0,1	, which in turn 
identifies the ideological orientation of the recently elected Cabinet as illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. Ideological type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) ... are informed on the new Cabinet’s (true) composition type  ∈ 1,2, … , which indicates the 
number of political parties integrating the Cabinet12, and on its (true) parliamentary type 
 ∈ 0,1, where  = 0 if the Cabinet is minoritarian and  = 1 if the Cabinet is majoritarian. 
 
The Cabinet knows exactly its true type. 
Having received this information, Investors build a prior belief about the probability 
distribution of the (unknown) true type a: they assume ~â, , 	. In this prior distribution I, 
expected value is the ideological signal â and the variance ∙	 is a function of Cabinet’s types  and . 
                                                 
12  > 1 indicates a coalition Cabinet. 
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In particular, 

 > 0 and  < 0, meaning that the uncertainty about the true ideological type of the 
Cabinet will be increasing in the number of agents (Cabinet parties and/or parliament) that need to be 
involved in policy-definition negotiations. Afterwards, Investors decide the new level of capital stock 

" ∈ 0, +∞	 they wish to hold in the domestic economy (versus abroad) and the first stage ends. 
In the beginning of the second stage, Nature determines the value of # ∈ 1, +∞	, the 
production function productivity level, according to #~$#% , &	, where P represents a probability 
distribution such that '#	 = #%  and ()#	 = &. After µ is known, capital level 
* ∈ 0,+∞	 is 
determined; 
* represents the capital stock Investors will hold in the domestic economy at the end of 
the 2nd stage (consisting on a reassessment of 
"). With probability 0 < + < 1, Nature allows 
Investors to freely choose the level of 
*; with probability 1 − -	, Nature sets 
* = 
"13. After 
* is 
determined, the Cabinet’s true type a is revealed to Investors and the Cabinet chooses . ∈ 0,+∞	, the 
strength of new economic policy measures to be taken in order to enhance #, as well as the values of two 
fiscal policy instruments: the tax rate / ∈ 0,1	 – to be applied to the production output – and the 
weight of public expenditure on production, g ∈ 0,1	14. Note that . = 0 is equivalent to not adopting 
any new economic policy measure. Production function has the form 1*
*, ., #	 = 1 + .	. #. 
*	3, 
where 4 ∈ 0,1	, but production is realized only after the Cabinet determines its policies. The fiscal 
policy instruments are subject to an ex-ante budget constraint /1* =  + g. 1*
*, 0, #%	; collected 
taxes must cover the inherited debt and the expenditure, without accounting for the impact of 
unexpected productivity shocks nor for the impact economic policy #% = # ∧ . = 0	15. Finally, 
production is realized, payoffs are assigned and the game ends. 
Investors dislike fiscal policy uncertainty and economic policy volatility; their payoff consists 
of (a) the net return on the capital placed abroad, (b) output of domestic production net of taxes, (c) a 
                                                 
13 1 − +	 may be interpreted as a discount for the time during which the investment cannot be reversed/mobilized or, 
alternatively/complementarily, as a short-term-immobile portion of 
". 
14 In the context of the model, economic policy comprises non-fiscal measures intended to boost productivity, like, for 
example, legislative action aiming at improving workstation organization, labor market dynamism, product market 
competition, business creation easiness… 
15 Note that, considering #%  instead of #, the budget constraint allows for the maintenance/accumulation of debt in the 
presence of negative productivity shocks, yielding public savings – or higher debt reduction, with re-parameterization – in 
the context of positive productivity shocks. Moreover, the null value of . represents the assumption that the public budget is 
defined before production takes place and without quantitative estimates of the potential impact from economic policy 
measures. All these assumptions are compatible with a scenario of ex-ante budget planning, in the context of which the 
budget constraint is assessed using production/productivity forecasts (#%) and abstracting from the impacts of (non-fiscal) 
economic policy.   
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disutility from the uncertainty linked to the signal â and (d) a disutility from the adoption of new 
economic policy measures by the Cabinet. Assuming (c) and (d) is proportional to the degree of 
Investors’ exposure to the economy (measured by 
*), Investors’ payoff is defined as follows: 
 
6 = ). 
 − 
*	 + 1 − /	. 1*
*, ., #	 − , 	. 
* − .78
*,  
 
where K represents total capital owned by Investors, ) ∈ 0,1	 the exogenous foreign capital (net) 
return rate and 78 the volatility-driven marginal cost from new policy strength. Cabinet’s payoff (or 
utility) W has the following form: 
 
9 = . g − :* /* − ;",<=	#	 . ">?	<@<=A
B
<= − ;, 	:D"⋁ F, 	 . . +  − 1	.*A <<= 7G, 
 
where , 	 is a vector in ℝ*>, 7G ∈ ℝ> represents the cost of having to negotiate new economic 
policies within Cabinet or with the parliament and I ∈ 1,+∞	. The first two terms of W refer to 
preferences with respect to fiscal policy instruments, with g yielding utility from its welfare 
applications (especially appealing to left-leaning Cabinets) and / imposing disutility due to tax related 
inefficiencies. The third term of W reflects the negative utility extracted from negative productivity 
shocks16 to µ, compared to its expected value – note that the marginal (dis)utility of µ is decreasing in µ 
(stronger negative shocks bring higher marginal utility losses). The last term in W represents the costs 
associated to the negotiations implied in economic policies adoption. These costs only appear in cases of 
coalitions or minorities17 and are: (i) increasing in the strength of the policies assessed, given that 
stronger policies shall impose higher costs on coalition partners or parties represented in Parliament 
that do not agree on their direction, (ii) increasing in the number of parties in Cabinet – according to 
Spolaore (2004), within-coalition-Cabinet negotiations follow the “consensus system” mechanics, 
therefore the increase in policy strength originates a “war of attrition” before policy is adopted (this 
“war” represents an additional cost linked to coalitions and lasts longer for larger . – more costly 
                                                 
16 ;",<=	#	 = 1, indicating # < #% . 
17 ;, 	:D"⋁ F, 	 = 1, indicating  > 1	 ⋁ 	 = 0. 
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measures – and larger n – more parties in Cabinet18) –, and (iii) decreasing in the magnitude of the 
shock, given that, the bigger the shock, the easier it shall be to reach an agreement on the measures to 
take19. 
In summary, the game structure is the following. 
 
 
Figure 15. Time structure of the game 
Stage 1 • â,  and  are revealed to the Investors  
• a,  and  are revealed to the Cabinet 
• Investors choose the level of K1 
Stage 2 • Nature determines # 
• With probability + , Investors choose the 
level of K2 and, with probability 1 −+	, Nature sets K2 = K1 
• a is revealed to Investors 
• Cabinet chooses ., / and g 
• Production 1* is realized  
• Payoffs R and W are assigned 
 
 
 
2.2. Equilibrium 
 
Equilibrium is presented by backward induction. Cabinet’s optimization problem in stage 2 is as 
follows: 
 
maxN,O,? 9 = g −
I
2 /* − ;",<=	#	 .
1 + .	# − #%A*#% − ;, 	:D"⋁ F, 	 . . +  − 1	.*A
#
#% 7G 
s.t.  /. 1*
*, 0, #%	 =  + g. 1*
*, 0, #%	 ⇔ g = / − QRSB+B,,<=	 
1*
*, ., #	 = 1 + .	. #. 
*	3 
                                                 
18 In of Spolaore (2004), the probability of measure adoption until a given time t, in the “consensus system”, is decreasing in 
the cost of the measure and in the number of decision-makers. 
19 Note that this utility function replicates the results of the Spolaore (2004) framework, not its mechanics, given that is not 
the aim of this model to analyze the intra-Cabinet or the Cabinet-parliament negation dynamics, but instead replicate their 
output in terms of Cabinet preferences vis-à-vis economic policy choice.  
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From the F.O.C. on τ and g, we get 
 T9
T/ = 0 ⇔ /∗ =

I ⇒ g∗ =

I −
1*
*, 0, #%	 
 
 For the case of # ≥ #% ⋀ 	 =  = 1	(single-party-majority Cabinet without negative shock), W 
is independent from ., so there is no maximization with respect to this variable. If # ≥ #% ⋀ 	 >
1	 ∨  = 0	, the optimum occurs at . = 0. In the case of # < #% ⋀ 	 =  = 1 (single-party-majority 
Cabinet with negative shock), we have: 
 T9
T. = 0 ⇔ −2
#
#% 1 + .	# − #%A = 0 ⇔ .Z∗ =
#%# − 1 
 
Note that the single-party-majority Cabinet will always act whenever a negative shock occurs, 
irrespective of its size # < #% ⇔ .Z∗ > 0	, fitting the Spolaore (2004) prediction of excessive action by 
“cabinet systems”20. Furthermore, this type of Cabinet will adjust completely to the shock: 1 + .Z∗	# =
#% . 
 If # < #% ⋀ 	 > 1	 ∨  = 0	, the F.O.C. with respect to . yields: 
 
T9
T. = 0 ⇔ −2
#
#% 1 + .	# − #%A − 1 + 2 − 1	.A
#
#% 7G = 0 ⇔ 
⟺ .\∗ = #% − # −
]^
*# +  − 1	7G 
Cabinets with coalition and/or minority in the parliament will act if and only if # < #% − ]^* ; there is, 
thus, an ‘inaction band’ _#% − ]^* , #%`, fitting the Spolaore (2004) prediction of greater shocks needed 
for “consensus” and “checks-and-balances systems” to act, compared to those demanded by “cabinet 
systems”21. Although having the same ‘action threshold’ a# < #% − ]^* ⇔ .\∗ > 0`, coalition-Cabinets 
(regardless of p), will adopt less intense policies than single-party-minority Cabinets:                 
.\∗|D" = <=@<@
c
B̂<>@"	]^ <
<=@<@cB̂< =.\∗|F"∧ F. This result fits Spolaore (2004) prediction of “action with 
                                                 
20 For # − #%  very small, .∗ > 0 may be inefficient, concerning the costs imposed over the Investors. 
21 Note that, technically, we must have 7G < 2. #% − #	, in order to have a non-empty action band for any type of cabinet. 
20 
 
delay” by “consensus systems”, in the same ‘action band’ that triggers immediate action by the “checks-
and-balances” system22. Note also that .Z∗ > .\∗. 
 Therefore, there is a theoretical correspondence in terms of reaction pattern vis-à-vis the 
shocks, linking single-party-majority Cabinets to Spolaore (2004) “cabinet systems”, coalition Cabinets 
to Spolaore (2004) “consensus systems” and single-party-minority Cabinets to Spolaore (2004) “check-
and-balances systems”.  
 As shown in Figure A5, in Appendix, evidence does not support that this action/inaction 
argument applies to fiscal policy. Accordingly, the model channels this hypothesis through other 
economic policy, measured through ..   
Proceeding with backward induction, Investors will, with probability +, choose K2 according 
to: 
1 − d/∗A	. 1 + .∗	. #4
*3@" − , 	 − .∗78 = ) ⇔ 
⇔
*∗ = ef1 − âIg
1 + .∗	#4
) + , 	 + .∗78h
i
ijk
 
 
Finally, in stage 1 and before the productivity level is known, investors choose K1 according to
23 
1 − d/∗A	. d1 + .∗	. #A4
"3@" − , , l	 − d.∗A. 78 = ) ⇔ 
⇔
"∗ = ef1 − âIg
4. d1 + .∗	#A
) + , 	 + d.∗A78h
i
ijk
 
 
Equilibrium outcome determines the following predictions: 
 
a) 
+m∗â < 0, n ∈ 1,2; due to preference for high g and τ, left cabinets attract less capital, 
leading to lower capital inflow or higher capital outflow between the beginning and the end 
of the stage 1
" − 
	; in particular, if we assume 
 = _a1 − op: ` 3.q">?
∗	<A
r>, 	>q?∗A]st
i
ijk
, the 
election of a right (left) Cabinet will imply 
" − 
 > <	0; 
                                                 
22 Note that the intensity loss in the coalitions’ intervention may be interpreted as time discount for its delay.  
23 Rigorously, the left hand side of the (initial) F.O.C. should be multiplied by 1 − -	; for the purpose of simplicity, this 
term is ignored, given it doesn’t impact the relevant analysis. 
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b) 
+m∗
 ⋚ 0, n ∈ 1,2; the effect of an additional party in cabinet or, more specifically, of 
having a coalition instead a single-party Cabinet is unpredictable. Note that, given single-
party-majority Cabinets  =  = 1	 always adjust completely to negative shocks,  
d1 + .Z∗	#A = v a1 + <=@<< ` #	w$<=@
c
B̂" + v #% 	w$<=<=@cB̂ + v #	w$
>x
<= . 
If = 1 ∧  = 0	,  
dy1 + .\∗|F"∧ F	#z = v {1 + <=@<@
c
B̂< |#w$<=@
c
B̂" + v #w$<=<=@cB̂ + v #	w$
>x
<= . 
For  > 1, 
d1 + .\∗|D"	#A = v {1 + <=@<@
c
B̂<>@"	]^|#	w$<=@
c
B̂" + v #	w$<=<=@cB̂ + v #	w$
>x
<= .  
We can, therefore establish the relation 
d1 + .Z∗	#A > 	dy1 + .\∗|F"∧ F	#z > d1 + .\∗|D"	#A, 
indicating that the numerator of 
"∗ is decreasing in n. But, on the other hand,  
d.Z∗A = } #% − ## 	w$
<=@cB̂
"
+} #% − ## 	w$
<=
<=@cB̂
> } #% − # −
]^
*# w$
<=@cB̂
"
= 
dy.\∗|F"∧ Fz > v <=@<@
c
B̂<>@"	]^ 	w$<=@
c
B̂" = d.\∗|D"A, 
indicating that the denominator of 
"∗ also decreases in n due to the reduction of policy-
volatility cost. Given  

 > 0, the denominator increases in n due to the uncertainty cost, 
confirming the unpredictability of 
+i∗
 . In 
*∗, the unpredictability is even greater, because, 
for # ∈ a#% − ]^* , #%`, .\∗|F"∧ F = .\∗|D" = 0. For each remaining value of #, the 
conclusions extracted for the numerator and denominator of 
"∗ may be extended to 
*∗.  
c) 
+m∗
 ⋚ 0, n ∈ 1,2; the inequalities exposed in (b) show that, from  = 0 to  = 1, it is 
impossible to predict the behavior of either the numerator or the denominator of 
"∗ and 

*∗, because it crucially depends on the value of n. The only clear monotonicity is   > 0. 
d) 
+B∗
< > 0; capital will be attracted/repelled by positive/negative productivity shocks. 
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 The unpredictability with respect to Investors’ reaction to n and p is due to the trade-off 
between the impact of these types (i) on the uncertainty about the Cabinet’s ideology – larger n repels 
capital and larger p attracts it – and (ii) on the efficiency of the reaction to the productivity negative 
shocks – single-party-majority Cabinets may react too frequently if, for # ∈ a#% − ]^* , #%`, the positive 
impact of . > 0 through # is more than compensated by the negative impact through 78 ; single-party-
minority Cabinets and coalition Cabinets may react too infrequently if, otherwise, the net impact of 
. > 0 is positive for # ∈ a#% − ]^* , #%`; finally, single-party-minority Cabinets and, especially, 
coalition cabinets may react with inefficiently low intensity if 
~
? > 0 for # ∈ a1, #% − ]^* ` – the 
particularly low intensity of reaction by coalition cabinets may be interpreted as “action with delay” 
(the lack of intensity being attributed to time discount of delayed actions). In other words, single-party 
and majoritarian cabinets are more prompt in adjusting productivity shocks and induce higher 
certainty around expected policy, but, on the other hand, generate, in consequence, more policy “noise” 
and potential excessive-action inefficiencies. 
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3. Empirical test 
 
In order to test assumptions and predictions of the model, as well as broader interrelations between 
politics, policy and capital flows, four distinct impact channels are assessed: 
A) capital flows’ reaction to electoral outcomes – testing predictions (a)–(d) in Section 2.2;  
B) capital flows’ reaction to the political profile of the cabinet in office, 1998–2008 – testing for 
non-immediate reactions; 
C) impact of cabinet’s political profile on fiscal policy followed, 1998–2008 – testing the 
ideological impacts implied in equilibrium outcomes /∗ = o: and g∗ = o: − RSB+B,,<=	, Section 
2.2; 
D) capital flows’ reaction to fiscal policy, both unconditionally and conditional on the political 
profile of the cabinet in office, 1998–2008. 
 
Note that assessments (B) and (D) outreach the limits of the model, exploring potential spill-overs of 
its assumptions and predictions to the political mandate. The following sections detail the data used 
and the methodology adopted.    
 
3.1.  Data 
 
An innovative political dataset is built by the author, starting from Woldendorp et al (1998) and 
extending the time span (to include the period from mid 90’s to 2008), the set of countries covered (to 
include Portugal, Spain, Greece and USA) and the set of variables (to include dates of elections). Other 
references used in this empirical endeavour are the Political Data Yearbooks (1995-2009) – published 
by the European Journal of Political Research24 –, the Keesing’s Contemporary Archives25, the 
Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS), 1960-200626, and several institutional and research websites27. 
The data in Woldendorp et al (1998) was in “cabinet-wise” format – each observation was a cabinet – 
                                                 
24 See EJPR Vol. 48, no. 7-8 (2009), Vol. 47, no. 7-8 (2008) and Vol. 46, no. 7-8 (2007) for examples. 
25 www.keesings.com 
26 See Armingeon et al (2008). 
27 Examples are the US House of Representatives (Office of the Clerk), US Senate (archives), Parties and elections in 
Europe (www.parties-and-elections.de), Zaraté’s Political Collections. 
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and is transformed into daily format, using the stock markets business days from Datastream, 
aggregating it afterwards into yearly format, in order to match the capital flows data.  
 The political dataset covers the period 1960-2008 for 23 OECD democracies – Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg,  Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK 
and USA –, characterizing, namely: cabinet  party’s/parties’ ideology, cabinet party composition, 
cabinet parliamentary support, prime minister identification, cabinet duration, reason for cabinet 
termination, day of new cabinet ‘office taking’, election days. The underlying specific variables 
characterize, in the daily format, the status quo or the transition occurred in each day, for each 
country. With the yearly aggregation, many ways of transforming the data were pursued. In order to 
perform the empirical test to the model, two types of political variables are used:  
 
(i) state variables, reporting the ‘dominant political profile in office’ in each country/year, 
measured through the number of days in office; these variables also characterize the 
‘dominant’ cabinet with respect to ideology – left, center, right (e.g. rightmode= 0 if the 
ideology most days ‘in office’ in a given country/year was not right-leaning)28 –, 
parliamentary support – majority/minority (e.g. majoritymode= 1 if the cabinet support most 
days ‘in office’ in a given country/year was majoritarian, majoritymode= 0 otherwise)
29 – and 
(quantitative) party composition – coalition/single-party (e.g. coalitionmode= 0 if the cabinet 
composition most days ‘in office’ in a given country/year was single-party). Note that the 
‘dominant profile’ need not have been possessed by the same cabinet, but by several distinct 
cabinets sharing one or more characteristics30. 
(ii) transition variables, reporting transitions occurred in years with election(s) and/or cabinet 
change(s) due to other reasons31; these variables discriminate between transitions occurred 
                                                 
28 In the case of the U.S.A., cabinet ideology fluctuates between center, for Democrat administrations, and right, for 
Republican administrations. 
29 In the case of the U.S.A., parliamentary support is classified through the composition of the Congress; in case of 
divergence between the status of the two chambers, the composition of the House of Representatives is used.   
30 Although it is possible to ensure the dominance by one exact cabinet by selecting country/year observations with a 
maximum of one change/election. 
31 Several events may occur in each year; for the country/year pairs with more than one event, all transitions occurred are 
reported. 
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in an election day and those occurred in an ‘office taking’ day – named as change day from 
now on –, even if the change was due to an election32. They characterize cabinet transition 
in terms of ideology (e.g. left-rightelection = 1 if there was one election in a given country/year 
giving origin to a transition from a left leaning cabinet to a right leaning one), 
parliamentary support (e.g. majority-nmajorityelection = 1 if there was one election in a given 
country/year giving origin to a transition from a majoritarian cabinet to a minoritarian 
one) and (quantitative) party composition (e.g. ncoalition-coalitionchange = 1 if there was a 
coalition cabinet taking office from a single-party one, in a given country/year). 
 
Ideological classification follows the criteria observed by the data sources mentioned above. The 
CPDS, in particular, cites Schmidt and Beyer (1992) and Schmidt (1996) as source of the party 
ideological classification criteria producing the cabinet ideological labeling33. Left denotes social 
democratic parties and political parties left of social democracy, right denotes liberal and conservative 
parties and center denotes center parties, in particular Christian Democratic or Catholic parties.  
Data on capital flows and controls – per capita real GDP growth and inflation rate – is 
extracted from the World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance database (World 
Bank Group). Capital flows used are:  
 
(i) FDI (net) inflows, flows of long-term-oriented investment in the domestic economy by 
foreign investors, net of disinvestment (original source is the International Monetary 
Fund, Balance of Payments (BoP) database, supplemented by data from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development and official national sources); 
(ii) FDI (net) outflows, flows of long-term-oriented investment in foreign economies by 
domestic investors, net of disinvestment (original sources are the International Monetary 
                                                 
32 In a country/year pair with one election and respective change, the same transition is reported by two variables – one 
devoted to elections and other to changes. The distinction is particularly relevant, for instance, in the cases of changes not 
due to elections and elections to which the respective change occurs in the following year. 
33 Other sources are mentioned in the CPDS and in Woldendorp et al (1998): Schmidt and Beyer (1992), Ismayr (2003), 
European Journal of Political Research, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, People in Power (http://www.circa-
uk.demon.co.uk/pip.html) and the Parline database (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp). Where all these 
criteria couldn’t help, the authors assigned the classifications by themselves. 
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Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, World Bank, 
Global Development Finance, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates); 
(iii)  FDI net flows, which consist of FDI (net) inflows subtracted of FDI (net) outflows 
(original source is the International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook and data files); positive (negative) sign denotes net capital entry (exit) in the 
domestic economy; 
(iv) Equity net inflows, net inflows of investment in domestic equity securities other than those 
recorded as FDI, by foreign investors (original sources are the International Monetary 
Fund, Balance of Payments database, and World Bank, Global Development Finance); 
(v) Capital account net flow, net balance of the Balance of Payments Capital and Financial 
Account (original source is the International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Statistics Yearbook and data files); positive (negative) sign represents net entry (exit) of 
capital in the domestic economy. 
 
All the capital flows series used are measured in percentage of domestic nominal GDP. Fiscal policy is 
measured through the following variables: 
 
(i) Corporate Tax Rate, in percentage points (OECD Tax Database, Corporate and Capital 
income taxes, basic (non-targeted) corporate income tax rates)34;  
(ii) Public Expenses in percentage of domestic nominal GDP, in percentage points – expp in 
regressions tables – (OECD Economic Outlook No. 86, December 2009);  
(iii) Public Revenue in percentage of domestic nominal GDP, in percentage points – revp in 
regressions tables – (OECD Economic Outlook No. 86, December 2009);  
(iv) Public Budget Balance in percentage of domestic nominal GDP, in percentage points – 
balp in regressions tables – (OECD Economic Outlook No. 86, December 2009); this 
variable represents Government Net Lending and corresponds to the subtraction of Public 
Expenses to Public Revenue (balp = revp – expp); positive (negative) sign denotes budget 
surplus (deficit);   
                                                 
34 Data available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxpolicyanalysis/oecdtaxdatabase.htm#C_CorporateCaptial. 
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(v) Public Gross Debt in percentage of domestic nominal GDP, in percentage points – debtp in 
regressions tables – (OECD Economic Outlook No. 86, December 2009).  
 
Control variables used are: 
 
(i) Real per capita GDP growth, annual growth rate of the gross domestic product in constant 
2000 US dollars, divided by midyear population (original source are the World Bank 
national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files); 
(ii) Inflation rate, annual percentage change of the Consumer Price Index (original source is 
the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data files). 
(iii) Unemployment rate, in percentage points, first difference – dunempp in regressions tables – 
(OECD Economic Outlook No. 86, December 2009)  
(iv) Short-term interest rate, in percentage points, first difference – dsinterestp in regressions 
tables – (OECD Economic Outlook No. 86, December 2009)  
(v) Productivity growth, in percentage points; annual percentage growth of real GDP per 
employed person – dproductivityp in regressions tables – (OECD Economic Outlook No. 86, 
Dec. 2009)  
(vi) Trade over domestic nominal GDP ([exports+imports]/GDP), in percentage points – tradep 
in regressions tables – (original source are the World Bank national accounts data, and 
OECD National Accounts data files)  
(vii) BoP Current Account Balance over domestic nominal GDP, in percentage points – curr-
accp in regressions tables – (OECD Economic Outlook No. 86, December 2009)  
(viii) Exchange rate appreciation/depreciation, in percentage points; percentage growth of the 
amount of local currency units per U.S. dollar; amount of dollars per Deutsche Mark, for 
the USA – Eurozone currencies were retrospectively converted to Euros for the entire 
sample, using the adhesion conversion rates – (original source are the World Bank 
national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files; Euro conversion rates 
from the European Central Bank)  
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See Table A1 and Table A2, in Appendix, for specific description and summary statistics of 
each variable used (respectively).  
 
 
3.2.  Methodology 
 
This section details the methodology followed to test each of the impact channels exposed at the 
beginning of Section 3. In all regressions, fixed and random effects are successively used. Time 
dummies are included in all specifications, in order to filter trends over time and abnormal spikes 
specific to some years – see Figure A8 in Appendix. 
 
A) Capital flows’ reaction to electoral outcomes 
 
The sample is restricted to years with no election following a year with one election only. Mid-term 
elections in the U.S.A. are not considered35, nor are elections involving incumbent or elected caretaker 
cabinets36.  
Capital flows are regressed on the last period’s transition variables, following the specification: 
 
,B =  +  + B + 4. n ∙ n	,i + 4\ . n ∙ n)	,i + 4r . n ∙ )ℎn	,i + 
+4\ . n) ∙ n	,i + 4\r. n) ∙ )ℎn	,i + 4r . )ℎn ∙ n	,i + 
+4r\ . )ℎn ∙ n)	,i + 4rr. )ℎn ∙ )ℎn	,i + .  ∙ 	,i + 
+.  ∙ 	,i +  .  ∙ 	,i + \\ .  ∙ 	,i + \.  ∙ 	,i + 
+\ .  ∙ 	,i + . ,B +  . ,B + 7,B, 
 
where: t1 represents the election year and t2 the following year; ,B  represents a specific capital flow 
(FDI, equity, or capital account) divided by nominal GDP, for country i, in period t2;  and B  
represent the country-effect and the time dummy, respectively; ,B  and ,B  represent, respectively, 
                                                 
35 U.S.A. mid-term elections aim at selecting part of the Congress members, but not the President or his/her cabinet. 
Therefore, these elections may lead to changes in cabinet’s parliamentary support, but not in its ideology (center/right) or in 
the number of parties in cabinet (always one).  
36 Such cabinets are often not associated to specific ideologies or parties and may assume a technocratic stance, often with 
the specific goal of overcoming economic or political crises. Examples of caretaker cabinets are those headed by Prime-
minister Dini in Itlay, 1995–1996.  
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real per capita GDP growth and CPI inflation rate for country i, in period t2, and the remaining 
variables stand for the political transition dummies referring to the election(s) occurred in country i, 
in period t1. Note that, from now on, indices denoting the type of event (election/change) the transitions 
refer to will be dropped, given the analysis shall focus only on elections. Center-center, nmaj-nmaj and 
ncoal-ncoal are left out in the ‘complete specification’, in order to avoid replicating the constant term. 
Capital flows are also regressed on the same period’s state variables (characterizing the elected 
cabinet37), following the specification: 
 
,B =  +  + B + 4 . n	,B + 4r . )ℎn	,B + . 	,B +	\ . 	,B+. ,B + . ,B + 7,B , 
 
where the political variables represent now the political state dummies characterizing the ‘dominant’ 
political profile in country i, in period t2. ‘Mode’ indices will also be dropped from now on for these 
variables. Center cabinets are left out, in order to avoid replicating the constant term. 
A final alternative specification is implemented, using interactions of the political state 
variables across the three political dimensions – ideology, parliamentary support and party 
composition (e.g. left-nmaj-coal = 1 denotes that the cabinet most days in office was a left-leaning 
minoritarian coalition). Such approach follows the specification: 
 
,B =  +  y4.  ∙  ∙ 	,Bz∈n,)ℎn∈,∈,
+. ,B + . ,B + 7,n, 
 
where the political variables  ∙  ∙ 	, represent the interacted state dummies – ideology, support and 
composition – characterizing the ‘dominant’ political profile in country i, period t2. Center-maj-ncoal 
and center-nmaj-ncoal are left out, in order to avoid replicating the constant term. 
Note that, differently from the model, the impact of productivity shocks on flows is assessed 
contemporaneously to the impact of political news. Both for transition and state variables, several ‘sub-
specifications’ are attempted, containing only subsets of the explanatory political variables exposed. 
                                                 
37 Absence of elections in t2 is imposed with the purpose of capturing the profile of the elected cabinet through the 
‘dominant’ state political variables.  
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Two distinct robustness tests are performed to all specifications above: (1) the additional control 
variables described in Section 3.1 – unemployment, short-term interest, productivity growth, trade, 
current account and exchange rate – are added to the specification; (2) years with 2 elections (or, more 
precisely, the years following them) are included in the analysis, political transition variables are 
redefined in order to report the transition occurred between the beginning and the end of the electoral 
year (instead of reporting each transition occurred in each election) and, for years with election(s) 
occurring only in the period January–March, the capital flows, control variables and political state 
variables used in the regressions respect to the electoral year, t1 (instead of those from the subsequent 
year, t2)
38. 
 
B) Capital flows’ reaction to the political profile of the cabinet in office, 1998–2008  
 
In order to capture clearer reactions, this analysis focus on the sample period during which 
capital flows become distinctively more active within the OECD – see Figures 1–4.  
All years in 1998–2008 are considered and each year’s capital flows are regressed on the same 
period’s political state variables, following the specification: 
, =  +  + B + 4 . n	, +4r . )ℎn	, +. 	, + \. 	,+. , + . , + 7, , 
where the political variables represent the political state dummies characterizing the ‘dominant’ 
political profile in country i, in period t. Center cabinets are left out, in order to avoid replicating the 
constant term. 
Capital flows are also regressed on the interactions of the political state variables across the 
three political dimensions, using the specification: 
, =  +  y4Z\.  ∙  ∙ 	,z
∈%,rZ∈o,o\∈\o,\o
+. , + . , + 7, , 
                                                 
38 In the sample used, there are 328 years with at least one election; in 3 of those years, 2 elections occurred (in the same 
year). With the redefinition of the political transition variables, years with two elections hold only one transition per 
political dimension (ideology, parliamentary support and party composition) – the one resulting from the direct comparison 
of the cabinets in office in the beginning and in the end of the year. Using the original definition for the transition 
variables, each of these years would have several transitions reported in each political dimension – see the maximum value 
of righ-right in Table A2 (Appendix) for an example. 
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where the political variables  ∙  ∙ 	, represent the interacted state dummies – on ideology, support 
and composition – characterizing the ‘dominant’ political profile in country i, period t. Center-maj-
ncoal and center-nmaj-ncoal are left out, in order to avoid replicating the constant term. 
Similarly to (A), ‘sub-specifications’ containing subsets of political regressors are run, and the 
additional control variables described in Section 3.1 – unemployment, short-term interest, productivity 
growth, trade, current account and exchange rate – are added to each specification.  
 
C) Impact of cabinet’s political profile on fiscal policy followed, 1998–2008  
 
In order to ensure comparability and consistency, this analysis focus on the same period as (B), 
testing the existence of distinct fiscal policy patterns associated to specific political traits; the 
specification used is: 
, =  +  + B + 4 . n	, + 4r. )ℎn	, + . 	, + \ . 	,+. , + . , + 7, ,  
and 
, =  +  y4Z\.  ∙  ∙ 	,z
∈%,rZ∈o,o\∈\o,\o
+. , + . , + 7, , 
 
where , represents a specific fiscal policy measure (corporate tax rate, public expenses, public 
revenue, or public budget balance39), for country i, in period t. Center, center-maj-ncoal and center-
nmaj-ncoal cabinets are left out, in order to avoid replicating the constant term. Similarly to (A) and 
(B), ‘sub-specifications’ containing subsets of political regressors are run. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Public debt is not assessed at this instance. 
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D) Capital flows’ reaction to fiscal policy, both unconditionally and conditional on the political 
profile of the cabinet in office, 1998–2008 
 
This represents an indirect potential impact channel: the political profile of the cabinet in 
office may influence the way capital flows react to its fiscal policy, by inducing expectations over 
future policy. This hypothesis is tested through the specifications: 
, =  +  + B+. , + . , + 
+  y4 . , + 4  .  × n	, + 4 r .  × )ℎn	, +  .  × 	, +  \ .  × 	,z
 ∈\o,% ,r%,%:
+ 7, , 
and 
, =  +  + B + 4:o . I, + 4:o . I × n	, + 4:or . I × )ℎn	, + 
+:o. I × 	, + :o\ . I × 	,+. , + . , + 7, . 
Budget balance is isolated in a distinct specification, in order to avoid the multi-colinearity with 
revenues and expenses. Center cabinets are left out, in order to avoid replicating the fiscal policy 
measure. For both regressions above, ‘sub-specifications’ are run, restricting the set of regressions only 
to the fiscal policy measure(s) isolated from political variables and, additionally, in the case of the first 
specification, addressing one fiscal policy at a time (either isolated or interacted with the political 
variables). 
 
 
3.3.  Results 
 
This section presents and discusses the results from the empirical test to impact channels (A)–(D), 
focusing on the results attained using fixed effects (FE), given that this technique always produces 
consistent estimators, even when not the most efficient. Moreover, the use of fixed effects implies the 
possibility of arbitrary correlation between the unobserved country-specific effects and the observed 
political/control variables. Such hypothesis seems plausible, given the homogeneous cabinets’ political 
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profile in some countries40, and implies, namely, that the country-specific constant term (representing 
a 1960-2008 country-specific average capital flow) may be correlated with the country-specific 1960-
2008 profile in terms of growth, inflation, politics, fiscal policy... This would mean that investors take 
into account a country’s macroeconomic/political track record or structural profile, when considering 
investing in its economy. 
Only the significant results holding under the robustness tests detailed in Section 3.2 and under 
error clustering41 are reported, highlighted and discussed. In case a given coefficient assumes different 
(rounded) values across regressions and unless otherwise stated, the coefficient from the most complete 
specification is used for discussion.  
 
A) Capital flows’ reaction to electoral outcomes.  
 
Tables 1–4 report the significant and robust results from this empirical test. Tables A5–A8 (Appendix) 
report the results of those same specifications, under the robustness test (2) described in Section 3.2.A. – 
redefining political transitions and considering contemporaneous flows for elections held in January–
March. Only FDI and equity flows show significant and robust reaction to some electoral outcomes.  
Table 1 shows that FDI flows react negatively to elections from which majority cabinets are 
formed: net flows are lower in about 1.5 GDP percentage points (p.p.), when compared to years after 
elections of minoritarian cabinets. Table 2 shows that this impact originates exclusively from elections 
in which the cabinet majoritarian status is maintained42. The renewal of the majoritarian status is 
associated with lower FDI net flows in 1.8 GDP (p.p.), when compared to any other electoral result – 
an impact representing more than 50% of the standard deviation of FDI net flows in years after 
elections43.  
Regarding prediction (c) in the end of Section 2.2, this performance by FDI implies the 
negative derivative 
+m∗  RF" < 0,	where  denotes the majoritarian status of the incumbent cabinet 
                                                 
40 Note that some countries are very close to the political axes’ extremes in Figures 8–12, indicating very homogeneous 
political profiles. A clear example is Canada, for which right = 1 in all years in sample.   
41 Variance estimation technique preventing the hypothesis of error correlation within sub-sample groups (“clusters”). In 
this study, countries are considered the potential clusters. 
42 Note that this does not imply the maintenance of the exact same cabinet. 
43 See Table A3 (Appendix), summary statistics excluding Luxembourg, for non-election years following years with 
election(s). 
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before the election. Such evidence supports that, after exposure to a majoritarian government, 
inefficiently excessive action by this type of cabinets dominates over the higher certainty around their 
expected ideology.  
Table 3 reveals that, contrary to FDI, equity inflows react positively to the election of 
majoritarian cabinets (regardless of incumbent’s type), in 0.9 GDP p.p. – about 50% of these flows’ 
standard deviation in years after elections44. 
Regarding the same model prediction, this evidence supports 
+m∗ > 0. Such an opposite 
behaviour by FDI and equity flows is consistent with their distinct purposes: contrary to equity, FDI 
has a long-term lasting management interest in an enterprise located at the destination economy45, 
being, thus, more sensitive to context volatility – harmful to business stability – implied in excessive 
action by the cabinet; more focused in the short-term and more indifferent to business environment, 
equity flows react positively to more active cabinets, more committed to neutralize shocks to 
productivity – and, thus, to stock returns.  
On the other hand, Table 4 shows that equity flows react negatively to electoral transitions from 
right to center cabinets, partially supporting the negative derivative in model prediction (a), Section 
2.2: 
+m∗â oRF	∧	â∈,op < 0. This impact reaches a magnitude of 4.7 GDP p.p., equivalent to more than 
2.5 standard deviations of equity inflows in years after elections46.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 See Table A3 (Appendix), summary statistics excluding Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland, for non-election years 
following years with election(s). 
45 See Section 3.1 and Table A1 (Appendix) for definitions.  
46 See Table A3 (Appendix), summary statistics excluding Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland, for non-election years 
following years with election(s). 
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Table 1. FDI net flows after elections and political profile variables characterizing the elected 
cabinet 
Dependent variable: FDI net flows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), in years without any 
election, following a year with election(s) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
variables 
 FE, maj, 
excl. Lux 
FE, maj, 
excl. Lux 
FE, coal, 
excl. Lux 
FE, coal, 
excl. Lux 
FE, all 
excl. Lux 
FE, all 
excl. Lux 
        
real per capita GDP 
growth 
 0.025 0.416 0.026 0.401 0.073 0.373 
 (0.238) (0.461) (0.241) (0.456) (0.235) (0.454) 
inflation (CPI)  0.013 0.205 0.013 0.211 0.004 0.164 
 (0.098) (0.163) (0.100) (0.164) (0.098) (0.159) 
dunempp   0.053  0.037  -0.042 
   (0.587)  (0.589)  (0.584) 
dsinterestp   -0.394*  -0.400*  -0.398* 
   (0.213)  (0.216)  (0.214) 
dproductivityp   -0.232  -0.227  -0.201 
   (0.396)  (0.396)  (0.393) 
tradep   0.054  0.053  0.055 
   (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
curr-accp   -0.405**  -0.407**  -0.393** 
   (0.176)  (0.177)  (0.170) 
dexchangep   0.155  0.156  0.154* 
   (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.093) 
left      -1.937 -1.265 
      (1.958) (1.288) 
right      -2.442 -1.692 
      (2.149) (1.275) 
majority  -1.476** -1.551* -1.482** -1.479* -1.498* -1.519* 
  (0.706) (0.853) (0.741) (0.860) (0.766) (0.889) 
coalition    0.025 -0.346 0.034 -0.366 
    (0.676) (0.770) (0.903) (0.951) 
Constant  -0.473 -6.258 -0.486 -1.725 4.629 0.353 
  (2.271) (4.043) (2.246) (3.327) (3.183) (3.844) 
        
Observations  199 182 199 182 199 182 
R-squared  0.094 0.320 0.094 0.320 0.128 0.335 
Number of countries  22 22 22 22 22 22 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level. *** 
Significant at 1% level. All political variables refer to the cabinet’s political profile most frequent in 
the year of the capital flow. Control variables always refer to the year of the capital flow. All 
regressions performed using fixed effects and robust variance estimates. Center left out to avoid 
multi-colinearity with constant. All controls are measured in percentage points. Luxembourg 
excluded due to outlying status – see Table A2 (Appendix). All the significant coefficients shaded 
are robust to error clustering by countries.  
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Table 2. FDI net flows after elections and political transition variables reflecting electoral outcome from each election 
Dependent variable: FDI net flows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), in years without any election, following a 
year with election(s) 
Independent 
variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE, str&comp, excl. Lux FE, str&comp, excl. Lux FE, all, excl. Lux FE, all, excl. Lux 
real per capita GDP 
growth 
 0.047 0.322 0.126 0.381 
 (0.240) (0.436) (0.249) (0.474) 
inflation (CPI)  -0.003 0.234 -0.029 0.120 
 (0.106) (0.163) (0.115) (0.180) 
dunempp   -0.295  -0.186 
   (0.632)  (0.634) 
dsinterestp   -0.528**  -0.587** 
   (0.257)  (0.265) 
dproductivityp   -0.094  -0.127 
   (0.416)  (0.416) 
tradep   0.059  0.067* 
   (0.036)  (0.038) 
curr-accp   -0.426**  -0.442*** 
   (0.176)  (0.152) 
dexchangep   0.176*  0.165* 
   (0.102)  (0.088) 
left-left    -0.980 -1.210 
    (1.429) (1.571) 
left-center    -1.120 0.061 
    (2.023) (1.844) 
left-right    -1.837 -1.923 
    (1.411) (2.082) 
center-left    -0.931 -0.251 
    (1.714) (2.195) 
center-right    -0.684 1.743 
    (2.250) (1.548) 
right-left    -1.689 -0.286 
    (1.611) (1.801) 
right-center    4.730 5.101* 
    (3.680) (2.580) 
right-right    -1.487 -1.188 
    (1.437) (1.406) 
maj-maj  -1.961** -1.702* -1.904** -1.846* 
  (0.798) (0.917) (0.878) (0.943) 
maj-nmaj  -0.624 0.022 -0.939 -0.947 
  (0.814) (1.327) (1.020) (1.308) 
nmaj-maj  -0.676 0.392 -0.837 -0.484 
  (0.870) (0.978) (1.049) (0.978) 
coal-coal  0.031 -1.009 -0.496 -1.946 
  (0.871) (1.078) (1.210) (1.448) 
coal-ncoal  -0.605 -1.281 -0.517 -2.183 
  (1.154) (1.502) (1.227) (1.774) 
ncoal-coal  -0.124 0.207 0.053 -0.212 
  (1.037) (1.101) (1.296) (1.219) 
Constant  -0.660 -4.190 2.660 -6.621 
  (2.588) (3.641) (3.438) (4.319) 
Observations  199 182 199 182 
R-squared  0.100 0.351 0.198 0.429 
Number of countries  22 22 22 22 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% 
level. All political variables refer to each election-driven transition occurred in the election of the year (t–1) preceding 
the year of the capital flow (t). Control variables always refer to the year of the capital flow. All regressions performed 
using fixed effects and robust variance estimates. Center-center, nmaj-nmaj and ncoal-ncoal left out to avoid multi-
colinearity with constant. All controls are measured in percentage points. Luxembourg excluded due to outlying status – 
see Table A2 (Appendix). All the significant coefficients shaded are robust to error clustering by countries. 
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 Table 3. Equity inflows after elections and political variables characterizing the elected cabinet 
Dependent variable: Equity inflows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), in years without 
any election, following a year with election(s) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
variables 
 FE, maj, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, maj, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, coal, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, coal, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, all 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, all 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
real per capita 
GDP growth 
 0.073 0.154 0.080 0.182 0.065 0.172 
 (0.091) (0.201) (0.087) (0.206) (0.085) (0.215) 
inflation (CPI)  0.029 -0.062 0.028 -0.069 0.030 -0.061 
 (0.036) (0.065) (0.037) (0.066) (0.037) (0.064) 
dunempp   0.321  0.357  0.347 
   (0.321)  (0.334)  (0.346) 
dsinterestp   0.113  0.119  0.123 
   (0.072)  (0.074)  (0.075) 
dproductivityp   -0.109  -0.125  -0.127 
   (0.172)  (0.177)  (0.182) 
tradep   -0.034  -0.030  -0.034 
   (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.035) 
curr-accp   0.143**  0.141*  0.139* 
   (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.072) 
dexchangep   -0.053  -0.055*  -0.054* 
   (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.031) 
left      0.567 0.043 
      (0.880) (0.729) 
right      0.759 0.390 
      (0.841) (0.617) 
majority  0.849** 1.016** 0.804** 0.928** 0.783** 0.893** 
  (0.366) (0.432) (0.359) (0.418) (0.349) (0.406) 
coalition    0.193 0.517 0.155 0.349 
    (0.365) (0.447) (0.481) (0.564) 
Constant  -1.443 -0.046 -1.113 -0.029 -1.313 -0.097 
  (0.892) (1.896) (0.748) (1.887) (1.355) (2.218) 
Observations  179 167 179 167 179 167 
R-squared  0.256 0.372 0.257 0.377 0.268 0.382 
N. of countries  20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. All political variables refer to the cabinet’s political profile most 
frequent in the year of the capital flow. Control variables always refer to the year of the capital 
flow. All regressions performed using fixed effects and robust variance estimates. Center left out to 
avoid multi-colinearity with constant. All controls are measured in percentage points. 
Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland excluded due to outlying status – see Figure A6 (Appendix). 
All the significant coefficients shaded are robust to error clustering by countries.  
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Table 4. Equity inflows after elections and political transition variables reflecting electoral outcome from each election 
Dependent variable: Equity inflows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), in years without any election, following a 
year with election(s) 
Independent 
variables 
 (1) FE, ideol, excl.Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
(2) FE, ideol, excl. 
Lux, Bel & Ire 
(3) FE, all, excl. 
Lux,Bel & Ire 
(4) FE, all, excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
real per capita GDP 
growth 
 0.048 0.116 0.068 0.149 
 (0.097) (0.211) (0.096) (0.227) 
inflation (CPI)  0.037 0.015 0.041 0.009 
 (0.039) (0.078) (0.041) (0.077) 
dunempp   0.113  0.247 
   (0.318)  (0.337) 
dsinterestp   0.181**  0.199** 
   (0.082)  (0.096) 
dproductivityp   -0.026  -0.041 
   (0.177)  (0.187) 
tradep   -0.054*  -0.058* 
   (0.030)  (0.034) 
curr-accp   0.160**  0.163** 
   (0.066)  (0.063) 
dexchangep   -0.042  -0.049* 
   (0.028)  (0.029) 
left-left  -1.144 -1.453 -0.626 -0.798 
  (0.841) (0.938) (0.835) (1.023) 
left-center  -1.143 -1.251 -0.669 -0.670 
  (1.172) (1.110) (1.118) (1.215) 
left-right  0.182 0.527 0.592 1.057 
  (0.801) (0.932) (0.811) (1.104) 
center-left  -0.372 -0.535 -0.332 -0.275 
  (0.879) (1.424) (1.035) (1.544) 
center-right  -1.069 -2.083** -1.297 -2.347** 
  (0.961) (1.015) (1.008) (0.981) 
right-left  -0.463 -0.897 -0.243 -0.641 
  (0.915) (0.990) (0.895) (0.974) 
right-center  -4.013** -4.510** -4.220** -4.673*** 
  (1.917) (1.859) (1.914) (1.740) 
right-right  -0.943 -1.076 -0.900 -0.892 
  (0.865) (0.964) (0.878) (1.032) 
maj-maj    0.978** 1.169* 
    (0.491) (0.597) 
maj-nmaj    1.059 1.177 
    (0.658) (0.800) 
nmaj-maj    0.770 0.638 
    (0.472) (0.514) 
coal-coal    0.773 1.000 
    (0.564) (0.699) 
coal-ncoal    0.280 0.678 
    (0.702) (0.956) 
ncoal-coal    0.055 0.171 
    (0.590) (0.651) 
Constant  1.232 1.403 0.223 4.062 
  (1.067) (1.953) (1.055) (2.558) 
Observations  179 167 179 167 
R-squared  0.378 0.502 0.411 0.546 
Number of countries  20 20 20 20 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
All political variables refer to each election-driven transition occurred in the election of the year (t–1) preceding the year of 
the capital flow (t). Control variables always refer to the year of the capital flow. All regressions performed using fixed 
effects and robust variance estimates. Center-center, nmaj-nmaj and ncoal-ncoal left out to avoid multi-colinearity with 
constant. All controls are measured in percentage points. Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland excluded due to outlying status 
– see Figure A6 (Appendix). All the significant coefficients shaded are robust to error clustering by countries. 
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B) Capital flows’ reaction to the political profile of the cabinet in office, 1998–2008. 
 
This empirical test searches for non-immediate reactions by capital flows to the political profile of 
elected cabinets. More specifically, it tests the existence of capital reactions during cabinets’ mandates. 
The same model hypotheses and predictions hold, except now they are assumed to apply on a 
continuous fashion, instead of around a discrete event.  Only equity and capital account net balance 
show significant and robust reactions to some cabinet profiles; Tables 5–7 report the results. 
Table 5 shows that equity inflows react positively to right-leaning cabinets; during these 
cabinets’ mandates, equity inflows are higher in 1.4 GDP p.p., when compared to any other cabinet’s 
mandates. Table 7 shows that the only robust source of this impact are single-party right-leaning 
majoritarian cabinets, which are associated to higher equity flows in 1.6 GDP p.p. – impact equivalent 
to about 65% of the equity flows standard deviation during the decade under analysis47.  
This evidence supports model prediction (a) in Section 2.2, conditional on a context of low 
uncertainty around cabinet ideology and minimum negotiation costs preventing the cabinet from 
reacting to productivity shocks: 
+m∗â  F"	∧	F" < 0. The preference for cabinets (hypothetically) 
associated to lower taxes is, thus, expressed only in the context of low barriers to action and less 
uncertainty around the link between ideology and fiscal policy pursued. 
Capital account net flows show a positive reaction to coalition cabinets in 0.3 GDP p.p. – Table 
6 –, specifically associated to right-leaning minoritarian coalitions (0.7 GDP p.p.), left-leaning 
minoritarian coalitions (0.6 GDP p.p.) and left-leaning majoritarian coalitions (0.5 GDP p.p.) – Table 
7. These impacts compare with a standard deviation of 0.7 GDP p.p. by capital account net flows in 
1998–200848.  
Such performance by the capital account partially supports a positive derivative in model 
prediction (b): 
+m∗ â∈,op> ∨ F > 0, for some ¡ ≥ 0. The order of preference within coalitions 
suggests also: 

 a+m
∗
 ` < 0. 
 
 
                                                 
47 See Table A3 (Appendix), summary statistics excluding Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland, for all years in 1998–2008. In 
this paragraph, the regressions coefficients chosen for discussion are those from the less complete regressions, due to the 
lack of significance by the potential additional regressors. 
48 See Table A3 (Appendix), summary statistics excluding Luxembourg, for all years in 1998–2008. In this paragraph, the 
regressions coefficients chosen for discussion are those from the less complete regressions, due to the lack of significance by 
the potential additional regressors. 
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Table 5. Equity inflows and political profile variables characterizing the cabinet most days in 
office, 1998–2008 
Dependent variable: Equity inflows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), yearly 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
variables 
 FE, right, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, right, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, ideol, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, ideol, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, all, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, all, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
real per capita 
GDP growth 
 0.098 0.256 0.112 0.234 0.133 0.276 
 (0.134) (0.314) (0.133) (0.313) (0.129) (0.317) 
inflation (CPI)  -0.310 -0.199 -0.274 -0.171 -0.277 -0.116 
 (0.405) (0.334) (0.399) (0.332) (0.401) (0.336) 
dunempp   0.213  0.158  0.160 
   (0.459)  (0.458)  (0.469) 
dsinterestp   -0.032  -0.023  -0.138 
   (0.184)  (0.183)  (0.198) 
dproductivityp   -0.093  -0.077  -0.027 
   (0.330)  (0.326)  (0.337) 
tradep   -0.024  -0.019  -0.030 
   (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.044) 
curr-accp   0.011  0.003  -0.004 
   (0.104)  (0.105)  (0.107) 
dexchangep   -0.027  -0.031  -0.038 
   (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
left    0.618 0.615 0.918 0.852 
    (0.813) (0.857) (0.845) (0.890) 
right  1.402*** 1.431*** 1.805** 1.827** 1.717* 1.668* 
  (0.448) (0.465) (0.852) (0.891) (0.873) (0.912) 
majority      0.560 0.909* 
      (0.426) (0.546) 
coalition      0.927 0.858 
      (0.706) (0.735) 
Constant  1.218 4.300 0.774 3.415 -0.198 3.045 
  (0.803) (3.259) (0.965) (3.364) (1.033) (3.442) 
Observations  214 214 214 214 214 214 
R-squared  0.178 0.187 0.181 0.189 0.192 0.206 
Number of 
countries 
 
20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% 
level. *** Significant at 1% level. All political variables refer to the cabinet’s political profile 
most frequent in the year of the capital flow. Control variables always refer to the year of the 
capital flow. All regressions performed using fixed effects and robust variance estimates. 
Center left out to avoid multi-colinearity with constant. All controls are measured in 
percentage points. Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland excluded due to outlying status – see 
Figure A6 (Appendix). All the significant coefficients shaded are robust to error clustering by 
countries. 
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Table 6. Capital account net flows and political profile variables characterizing 
the cabinet most days in office, 1998–2008 
Dependent variable: Capital account net flows, in percentage of GDP (percentage 
points), yearly 
  (1) (1) (3) (4) 
Independent 
variables 
 FE, coal, 
excl. Lux 
FE, coal, 
excl. Lux 
FE, all, excl. 
Lux 
FE, all, excl. 
Lux 
real per capita 
GDP growth 
 0.048** 0.025 0.046** 0.021 
 (0.023) (0.039) (0.022) (0.039) 
inflation (CPI)  -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.033) 
dunempp   -0.076  -0.074 
   (0.053)  (0.055) 
dsinterestp   -0.039  -0.028 
   (0.029)  (0.032) 
dproductivityp   -0.003  -0.004 
   (0.033)  (0.034) 
tradep   0.003  0.004 
   (0.004)  (0.004) 
curr-accp   -0.002  -0.002 
   (0.009)  (0.009) 
dexchangep   0.001  0.002 
   (0.003)  (0.003) 
left    0.032 0.051 
    (0.093) (0.096) 
right    0.041 0.039 
    (0.082) (0.083) 
majority    -0.100 -0.094 
    (0.067) (0.072) 
coalition  0.253*** 0.232** 0.293*** 0.275*** 
  (0.086) (0.090) (0.094) (0.100) 
Constant  0.022 -0.375 0.034 -0.350 
  (0.140) (0.386) (0.154) (0.330) 
Observations  235 235 235 235 
R-squared  0.099 0.119 0.104 0.124 
N. of countries  22 22 22 22 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** 
Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. All political variables refer to 
the cabinet’s political profile most frequent in the year of the capital flow. 
Control variables always refer to the year of the capital flow. All regressions 
performed using fixed effects and robust variance estimates. Center left out to 
avoid multi-colinearity with constant. All controls are measured in percentage 
points. Luxembourg excluded due to outlying status – see Figure A7 (Appendix). 
All the significant coefficients shaded are robust to error clustering by countries. 
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Table 7. Capital flows and political profile variables characterizing the cabinet most days in office, ideology-strength-
composition interactions, 1998–2008 
  Dependent variable, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), yearly 
  Equity inflows  Capital account net flows 
Independent variables 
 (1) FE, excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
(2) FE, excl. Lux, Bel 
& Ire 
 (3) FE, excl. 
Lux 
(4) FE, excl. 
Lux 
real per capita GDP 
growth 
 0.118 0.249  0.032 0.011 
 (0.134) (0.318)  (0.021) (0.040) 
inflation (CPI)  -0.273 -0.141  -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.423) (0.349)  (0.027) (0.034) 
dunempp   0.136   -0.071 
   (0.492)   (0.057) 
dsinterestp   -0.092   -0.022 
   (0.202)   (0.034) 
dproductivityp   -0.032   0.002 
   (0.348)   (0.035) 
tradep   -0.031   0.001 
   (0.049)   (0.005) 
curr-accp   -0.012   0.001 
   (0.125)   (0.010) 
dexchangep   -0.036   0.000 
   (0.033)   (0.003) 
left-maj-coal  1.412 2.158  0.466** 0.411* 
  (1.355) (1.671)  (0.191) (0.210) 
left-maj-sing  1.107 1.804  0.059 0.028 
  (1.241) (1.541)  (0.213) (0.235) 
left-min-coal  1.743 2.110  0.601*** 0.556** 
  (1.240) (1.782)  (0.194) (0.214) 
left-min-sing  0.131 0.643  0.190 0.170 
  (1.020) (1.514)  (0.166) (0.179) 
center-maj-coal  0.786 1.642  0.394** 0.327 
  (1.629) (2.003)  (0.196) (0.222) 
center-min-coal  -0.798 -0.335  0.343* 0.339 
  (1.327) (2.403)  (0.183) (0.243) 
right-maj-coal  2.554**a 3.284**  0.329* 0.276 
  (1.267) (1.648)  (0.184) (0.201) 
right-maj-sing  1.602** 2.330**  0.202** 0.175 
   (0.638) (1.107)  (0.095) (0.106) 
right-min-coal  2.135 2.657  0.747*** 0.653*** 
  (1.469) (1.864)  (0.212) (0.242) 
right-min-sing  0.957 1.365  0.185* 0.141 
  (0.939) (1.362)  (0.101) (0.131) 
Constant  0.462 3.280  -0.090 -0.276 
  (1.174) (3.714)  (0.172) (0.402) 
Observations  214 214  235 235 
R-squared  0.197 0.208  0.139 0.149 
Number of countries  20 20  22 22 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Signif. at 10% level ** Signif. at 5% level. *** Signif. at 1% level. All political 
variables refer to cabinet’s political profile most frequent in the year of the capital flow. Control variables always refer to the 
year of the capital flow. All regressions performed using FE and robust variance estimates. Min and sing denote minoritarian 
and single-party cabinets, respectively. Center-maj-sing and center-min-sing left out to avoid multi-colinearity with constant. 
All controls measured in percentage points. a Not robust to error clustering by countries. Luxemb., Belgium and Ireland 
excluded from equity flows regressions, due to outlying status – Figure A6 (Appendix). Luxemb. excluded from capital-account 
flows regressions, due to outlying status – Figure A7 (Appendix). All the significant coefficients shaded are robust to error 
clustering by countries. 
43 
 
 
C) Impact of cabinet’s political profile on fiscal policy followed, 1998–2008.  
 
This empirical assessment tests ideological impacts on fiscal policy, implied in equilibrium outcomes 
/∗ = o: and g∗ = o: − RSB+B,,<=	 (Section 2.2), as well as the assumed impacts of cabinet 
majoritarian/coalition status on expected ideology uncertainty: 

 > 0,  < 0. Table 8 reports the 
results. 
Left-leaning cabinets are indeed associated to higher corporate tax rates: 3.9 p.p. higher with 
respect to center cabinets and 1.0 p.p. higher with respect to right-leaning cabinets (these impacts 
compare with a standard deviation of 6.8 p.p. by the corporate tax rate in the period analyzed49). This 
relative ranking of ideologies with respect to the corporate tax rate is common to all combinations of 
parliamentary support and party composition, except for minoritarian coalitions, in which case right-
leaning cabinets hold the highest tax rates. Within single-party cabinets, the distance from tax 
revenues of left ideology to that implemented by other ideologies (either right or center) is larger. Such 
pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that coalitions hamper the correlation between cabinet 
ideology and implemented fiscal policy, casting higher uncertainty over expected fiscal policy. This 
may be seen as support for the assumption of higher ideology uncertainty under coalitions: 

 > 0. It 
would also contribute to explain the focused reaction of equity flows to single-party majoritarian right-
leaning cabinets, discussed in 3.3.B – those cabinets shall implement more freely their (assumed) low-
tax proneness – if right cabinets did set lower taxes than cabinets of any other ideological type. More 
specifically, the evidence that right cabinets hold higher corporate taxes than center cabinets is not 
consistent with the negative reaction by equity inflows to right-center electoral transitions. 
Coalitions also show higher corporate tax rates than single-party cabinets and that pattern is 
consistent throughout the interactions between political dimensions, within each ideology. 
Regarding the weight of public revenues on GDP, left cabinets are again associated to higher 
levels: 1.2 GDP p.p. (comparing with a standard deviation of 7.4 GDP p.p.50). Such fact originates from 
the lower tax revenues collected by right-leaning single-party cabinets and by center minoritarian 
coalitions. The absence of coalitions enables, thus, right cabinets to lower taxes, contributing to explain 
                                                 
49 See Table A2, for the summary statistics of fiscal policy measures in 1998–2008. 
50 See Table A2, for the summary statistics of fiscal policy measures in 1998–2008. 
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the negative reaction by equity inflows to right-center electoral transitions and, more clearly, the 
positive reaction by equity inflows to single-party right cabinet mandates. 
Simultaneously, these same cabinets – right single-party cabinets and center minoritarian 
coalitions – exhibit, together with left single-party majorities, higher public expenses and, in 
consequence, lower budget balances (higher deficits and/or lower surpluses). As an additional 
consequence, coalitions show lower public expenses in 1.4 GDP p.p. (s.d. of 6.6 GDP p.p.51) and higher 
budget balances in 2.0 GDP p.p. (s.d. of 4.6 GDP p.p.52). This evidence suggests that coalitions may 
cause some inaction also with respect to public expenses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 See Table A2, for the summary statistics of fiscal policy measures in 1998–2008. 
52 See Table A2, for the summary statistics of fiscal policy measures in 1998–2008. 
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Table 8. Fiscal policy measures and political profile variables characterizing the cabinet most days in office, isolated 
traits and ideology-strength-composition interactions, 1998–2008 
  Dependent variable, in percentage points, yearly 
  
Corporate tax rate 
 Public Revenue, % of 
GDP 
 Public Expense, % of 
GDP 
 Public Budget Balance, 
% of GDP 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Independent 
variables 
 FE, 
isolated 
FE, 
interact. 
 FE, 
isolated 
FE, 
interactions 
 FE, 
isolated 
FE, 
interactions 
 FE, 
isolated 
FE, 
interactions 
                     
real per capita 
GDP growth 
 0.182 
(0.159) 
0.033 
(0.138) 
 -0.000 
(0.080) 
-0.061 
(0.085) 
 -0.497*** 
(0.131) 
-0.520*** 
(0.141) 
 0.497*** 
(0.143) 
0.459*** 
(0.152)     
inflation (CPI)  0.359* 0.329  -0.044 -0.021  0.457 0.420  -0.501 -0.441 
 (0.199) (0.209)  (0.117) (0.116)  (0.428) (0.456)  (0.403) (0.439) 
left  3.938***   1.246***   -0.439   1.685**a  
  (0.823)   (0.458)   (0.630)   (0.824)  
right  2.975***   0.227   -0.373   0.600  
  (0.722)   (0.412)   (0.533)   (0.675)  
majority  -0.677   0.558*a   -0.105   0.663  
  (0.601)   (0.323)   (0.484)   (0.526)  
coalition  2.505***   0.615   -1.382**   1.997***  
  (0.819)   (0.459)   (0.633)   (0.684)  
left-maj-coal   9.392***   0.396   -0.185   0.581 
   (1.830)   (0.772)   (1.147)   (1.151) 
left-maj-sing   8.145***   0.336   1.981*   -1.644* 
   (1.556)   (0.672)   (1.084)   (0.855) 
left-min-coal   9.494***   -0.342   1.289   -1.630 
   (1.611)   (0.715)   (1.125)   (1.233) 
left-min-sing   7.912***   -0.443   0.965   -1.408 
   (1.314)   (0.701)   (0.890)   (0.874) 
center-maj-coal   6.165***   -0.398   -0.005   -0.393 
   (1.644)   (0.836)   (1.101)   (0.998) 
center-min-coal   4.810***   -5.256***   3.718***   -8.975*** 
   (1.654)   (0.765)   (1.334)   (1.626) 
right-maj-coal   8.485***   -0.214   -0.543   0.329 
   (1.658)   (0.816)   (1.096)   (0.934) 
right-maj-sing   5.397***   -1.167***   1.933***   -3.101*** 
    (0.891)   (0.448)   (0.516)   (0.509) 
right-min-coal   12.175***   -0.179   0.933   -1.112 
   (1.900)   (0.774)   (1.183)   (1.202) 
right-min-sing   4.676***   -2.418***   2.041***   -4.459*** 
   (1.124)   (0.522)   (0.714)   (0.637) 
Constant  30.234*** 27.180***  42.572*** 44.174***  43.983*** 42.299***  -1.411 1.875 
  (1.023) (1.386)  (0.717) (0.791)  (1.354) (1.710)  (1.342) (1.548) 
Observations  247 247  251 251  251 251  251 251 
R-squared  0.561 0.605  0.158 0.258  0.280 0.329  0.366 0.495 
N. of countries  23 23  23 23  23 23  23 23 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% 
level. All control and political variables refer to the cabinet’s political profile most frequent in the respective year. All 
regressions performed using fixed effects and robust variance estimates. Min and sing denote minoritarian and single-
party cabinets, respectively. Center-maj-sing and center-min-sing left out to avoid multi-colinearity with constant. All 
controls are measured in percentage points. a Not robust to error clustering by countries. All the significant coefficients 
shaded are robust to error clustering by countries. 
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D) Capital flows’ reaction to fiscal policy, both unconditionally and conditional on the political 
profile of the cabinet in office, 1998–2008. 
 
This analysis tests an indirect impact channel linking the cabinet’s political profile to capital flows, 
through the fiscal policy implemented. Expected policy patterns associated to specific political profiles 
may induce, on capital flows, distinct reactions to the same observed fiscal policy, depending on the 
policymaker’s political profile. Tables 9 and 10 report the results53.  
FDI net flows react positively to budget deficits and negatively to surpluses by center cabinets: 
1.4 GDP p.p. of additional net flows per GDP percentage point of additional deficit (or lower surplus) 
– a decrease in budget balance in one standard deviation is associated to an increase in FDI net flows 
in 1.2 standard deviations. For left and right cabinets, this reaction is 92% and 70% lower in magnitude, 
respectively.  
Oppositely, equity inflows react negatively to budget deficits and positively to surpluses by 
center cabinets: 0.8 GDP p.p. of less inflows per GDP percentage point of additional deficit (or lower 
surplus) – a decrease in budget balance in one standard deviation is associated to a decrease in equity 
inflows in 2.5 standard deviations. This reaction is lower in magnitude for left and right cabinets, by 
56–57%. Equity flows react negatively also to public expenditure by center and right cabinets, although 
with less magnitude for the latter. 
Being more sensitive to economic activity, due to the business management aim, FDI responds 
positively to expansionary fiscal policy. On the contrary, equity investments react negatively to higher 
expenditure and lower budget balance, possibly anticipating future budget consolidation, namely 
through higher taxes.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 See Table A4 in Appendix for the results of specifications in Table 10 without controls. 
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Table 9. FDI net flows, Public Budget Balance and political profile variables characterizing the 
cabinet most days in office, 1998–2008 
Dependent variable: FDI net flows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), yearly 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
variables 
 FE, isolated, excl. 
Lux 
FE, isolated, excl. 
Lux 
FE, interactions, 
excl. Lux 
FE, interactions, 
excl. Lux 
          
real per capita 
GDP growth 
 0.475** 0.364 0.768** 0.972* 
 (0.190) (0.575) (0.360) (0.569) 
inflation (CPI)  0.501 0.504 0.990** 1.236** 
 (0.669) (0.614) (0.499) (0.584) 
dunempp   -0.652  -0.002 
   (0.878)  (0.767) 
dsinterestp   -0.680  -1.088** 
   (0.466)  (0.453) 
dproductivityp   0.181  -0.066 
   (0.591)  (0.629) 
tradep   0.027  0.034 
   (0.056)  (0.050) 
curr-accp   -0.175  -0.096 
   (0.203)  (0.135) 
dexchangep   0.016  0.017 
   (0.043)  (0.037) 
balp   -0.560* -0.469* -1.612*** -1.405*** 
  (0.292) (0.262) (0.344) (0.389) 
balp × left      1.353*** 1.288*** 
      (0.316) (0.342) 
balp × right      1.176*** 0.984** 
      (0.341) (0.383) 
balp × maj    -0.329 -0.422* 
   (0.220) (0.235) 
balp × coal    0.080 0.193 
   (0.186) (0.227) 
Constant  -3.199** -5.669 -5.101*** -9.027* 
  (1.620) (5.763) (1.874) (4.858) 
      
Observations  255 255 235 235 
R-squared  0.081 0.104 0.267 0.309 
N. of countries  22 22 22 22 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level. *** 
Significant at 1% level. All political variables refer to the cabinet’s political profile most frequent in 
the year of the capital flow. Control variables always refer to the year of the capital flow. All 
regressions performed using fixed effects and robust variance estimates. Balp denotes Public Budget 
Balance in percentage of GDP and is expressed in percentage points. Center left out to avoid multi-
colinearity with constant. All controls are measured in percentage points. All the significant 
coefficients shaded are robust to error clustering by countries. Luxembourg excluded due to outlying 
status – see Table A2 (Appendix). 
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Table 10. Equity inflows, fiscal policy and political profile variables characterizing the cabinet most days in office, 1998–2008 
Dependent variable: Equity inflows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), yearly. All regressions performed excluding 
Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland. 
Independent Var.  (1) FE, isol. (2) FE, interact.  (3) FE, isol. (4) FE, interact. (5) FE, isol. (6) FE, interact. 
real per capita GDP 
growth 
 0.053 0.167 -0.096 0.075 0.040 -0.028 
 (0.261) (0.280) (0.282) (0.264) (0.251) (0.269) 
inflation (CPI)  -0.197 -0.057 -0.157 0.044 -0.160 0.041 
 (0.208) (0.284) (0.267) (0.195) (0.212) (0.249) 
additional controlsa  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
expp   -0.349**b -0.452*** -0.518*** -1.472***   
  (0.145) (0.161) (0.182) (0.410)   
expp × left   0.012  0.972**   
   (0.017)  (0.374)   
expp × right   0.031*  0.955**   
   (0.018)  (0.380)   
expp × majority   0.017  -0.021   
   (0.014)  (0.160)   
expp × coalition   0.002  0.260   
   (0.016)  (0.169)   
revp     0.172 0.930***c   
    (0.113) (0.221)   
revp × left     -0.796***c   
     (0.269)   
revp × right     -0.770***c   
     (0.265)   
revp × majority     0.017   
     (0.142)   
revp × coalition     -0.196   
     (0.140)   
debtp     0.029 0.173*   
    (0.027) (0.102)   
debtp × left     -0.116   
     (0.089)   
debtp × right     -0.111   
     (0.095)   
debtp × maj.     0.015   
     (0.032)   
debtp × coal.     -0.039   
     (0.035)   
balp       0.286**b 0.787*** 
      (0.122) (0.188) 
balp × left       -0.443*** 
       (0.150) 
balp × right       -0.448*** 
       (0.152) 
balp × majority       -0.016 
       (0.112) 
balp × coalition       -0.046 
       (0.115) 
Constant  20.465*** 24.381*** 19.949** 16.292* 4.904** 4.810** 
  (7.866) (8.439) (8.639) (8.714) (2.363) (2.410) 
Observations  232 214 214 214 232 214 
R-squared  0.139 0.212 0.191 0.304 0.133 0.203 
N. of countries  20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Signif. at 10% level ** Signif. at 5% level. *** Signif. at 1% level. All political variables 
refer to cabinet’s political profile most frequent in the year of the capital flow. Control variables always refer to year of capital flow. 
All regressions performed using FE and robust variance estimates. Center kept out to avoid replicating the constant. a These are: 
dunempp, dsinterestp, dproductivityp, tradep, curr-accp and dexchangep. b Not robust to absence of additional controls. c Not robust 
to absence of other fiscal policy measures. All controls measured in percentage points. All significant coefficients shaded are robust 
to error clustering by countries. Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland excluded due to outlying status – see Figure A6 (Appendix). 
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Conclusion 
 
International capital flows hold a notable and increasing economic relevance within OECD countries, 
showing clear reactions to economic policy and to governments’ political profile. This study explores 
the channels through which these impacts operate, testing their empirical support. 
A game theoretical model is built, exploring (i) how the cabinet’s political profile may 
determine the economic policy pursued and (ii) how the expectations over economic policy associated to 
each political profile may determine capital flows’ reactions to electoral results. The model rationalizes 
the hypothesis that (a) left-leaning cabinets implement higher taxes and higher public expenditures, 
and that (b) cabinets with parliamentary minoritarian support or composed by a coalition of parties 
react less actively to productivity shocks. Hypothesis (a) produces a predicted negative reaction by 
capital flows to left-leaning cabinets. Hypothesis (b) produces an uncertain reaction by capital flows to 
both minorities and coalitions; the impact of each of these political traits on capital flows depends on 
how efficient is the inaction they produce: veto powers may hamper productivity-boosting measures and 
generate policy uncertainty, but autonomous decision may lead to excessive policy “noise”.   
Four types of impacts are empirically tested: (A) capital flows’ reaction to electoral outcomes; 
(B) capital flows’ reaction to the political profile of the cabinet in office; (C) impact of cabinet’s 
political profile on fiscal policy followed and (D) capital flows’ reaction to fiscal policy, both 
unconditionally and conditional on the political profile of the cabinet in office.  
Starting by (C), left-leaning cabinets are indeed associated to higher corporate tax rates. Right 
cabinets set higher corporate tax rates than center cabinets and single-party right-leaning cabinets set 
lower public revenues than all other cabinets, except minoritarian center coalitions. Coalitions, in turn, 
show higher corporate tax rates, lower public expenses and higher budget balances (lower deficits 
and/or higher surpluses) than single-party cabinets, suggesting that coalitions may produce some 
inaction with respect to public expenses and corporate tax exemptions/reductions. 
Concerning impacts (A), FDI net flows react negatively to elections in which cabinet majorities 
are renewed (1.8 GDP percentage points). Contrary to FDI, equity inflows react positively to the 
election of majoritarian cabinets (0.9 GDP p.p.). Such an opposite behaviour is consistent with these 
flows’ distinct purposes: contrary to equity, FDI has a long-term lasting management interest in an 
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enterprise located at the destination economy, being, thus, more sensitive to context volatility implied 
in excessive action by the cabinet; being more focused in the short-term, equity flows react positively to 
more active cabinets, more committed to neutralize shocks to productivity. 
Equity inflows react negatively to electoral transitions from right to center cabinets (4.7 GDP 
p.p.) – impacts (A) – and positively during the mandates of single-party right-leaning majoritarian 
cabinets (1.6 GDP p.p.) – impacts (B). This latter preference for right-leaning cabinets is, thus, 
expressed only in the context of low barriers to action and less uncertainty around the link between 
ideology and fiscal policy pursued. The positive reaction to single-party right cabinets is consistent 
with the lower public revenues associated to this political profile. 
Capital account net flows show a positive reaction to coalition cabinets (0.3 GDP p.p.)54. 
Finally, concerning impacts (D), FDI net flows react positively to budget deficits and 
negatively to surpluses by center cabinets. With left and right cabinets, this reaction is 92% and 70% 
lower in magnitude, respectively. Oppositely, equity inflows react negatively to budget deficits and 
positively to surpluses by center cabinets, being the reaction also lower in magnitude for left and right 
cabinets, by 56–57%. Equity flows react negatively also to public expenditure by center and right 
cabinets, although with less magnitude for the latter. Being sensitive to economic activity, due to the 
business management aim, FDI responds positively to expansionary fiscal policy. On the contrary, 
equity investments react negatively to higher expenditure and lower budget balance, possibly 
anticipating future budget consolidation, namely through higher taxes. 
The magnitude of the direct impacts of political profiles on capital flows range from 0.3 to 4.7 
GDP percentage points, representing from 0.5 to 2.5 standard deviations of the respective flows in the 
relevant sample.  
In sum, the hypothesis that left-leaning cabinets set higher taxes finds empirical support. This 
ideology-driven policy divergence occurs more intensely in the context of single-party cabinets, 
suggesting that coalitions may be associated to fiscal policy inaction, hampering the link between 
ideology and policy. All this evidence is consistent with the observed positive reaction of equity inflows 
to single-party right cabinets. The heterogeneous nature and purposes of the several types of capital 
                                                 
54 This positive reaction could be grounded on a preference by this type of flows for higher budget balances (to which 
coalitions are associated), but such preference does not appear in (D). 
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flows determine very distinct reactions to other political profiles and policies. FDI is more sensitive to 
business environment stability and economic activity fiscal promotion, reacting negatively to 
majoritarian cabinets and positively to budget deficits. Equity inflows are particularly focused on 
short-term gains and on taxes, reacting positively to majoritarian cabinets (potentially more active in 
countering negative GDP shocks) and negatively to budget deficits (potentially anticipating higher 
taxes).    
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Table A1. Variables description  
Financial & Controls 
FDI net (p.p.) Foreign direct investment represents net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than 
that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows total net 
flows, that is, net FDI in the reporting economy from foreign sources less net FDI by the reporting 
economy to the rest of the world, divided by current GDP and expressed in percentage points. 
FDI in (p.p) Foreign direct investment represents the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than 
that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows 
(new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors, is 
divided by nominal GDP and expressed in percentage points. 
FDI out (p.p) Foreign direct investment represents the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than 
that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net outflows 
of investment from the reporting economy to the rest of the world, is divided by nominal GDP and 
expressed in percentage points. 
Capital account 
(p.p.) 
Net capital account includes government debt forgiveness, investment grants in cash or in kind by a 
government entity, and taxes on capital transfers. Also included are migrants' capital transfers and 
debt forgiveness and investment grants by nongovernmental entities. Data is divided by nominal 
GDP and expressed in percentage points. 
Equity net 
inflows (p.p.) 
Portfolio equity includes net inflows from equity securities other than those recorded as direct 
investment and including shares, stocks, depository receipts (American or global), and direct 
purchases of shares in local stock markets by foreign investors. Data is divided by nominal GDP 
and expressed in percentage points. 
Real per capita 
GDP growth 
(p.p.) 
Annual growth of the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
percentage points. 
Inflation CPI 
(p.p.) 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the 
cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or 
changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used. Data are in 
percentage points. 
Unemployment 
rate 1st diff. (p.p.) 
First difference of the Harmonised unemployment rate, which is based on the definition 
recommended by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), ensuring comparability over time. 
Short-term 
interest rate 1st 
diff. (p.p.) 
The short-term interest rates are based on three-month money market rates where available, or 
rates on similar financial instruments. First difference. 
Productivity 
growth (p.p.) 
Annual growth rate of the real GDP per employed person, accounted for in the national accounts. 
Trade (p.p.) Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic 
product. 
Current account 
(p.p.) 
Current account balance (% of GDP). Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods, 
services, net income, and net current transfers. 
Exchange rate 
variation (p.p.) 
Variation of the official exchange rate (% variation of LCU per USD; % variation of USD per 
DEM, in the case of the U.S.A.) 
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Political 
left-left No. of elections originating left to left cabinet transitions, in a given country/year observation. 
left-center No. of elections originating left to center cabinet transitions, in a given country/year observation. 
left-right No. of elections originating left to right cabinet transitions, in a given country/year observation. 
center-left No. of elections originating center to left cabinet transitions, in a given country/year observation. 
center-center No. of elections originating center to center cabinet transitions, in a given country/year observation. 
center-right No. of elections originating center to right cabinet transitions, in a given country/year observation. 
right-left No. of elections originating right to left cabinet transitions, in a given country/year observation. 
right-center No. of elections originating right to center cabinet transitions, in a given country/year observation. 
right-right No. of elections originating right to right cabinet transitions, in a given country/year observation. 
maj-maj No. of elections originating majority to majority cabinet transitions, in a given country/year 
observation. 
maj-nmaj No. of elections originating majority to minority cabinet transitions, in a given country/year 
observation. 
nmaj-maj No. of elections originating minority to majority cabinet transitions, in a given country/year 
observation. 
nmaj-nmaj No. of elections originating minority to minority cabinet transitions, in a given country/year 
observation. 
coal-coal No. of elections originating coalition to coalition cabinet transitions, in a given country/year 
observation. 
coal-ncoal No. of elections originating coalition to single-party cabinet transitions, in a given country/year 
observation. 
ncoal-coal No. of elections originating single-party to coalition cabinet transitions, in a given country/year 
observation. 
ncoal-ncoal No. of elections originating single-party to single-party cabinet transitions, in a given country/year 
observation. 
left Dummy variable identifying country/year pairs in which the cabinet ideology most days “in office” is 
left, in a given country/year observation. 
center Dummy variable identifying country/year pairs in which the cabinet ideology most days “in office” is 
center, in a given country/year observation. 
right Dummy variable identifying country/year pairs in which the cabinet ideology most days “in office” is 
right, in a given country/year observation. 
majority Dummy variable identifying country/year pairs in which the cabinet parliamentary most days “in 
office” is majority, in a given country/year observation. 
coalition Dummy variable identifying country/year pairs in which the cabinet quantitative party composition 
most days “in office” is coalition, in a given country/year observation. 
Fiscal 
Corporate tax 
rate (p.p.) 
Combined corporate income tax rate: basic combined central and sub-central (statutory) corporate 
income tax rate given by the adjusted central government rate plus the sub-central rate. 
Public 
Revenue, % of 
GDP (p.p.) 
Total receipts, general government, as a percentage of GDP 
Public 
Expense, % of 
GDP (p.p.) 
Total disbursements, general government, as a percentage of GDP 
Public Budget 
Balance, % of 
GDP (p.p.) 
Government net lending , general government, as percentage of GDP 
Public Debt, % 
of GDP (p.p.) 
General government gross financial liabilities, as a percentage of GDP 
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Table A2. Summary statistics (1960-2008)   
Financial & Controls 
Variable Non missing observations Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
FDI net (p.p.) 784 -0.662 6.843 -147.16855 33.421 
FDI in (p.p) 860 7.769 42.111 -15.048 564.91656 
FDI out (p.p) 784 5.501 35.850 -22.560 570.39857 
Equity net (p.p.) 775 4.583 42.334 -229.41158 731.78059 
Capital account (p.p.) 790 0.093 0.530 -3.910 6.986 
Real per capita GDP growth (p.p.) 1077 2.610 2.609 -7.914 13.273 
Inflation CPI (p.p.) 1071 6.030 6.703 -0.895 84.222 
Unemployment rate 1st diff. (p.p.) 1043 0.110 0.922 -3.189 6.758 
Short-term interest rate 1st diff. 
(p.p.) 
899 -0.187 2.034 -13.050 8.283 
Productivity growth (p.p.) 1070 2.172 2.497 -8.608 12.706 
Trade (p.p.) 839 74.641 62.613 11.224 667.568 
Current account (p.p.) 820 -0.525 4.860 -26.619 17.572 
Exchange rate variation (p.p.) 1126 1.239 10.803 -29.352 101.131 
      
Political 
Variable Non missing obs.60 Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
left-left 283 0.155 0.363 0 1 
left-center 283 0.011 0.103 0 1 
left-right 283 0.081 0.274 0 1 
center-left 283 0.021 0.144 0 1 
center-center 283 0.106 0.308 0 1 
center-right 283 0.060 0.238 0 1 
right-left 283 0.078 0.268 0 1 
right-center 283 0.067 0.251 0 1 
right-right 283 0.428 0.503 0 2 
maj-nmaj 283 0.102 0.304 0 1 
maj-maj 283 0.534 0.500 0 1 
nmaj-maj 283 0.173 0.379 0 1 
nmaj-nmaj 283 0.194 0.396 0 1 
coal-ncoal 283 0.078 0.268 0 1 
coal-coal 283 0.403 0.491 0 1 
ncoal-coal 283 0.138 0.345 0 1 
ncoal-ncoal 283 0.385 0.495 0 2 
left 1087 0.238 0.426 0 1 
center 1087 0.203 0.403 0 1 
right 1087 0.558 0.497 0 1 
majority 1088 0.750 0.433 0 1 
coalition 1088 0.568 0.496 0 1 
   
 
 
 
   
                                                 
55 Luxembourg has the only observation below -100% (in the year 2007). 
56 Luxembourg has the only (12) observations above 100%. 
57 Luxembourg has the only (8) observations above 100%. 
58 Luxembourg has the only observation below -100% (in the year 2008). 
59 Luxembourg has the only (7) observations above 100%. 
60 In the case of political transitions, observations respect only to years with elections that didn’t involve caretaker cabinets, 
followed by years without any elections. Years of U.S. mid-term elections are also not considered. 
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Fiscal 
Variable Non missing obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Corporate tax rate (p.p.) 597 38.151 9.715 12.500 61.750 
Public Revenue, % of GDP (p.p.) 922 40.806 9.271 20.199 63.471 
Public Expense, % of GDP (p.p.) 922 42.725 9.549 18.169 70.928 
Public Budget Balance, % of GDP 
(p.p.) 
943 -1.886 4.355 -16.009 18.768 
Public Debt, % of GDP (p.p.) 697 60.340 28.527 7.647 175.274 
      
Fiscal, 1998–2008 
Variable Non missing obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Corporate tax rate (p.p.) 249 31.859 6.800 12.500 56.046 
Public Revenue, % of GDP (p.p.) 276 43.817 7.411 30.332 62.861 
Public Expense, % of GDP (p.p.) 276 44.323 6.628 31.333 61.182 
Public Budget Balance, % of GDP 
(p.p.) 
276 -0.506 4.607 -15.658 18.768 
Public Debt, % of GDP (p.p.) 253 65.000 32.556 7.647 175.274 
 
 
 
 
Table A3. Summary statistics, excluding outliers (1960-2008) 
Financial 
Outlier(s) 
excluded 
(Sub)sample Variable  
Non missing 
observations 
Mean 
(p.p.) 
St. Dev. 
(p.p.) 
Min. 
(p.p.) 
Max. 
(p.p.) 
Luxembourg 
Non-election 
years, after 
year with 
election(s) 
FDI net  222 -0.085 3.441 -13.832 29.747 
Equity net 220 1.191 5.949 -12.853 54.440 
Capital account 223 0.081 0.467 -2.581 1.853 
All years in 
1998–2008 
FDI net  258 -1.062 5.235 -24.477 29.747 
Equity net 259 3.856 12.058 -12.853 75.836 
Capital account 258 0.110 0.650 -2.581 2.088 
Luxembourg, 
Belgium and 
Ireland 
Non-election 
years, after 
year with 
election(s) 
FDI net  211 -0.133 3.266 -13.832 29.747 
Equity net 201 0.408 1.801 -12.853 8.310 
Capital account 212 0.072 0.451 -2.581 1.853 
All years in 
1998–2008 
FDI net  238 -1.278 4.505 -24.477 29.747 
Equity net 235 1.139 2.455 -12.853 12.989 
Capital account 238 0.120 0.643 -2.581 2.088 
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Table A4. Equity inflows, fiscal policy and political profile variables characterizing the cabinet most days in office, 1998–2008 
Dependent variable: Equity inflows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), yearly. All regressions performed excluding 
Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland. 
Independent Var.  (1) FE, isol. (2) FE, interact.  (3) FE, isol. (4) FE, interact. (5) FE, isol. (6) FE, interact. 
real per capita GDP 
growth 
 0.037 0.301** 0.117 0.227* 0.030 0.177 
 (0.081) (0.123) (0.135) (0.117) (0.081) (0.117) 
inflation (CPI)  -0.301 -0.173 -0.310 0.026 -0.302 -0.124 
 (0.209) (0.260) (0.263) (0.182) (0.220) (0.182) 
additional controlsa  No No No No No No 
expp   -0.193 -0.249** -0.314** -1.172***   
  (0.120) (0.118) (0.131) (0.330)   
expp × left   0.024  0.842**   
   (0.018)  (0.381)   
expp × right   0.035*   0.806**   
   (0.019)   (0.393)   
expp × majority   0.004  -0.056   
   (0.011)  (0.165)   
expp × coalition   0.009  0.345*   
   (0.014)  (0.181)   
revp     0.149 0.917***b   
    (0.121) (0.223)   
revp × left     -0.697**b   
     (0.269)   
revp × right      -0.681**b   
      (0.276)   
revp × majority     0.018   
     (0.142)   
revp × coalition     -0.241*   
     (0.142)   
debtp     0.023 0.131   
    (0.024) (0.099)   
debtp × left     -0.081   
     (0.092)   
debtp × right     -0.064   
     (0.094)   
debtp × maj.     0.027   
     (0.035)   
debtp × coal.     -0.057   
     (0.037)   
balp       0.166 0.720*** 
      (0.104) (0.180) 
balp × left       -0.448*** 
       (0.159) 
balp × right       -0.471*** 
       (0.157) 
balp × majority       -0.017 
       (0.115) 
balp × coalition       -0.104 
       (0.118) 
Constant  10.373* 10.459* 7.387 1.540 1.847*** 1.071* 
  (5.705) (5.445) (6.105) (5.725) (0.532) (0.584) 
Observations  232 214 214 214 232 214 
R-squared  0.072 0.136 0.119 0.231 0.070 0.153 
N. of countries  20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Signif. at 10% level ** Signif. at 5% level. *** Signif. at 1% level. All political variables 
refer to cabinet’s political profile most frequent in the year of the capital flow. Control variables always refer to the year of the 
capital flow. All regressions performed using fixed effects and robust variance estimates. Center left out to avoid multi-colinearity 
with constant. a These are: dunempp, dsinterestp, dproductivityp, tradep, curr-accp and dexchangep. b Not robust to absence of other 
fiscal policy measures. All controls are measured in percentage points. All the significant coefficients shaded are robust to error 
clustering by countries. Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland excluded due to outlying status – see Figure A6 (Appendix). 
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Table A5. FDI net flows after elections and political profile variables characterizing the elected 
cabinet 
Dependent variable: FDI net flows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), in (i) years 
without any election, following a year with election(s) taking place in April–December, and in 
(ii) years with election(s) taking place in January–March 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
variables 
 FE, maj, 
excl. Lux 
FE, maj, 
excl. Lux 
FE, coal, 
excl. Lux 
FE, coal, 
excl. Lux 
FE, all 
excl. Lux 
FE, all 
excl. Lux 
real per capita 
GDP growth 
 0.050 0.435 0.053 0.442 0.107 0.427 
 (0.196) (0.423) (0.199) (0.430) (0.192) (0.414) 
inflation (CPI)  0.012 0.184 0.012 0.183 -0.004 0.127 
 (0.085) (0.137) (0.087) (0.137) (0.087) (0.129) 
dunempp   0.295  0.302  0.260 
   (0.542)  (0.541)  (0.533) 
dsinterestp   -0.327  -0.328  -0.317 
   (0.198)  (0.201)  (0.194) 
dproductivityp   -0.232  -0.235  -0.199 
   (0.428)  (0.429)  (0.416) 
tradep   0.052  0.053  0.054 
   (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
curr-accp   -0.392**  -0.393**  -0.381** 
   (0.184)  (0.185)  (0.176) 
dexchangep   0.139  0.138  0.141 
   (0.091)  (0.091)  (0.088) 
left      -2.223 -1.770 
      (1.971) (1.435) 
right      -2.524 -2.076 
      (1.951) (1.312) 
majority  -1.370** -1.838** -1.389** -1.857** -1.421** -1.908** 
  (0.667) (0.901) (0.679) (0.928) (0.702) (0.958) 
coalition    0.087 0.137 -0.123 -0.085 
    (0.645) (0.777) (0.788) (0.874) 
Constant  0.582 -1.154 1.172 -1.150 2.438 1.627 
  (1.159) (2.885) (1.521) (2.897) (2.400) (3.483) 
Observations  196 181 196 181 196 181 
R-squared  0.088 0.311 0.088 0.312 0.125 0.334 
N. of countries  22 22 22 22 22 22 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% 
level. *** Significant at 1% level. All political variables refer to the cabinet’s political profile 
most frequent in the year of the capital flow. Control variables always refer to the year of the 
capital flow. All regressions performed using fixed effects and robust variance estimates. Center 
left out to avoid multi-colinearity with constant. All controls are measured in percentage points. 
Luxembourg excluded due to outlying status – see Table A2 (Appendix). All the significant 
coefficients shaded are robust to error clustering by countries.  
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Table A6. FDI net flows after elections and political transition variables reflecting electoral outcome from each election 
Dependent variable: FDI net flows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), in (i) years without any election, following a year 
with election(s) taking place in April–December, and in (ii) years with election(s) taking place in January–March 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variables  FE, str&comp, excl. Lux FE, str&comp, excl. Lux FE, all, excl. Lux FE, all, excl. Lux 
real per capita GDP 
growth 
 0.055 0.385 0.140 0.511 
 (0.204) (0.424) (0.202) (0.415) 
inflation (CPI)  0.003 0.215 -0.018 0.124 
 (0.093) (0.142) (0.104) (0.143) 
dunempp   0.055  0.268 
   (0.622)  (0.556) 
dsinterestp   -0.418*  -0.437* 
   (0.241)  (0.235) 
dproductivityp   -0.178  -0.199 
   (0.471)  (0.442) 
tradep   0.067*  0.080** 
   (0.036)  (0.038) 
curr-accp   -0.424**  -0.422*** 
   (0.188)  (0.153) 
dexchangep   0.140  0.138* 
   (0.092)  (0.081) 
left-left    -0.168 -0.741 
    (1.141) (1.746) 
left-center    -0.512 -0.657 
    (1.696) (1.981) 
left-right    -0.509 -0.926 
    (1.339) (1.542) 
center-left    -0.893 -1.339 
    (1.730) (1.866) 
center-right    0.382 1.893 
    (1.661) (1.568) 
right-left    -1.136 0.129 
    (1.209) (1.313) 
right-center    5.337 5.600** 
    (4.195) (2.800) 
right-right    -1.056 -1.346 
    (1.149) (1.430) 
maj-maj  -1.840** -2.382** -1.560* -2.394** 
  (0.881) (1.090) (0.920) (1.041) 
maj-nmaj  -0.694 -1.350 -0.922 -2.254** 
  (0.744) (1.006) (0.961) (1.069) 
nmaj-maj  -0.685 -0.559 -0.821 -1.540 
  (0.778) (0.977) (0.957) (1.200) 
coal-coal  0.154 -0.471 -0.461 -1.254 
  (0.911) (1.136) (1.206) (1.505) 
coal-ncoal  -0.627 -0.779 -0.668 -2.108 
  (1.291) (1.447) (1.364) (1.935) 
ncoal-coal  -0.113 0.701 -0.117 0.308 
  (1.066) (1.206) (1.237) (1.162) 
Constant  0.240 -3.702 0.572 -2.831 
  (1.447) (3.344) (1.910) (3.671) 
Observations  196 181 196 181 
R-squared  0.091 0.333 0.200 0.435 
Number of countries  22 22 22 22 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Signif. at 10% level ** Signif. at 5% level. *** Signif. at 1% level. All political 
variables refer to cabinet transition occurred between the first and last days of the election year (direct comparison between the 
cabinet in office on the first business day and the cabinet in office on the last business day). Control variables always refer to the 
year of the capital flow. All regressions performed using FE and robust variance estimates. Center-center, nmaj-nmaj and ncoal-
ncoal left out to avoid multi-colinearity with constant. All controls are measured in percentage points. Luxembourg excluded due 
to outlying status – see Table A2 (Appendix). All the significant coefficients shaded are robust to error clustering by countries. 
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Table A7. Equity inflows after elections and political profile variables characterizing the elected cabinet 
Dependent variable: Equity inflows, in percentage of GDP (percentage points), in (i) years without any 
election, following a year with election(s) taking place in April–December, and in (ii) years with election(s) 
taking place in January–March 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
variables 
 FE, maj, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, maj, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, coal, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, coal, 
excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
FE, all excl. 
Lux, Bel & 
Ire 
FE, all excl. 
Lux, Bel & 
Ire 
        
real per capita GDP 
growth 
 0.066 0.274** 0.069 0.287** 0.042 0.282** 
 (0.068) (0.138) (0.066) (0.141) (0.066) (0.139) 
inflation (CPI)  0.019 -0.043 0.018 -0.045 0.024 -0.022 
 (0.033) (0.051) (0.034) (0.051) (0.032) (0.052) 
dunempp   0.439*  0.450*  0.440* 
   (0.250)  (0.254)  (0.256) 
dsinterestp   0.074  0.071  0.069 
   (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.070) 
dproductivityp   -0.233  -0.238  -0.255 
   (0.150)  (0.151)  (0.154) 
tradep   -0.040  -0.039  -0.034 
   (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
curr-accp   0.142*  0.141*  0.130* 
   (0.078)  (0.078)  (0.076) 
dexchangep   -0.056*  -0.057*  -0.060* 
   (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.032) 
left      1.169 0.885 
      (0.938) (0.783) 
right      1.270 1.086 
      (0.864) (0.736) 
majority  0.748** 1.095** 0.723** 1.064** 0.726** 1.057** 
  (0.330) (0.448) (0.312) (0.440) (0.316) (0.420) 
coalition    0.108 0.242 0.251 0.361 
    (0.347) (0.388) (0.424) (0.471) 
Constant  -1.528** 0.833 -0.458 0.660 -2.981* -1.736 
  (0.706) (1.573) (0.826) (1.601) (1.523) (1.831) 
        
Observations  177 166 177 166 177 166 
R-squared  0.260 0.394 0.260 0.395 0.291 0.415 
Number of countries  20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level. *** 
Significant at 1% level. All political variables refer to the cabinet’s political profile most frequent in the year 
of the capital flow. Control variables always refer to the year of the capital flow. All regressions performed 
using fixed effects and robust variance estimates. Center left out to avoid multi-colinearity with constant. All 
controls are measured in percentage points. Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland excluded due to outlying 
status – see Figure A6 (Appendix). All the significant coefficients shaded are robust to error clustering by 
countries.  
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Table A8. Equity inflows after elections and political transition variables reflecting electoral outcome from each election 
Dependent variable: Equity inflows, in percentage of GDP (percent. points), in (i) years without any election, following a 
year with election(s) taking place in April–Dec., and in (ii) years with election(s) taking place in Jan.–March 
Independent 
variables 
 (1) FE, ideol, excl.Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
(2) FE, ideol, excl. 
Lux, Bel & Ire 
(3) FE, all, excl. 
Lux,Bel & Ire 
(4) FE, all, excl. Lux, 
Bel & Ire 
real per capita GDP 
growth 
 0.035 0.171 0.057 0.220 
 (0.075) (0.143) (0.076) (0.175) 
inflation (CPI)  0.030 0.004 0.030 -0.003 
 (0.032) (0.066) (0.036) (0.069) 
dunempp   0.168  0.342 
   (0.272)  (0.296) 
dsinterestp   0.123  0.143 
   (0.084)  (0.095) 
dproductivityp   -0.152  -0.163 
   (0.155)  (0.173) 
tradep   -0.051  -0.055 
   (0.032)  (0.034) 
curr-accp   0.131*  0.140** 
   (0.070)  (0.066) 
dexchangep   -0.045  -0.055* 
   (0.030)  (0.031) 
left-left  -0.960 -1.159 -0.593 -0.641 
  (0.697) (0.872) (0.674) (0.824) 
left-center  -0.956 -0.803 -0.590 -0.237 
  (1.074) (1.083) (1.012) (1.018) 
left-right  -0.095 0.207 0.341 0.712 
  (0.755) (0.910) (0.885) (0.993) 
center-left  -0.404 0.167 -0.508 0.209 
  (0.955) (1.492) (1.035) (1.575) 
center-right  -0.035 -0.615 -0.264 -0.970 
  (0.987) (1.139) (1.072) (1.201) 
right-left  -0.145 -0.406 -0.031 -0.309 
  (0.781) (0.863) (0.791) (0.866) 
right-center  -3.561* -3.802** -3.782** -3.940** 
  (1.829) (1.786) (1.859) (1.629) 
right-right  -0.467 -0.383 -0.502 -0.298 
  (0.737) (0.920) (0.749) (0.884) 
maj-maj    0.787 1.330** 
    (0.492) (0.643) 
maj-nmaj    0.736 1.119 
    (0.656) (0.759) 
nmaj-maj    0.634 0.831 
    (0.458) (0.572) 
coal-coal    0.852 1.000* 
    (0.571) (0.580) 
coal-ncoal    0.396 0.750 
    (0.657) (0.837) 
ncoal-coal    -0.090 -0.076 
    (0.564) (0.613) 
Constant  0.099 1.921 -0.735 0.995 
  (0.989) (1.734) (1.092) (2.005) 
Observations  177 166 177 166 
R-squared  0.373 0.482 0.405 0.537 
Number of countries  20 20 20 20 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *Sign. at 10% level **Sign. at 5% level. ***Sign. at 1% level. Political 
variables refer to cabinet transition occurred between the first and last days of the election year (direct comparison 
between cabinet in office on the first business day and the cabinet in office on the last business day). Control variables 
measured in percentage points and refering to same year as capital flow. All regressions performed using FE. Center-
center, nmaj-nmaj and ncoal-ncoal left out to avoid replicating the constant. Luxemb., Belgium and Ireland excluded due 
to outlying status – see Figure A6 (Appendix). Significant coefficients shaded are robust to error clustering by countries. 
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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Notes: Classes of countries defined by the World Bank. Simple averages by country group, in percentage points. 
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Figure A5. Policy volatility, parliamentary support and party composition 
 
Figure A5.A shows the comparison between an index of single-party majoritarian status – singmaj, 
ranging from zero (minority or coalition) to 1 (single-party majority) – and a measure for the volatility of 
each fiscal policy variable, consisting of its 1960-2008 country-wise standard deviation. The plots show 
that countries with more frequent majoritarian single-party cabinets hold less volatile fiscal policy, 
suggesting that the action/inaction argument in Spolaore (2004) is not valid for fiscal policy.  
 
Figure A5.A. Standard-deviation of Public Revenue, Public Expense, Budget balance and Public debt (all 
in GDP p.p.), compared with cabinet majoritarian-single-party status (country-averages, 1960–2008) 
 
 
 
Source: Fiscal data from OECD Economic Outlook No. 86; political data collected by the author – see 
Section 3.1 for references and details. 
Notes: Majsing is originally in daily frequency and fiscal policy variables are originally in yearly 
frequency. Majsing is a dummy variable signaling days with a majoritarian single-party cabinet in office. 
First the political variable is averaged to yearly frequency (into country-year observations) and, secondly, 
is averaged country-wise for the whole period, considering, for each plot, only the observations for which 
the respective political and fiscal variables are non-missing. Country-wise standard-deviation is computed 
for each fiscal policy variable (for 1960-2008).  
 
Figure A5.B performs a similar exercise, replacing majsing with its two underlying political indexes – 
maj, ranging from zero (minoritarian cabinet) to 1 (majoritarian), and coal, ranging from zero (single-
party cabinet) to 1 (coalition). In line with Figure A5.A, there seems to be no clear evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that majority or single-party cabinets hold more volatile fiscal policy.   
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Figure A5.B. Standard-deviation of Public Revenue, Public Expense, Budget balance and Public debt (all 
in GDP p.p.), compared with cabinet majoritarian and coalition statuses (country-averages, 1960–2008) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fiscal data from OECD Economic Outlook No. 86; political data collected by the author – see 
Section 3.1 for references and details. 
Notes: Maj and coal are originally in daily frequency and fiscal policy variables are originally in yearly 
frequency. Maj (coal) is a dummy variable signaling days with a majoritarian (coalition) cabinet in 
office. First the political variables are averaged to yearly frequency (into country-year observations) and, 
secondly, these variables are averaged country-wise for the whole period, considering, for each plot, only 
the observations for which the respective political and fiscal variables are non-missing. Country-wise 
standard-deviation is computed for each fiscal policy variable (for 1960-2008).  
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Figure A6. Outlying character of Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland with respect 
to Equity inflows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7. Outlying character of Luxembourg with respect to Capital Account net flows 
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Figure A8. Cross-country yearly average of FDI, Equity and Capital Account net flows 
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Euro And International Trade: The Role Of Exchange Rate
Uncertainty And Policy Credibility On Export Market Entry
Rúben Branco
Nuno Limão
Luca David Opromolla
José Tavares
Abstract
Exchange rate risk is central to discussions about international economic policy. The elim-
ination of that risk is one of the benets attributed to the European currency union project.
The introduction of the Euro represents a distinctive experiment of exchange uncertainty
reduction, given the extraordinary credibility associated to such policy action. This study
presents a theoretical model using the real options approach to understand how exchange
rate volatility may induce rms to wait before entering the export market - entry hysteresis.
The model combines (i) uncertainty around future exchange rates, (ii) sunk entry costs, (iii)
entry decision preceding the realization of the future exchange rates, and (iv) irreversibil-
ity of the entry decision. According to the model, by eliminating exchange rate uncertainty
within the Eurozone, the Euro contributed to export market entry by rms that would, oth-
erwise, remain as non-exporters. The model produces a closed-form market-entry threshold,
with a clear relation with exchange rate volatility, allowing for objective empirically-testable
hypotheses.
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1 Introduction
The risk associated to exchange rates is crucial to international economic policy. The elimination
of that risk is one of the benets attributed to the European currency union project. The introduc-
tion of the European single currency represents a distinctive experiment of exchange uncertainty
reduction, given the extraordinary credibility associated to this policy action. This study presents
a theoretical model using the real options approach to understand how exchange rate volatility
may induce rms to wait before entering the export market. According to the model, by elim-
inating exchange rate uncertainty within the Eurozone, the Euro contributed to export market
entry by rms that would, otherwise, remain as non-exporters. The model produces a closed-form
market-entry threshold, with a clear relation with exchange rate volatility, allowing for objective
empirically-testable hypotheses.
As noted in Obstfeld and Rogo (1998), exchange risk is central to discussions about inter-
national economic policy  dollar safe-haven appreciations after crises external to the USA and
risk-aversion-based arguments driving the European common currency project are examples. The
Delors Report on the European Monetary Union (Delors, 1989) explicitly states that the cre-
ation of a single currency area would add to the potential benets of an enlarged economic area
because it would remove intra-Community exchange rate uncertainties and reduce transaction
costs, eliminate exchange rate variability and reduce the susceptibility of the Community to ex-
ternal shocks. This European single currency - the Euro - aggregates 11 countries accounting for
20% of world's output, 30% of world's trade and 300 million people (Baldwin, 2006), integrating
an economic and monetary union process ultimately aiming at price stability, balanced growth,
living standards convergence, high employment and external equilibrium (Delors, 1989). Baldwin
(2006) considers it the world's largest economic policy experiment. Along the process, the Euro
produces an uncertainty reduction with high potential impact on international trade.
But this uncertainty-reduction eect is especially powerful due the distinctive credibility asso-
ciated to the policy: a single currency would clearly demonstrate the irreversibility of the move
to monetary union (...) (Delors, 1989). Irreversibility is key. The extraordinary commitment
credibility around the Euro is compared by Zingales (2012) to a legendary strategy by the Spanish
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explorer Hernán Cortés1. According to the legend, Cortés, in his quest to conquer Mexico, ordered
the burn of the ships that transported the army from Spain. Irreversibility motivated the army
towards victory, by inducing unquestionable commitment.
Baldwin et al (2008) test the impact of the European currency union on international trade,
replicating the exercise in Rose (2000)2 for the EU-15 in the 1996-2006 period, with several method-
ological improvements3. Their results point a signicant positive impact of the Euro on the level
of exports from Eurozone (EZ) countries to both EZ and non-EZ countries, qualitatively conrm-
ing the Rose eect4, although with much smaller magnitude. These results appear in a context
of no clear or solid evidence supporting the impact of exchange rate volatility on international
trade. Many studies had found signicant (and, sometimes, very large) impacts of either exchange
volatility or currency unions on trade5; nevertheless, Tenreyro (2007) identies and implements a
set of methodological improvements to the empirical framework used in several of those (successful)
studies - the gravity equation - nding no signicant impact6.
In any case, Baldwin (2006) acknowledges (in it concluding remarks) the long way still to be
covered in order to understand the impact of the Euro on trade. Moreover, a theoretical discussion
on how this impact may occur is pointed as the next step to take. According to the author, it is
now time to move beyond studies of how big is the magic.
Our study intends to take this step, contributing to end the absence of clear-cut conclusions
on the eect of exchange rate volatility on trade (see IMF, 2004, for a review). More specically,
we explore a possibility already discussed in Baldwin (1988) but  to the best of our knowledge
 not yet directly assessed in the literature: (. . . ) it seems likely that real exchange rate shocks
1This legend is not historically accurate and is used by the author in an essay on the scal policy constraints
associated to the Euro adhesion.
2Rose (2000) nds signicant positive impacts of currency unions and signicant negative impacts of exchange
rate volatility on international trade.
3Some of them proposed in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
4(...) two countries sharing the same currency trade three times as much as they would with dierent currencies.
5Examples are Kenen and Rodrik (1986), De Grauwe (1987), Koray and Lastrapes (1989), Bini-Smaghi (1991),
Arize (1998), Dell'Ariccia (1999), Fountas and Aristotelous (1999), Rose (2000), Rose andWincoop (2001), Anderton
and Skudelny (2001), Rose and Engel (2002), Glick and Rose (2002), Bun and Klaassen (2002), Nitsch (2002, 2004),
De Nardis and Vicarelli (2003), Micco et al. (2003), Barr et al (2003), Broda and Romalis (2003) and Koren and
Szeidl (2003). See Baldwin et al (2005) for a review. In IMF (2004), a panel data empirical analysis is performed,
nding some negative impacts of exchange volatility on trade, but those impacts are also not robust, mainly to the
introduction of country time-varying eects.
6More recently, Berthou and Fontagné (2008), Esteve-Pérez et al (2008) and Fontagné et al (2009) use rm-level
data to nd signicant trade eects from the introduction of the Euro.
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could (...) have hysteretic eects. Additional research is needed to explore this conjecture7. We
design a theoretical model that answers this call by analyzing the role of exchange rate volatility
in enhancing the value of a specic strategic option, available to any potential exporter: waiting
one more period before entering the export market. This represents an application of the real
options approach developed in Dixit (1989) to the interaction between exchange rate volatility and
export market entry. Some pivotal components in this framework are (i) the uncertainty around
future exchange rates, (ii) the existence of sunk entry costs, (iii) the entry decision timing, previous
to the realization of the future exchange rates, and (iv) the irreversibility of the entry decision.
Under such conditions, rms become vulnerable to unfavorable exchange rate realizations after
entry. This vulnerability, associated to the sunk cost of entry, produces a theoretical rationale for
entry hysteresis, by enhancing the value of waiting as defensive strategy. Broll and Eckwert (1999)
build a theoretical model close to this approach, abstracting away from components (ii)-(iv) and
considering instead that there are no entry costs, that the rm decides if to enter after observing
the exchange rate and that she may exit the export market at any time. This alternative context
produces, instead, a theoretical argument in favor of a positive impact of exchange risk on the
value of entering the export market8.
Baldwin and Krugman (1989) also build a theoretical framework assessing the real options of
entering and exiting the export market9. In their model, hysteresis is driven by the gap between
the export-market entry cost and the ongoing maintenance costs associated to that market. We
wish, instead, to underline, isolate and understand the role of exchange rate volatility in the entry
hysteresis. Moreover, our model uses a realistic stochastic process to represent exchange rate
motion and aims at producing an empirically testable closed form rule guiding the entry decision.
These two features answer two improvement needs made explicit in Baldwin and Krugman (1989):
to abandon the (unrealistic) i.i.d. assumption in the conditional distribution of the future exchange
rate and to assess the empirical importance of the eects at hand.
7Baldwin (1988) explores the role of hysteresis in the impact of exchange rate shocks on market entry/exit,
after the shocks take place. Dierently, our study assesses the role of potential future exchange rate variations in
determining current entry hysteresis, before those variations occur.
8Examples of other studies exploring positive impacts of exchange rate volatility on the value of the real option
of exporting are Franke (1991) and Sercu and Vanhulle (1992).
9Firms, in this model, are foreign and face the decision of entering a domestic market to sell their products.
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Our model follows closely the theoretical framework in Handley and Limão (2012). Sections
2 and 3 replicate its monopolistic competition setting and the zero-prot condition determining
market entry under certainty; dierently, trade taris and wages are not considered, exchange
rate is made explicit instead, and new forms of heterogeneity across production sectors are added.
Firm productivity remains the pivotal dimension with respect to which export market entry is
determined10. Section 4 designs a stochastic path for the relevant policy variable, similar to the
one in Handley and Limão (2012) in its shock-driven dynamics and in its focus on the potential
worst-case scenario for future policy. The specic policy motion process, though, is distinct, in
order to eectively represent the specic dynamics of our policy variable: the exchange rate. This
motion process distinction translates into a distinct set of conditions determining market entry
under uncertainty, in Section 5. Nevertheless, these conditions follow the real options approach
taken in Handley and Limão (2012), leading to a similar interrelation between the entry thresholds
with and without uncertainty. The channel through which policy credibility operates is also the
same - the probability of policy shocks -, although now designed (in Section 6) under a framework
specic to the policy experiment at hand: the European currency union. Given the clear role of
exchange volatility in the closed-form entry threshold under uncertainty, Section 6 derives objective
hypotheses concerning the Euro impact on export market entry. Such hypotheses pave the way
for promising empirical research.
The model predicts that, by reducing exchange volatility, the Euro reduces hysteresis and
lowers the export-market entry threshold, promoting rm entry. The framework we design does
not account for potential general equilibrium eects associated to the simultaneous introduction
of the Euro in a broad set of countries. One example of such eects is the enhanced competition
in intra-Eurozone trade, produced by the additional rm entry (e.g. if more French rms start
exporting to Italy after the Euro is introduced, the same happens with German rms, meaning
that French exporters will face additional competition in the Italian market after the Euro). Such
competition increase could induce export price decline, countering and potentially o-setting the
direct entry promotion from the Euro introduction. Baldwin et al (2008) and Fontagné et al (2009)
10As in Melitz (2003), rms face a xed cost to enter the foreign market, and, as an output of the framework,
only a range of the most competitive rms will nd it protable to export.
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present evidence supporting this competition-driven price reduction11. Even in the presence of
this general equilibrium eect, our model remains adequate to analyze the accession to a currency
union by an isolated country (the Eurozone enlargements provide recent experiences of the kind;
see Flandreau and Maurel, 2005, for an example of monetary union involving two countries only,
the Austro-Hungarian union).
As mentioned above, the next sections describe the theoretical model. Appendix B generically
provides details on its mechanics. Any other specic Appendix section providing additional details
shall be explicitly mentioned.
11Baldwin et al (2008) extract this conclusion from (i) the absence of empirical support for trade diversion by EZ
exports towards EZ markets  which would concomitantly result from transaction costs reduction , (ii) the presence
of evidence supporting a broad price reduction in EZ imports, regardless the origin country, (iii) the presence of
evidence supporting the trend towards the usage of pricing-to-market strategy by non-EZ exporters when assessing
the EZ, (iv) the empirical evidence pointing the absence of product-type portfolio expansion in non-EZ exports to
EZ  one of the arguments pointed in earlier studies to explain the empirical invisibility of trade diversion towards
the EZ  (this evidence conrms (i)) and (indirectly) from (v) the presence of evidence supporting the increasing
convergence of exports prices within the EZ.
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2 Demand, Supply and Pricing
The model operates on a monopolistic competition setting. Consumers in importing country i face
price piv (denoted in country i's currency) for each unit of product v. Their optimal demand for
product v, qiv, is given by
qiv =
µsYi
Pis
(
piv
Pis
)−σs
,
where Pis =
[´
v∈Ωs (piv)
1−σs dv
]1/1−σs
represents the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) price
index of sector s, Yi the aggregate income of country i, µs the income share devoted to goods from
sector s, and σs > 1 the constant elasticity of substitution, heterogeneous across sectors s ∈ S.
Note that piv includes any existing trade costs
12. Each product v belongs to a given sector s, which
corresponds to a set of products Ωs, a sub-sector of Ω (v ∈ Ωs ⊆ Ω).13
Firm j, located in country x and exporting v to country i, receives pxiv =
piv
ex,i
per unit sold,
where pxiv is measured in country x's currency and e
x,i represents the exchange rate between
countries x and i, measuring the amount of i currency units per x currency unit. Firm j's marginal
cost for producing product v, cj, is heterogeneous across rms, is constant for each rm, and has
the form
cj =
c
aj
,
where aj represents a measure of rm j's productivity, c represents the the unitary price of inputs
originating from country x  measured in country x's currency, heterogeneous in x, and constant
for all rms and products within x.14
12Including dealer costs, transportation and advertising.
13Note that S denotes the set of sectors, while each sector s and the universe of varieties, Ω, are sets of products.
Optimal demand function qiv may be obtained from standard optimization of the representative consumer's utility
function associated to consumption of goods from sector s, U = Qµss q
1−µs
0 , where Qs =
[´
v∈Ωs q
ρs
v dv
]1/ρs
and
ρs = 1− 1σs .
14We omit the index x for simplicity, given we focus on a same and unique origin country. Marginal cost cj =
c
aj
may be rationalized by a rm j's production function of the form Qj = C
α
j L
1−α
j m, where Cj and Lj represent,
respectively, the capital and labor stocks used by rm j and m represents the quantity of intermediate inputs used.
Assuming the capital and labor stocks are constant (short term), the total cost function Tj = cm(Qj)+wLj + rKj
(where c, w and r represent unitary prices of intermediate inputs, labor and capital, respectively) only depends on
Qj through the quantities of intermediate inputs used: Qj = C
α
j L
1−α
j m ⇔ m(Qj) =
Qj
Cαj L
1−α
j
. Under such a setting,
marginal cost associated to Qj will be cj =
∂Tj
∂Qj
= c
∂m(Qj)
∂Qj
= c
Cαj L
1−α
j
, where Cαj L
1−α
j ≡ aj . Under such a setting,
productivity is increasing in labor and capital stocks.
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Firms maximize prot xjis =
(
piv
ex,i
− cj
)
qiv, reaching the mark-up rule
15
p∗xiv =
c
ρsaj
,
where 0 < ρs = 1− 1σs < 1.
Using this optimal pricing strategy and the optimal demand function in the prot function we
obtain (after simplication) optimal prots
∗
xjis = Ais
aσs−1j
(ex,i)σs
,
where Ais ≡
(
ρσss
σs−1
)
µsYi(Pis)
σS−1c1−σS . Note that optimal prots (expressed in x's currency) are
decreasing in ex,i, but this sensitivity is heterogeneous across sectors16.
15 ∂
∂piv
[(
piv
ex,i − cj
)
qiv
]
= 0 ⇔ ∂∂piv
[(
piv
ex,i − cj
)
µsYi
Pis
(
piv
Pis
)−σs]
= 0 ⇔ piv = cjρs e
x,i ⇔ pxiv = cjρs
16
∂ ln ∗jis
∂ ln ex,i = −σs
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3 Deterministic entry setup
This section discusses export market entry in the absence of uncertainty. Firm j enters the foreign
market of country i if the present discounted value of the exporting prots exceeds the sunk cost
of entry Kxi (expressed in x's currency)
∗
xjis
1− β
≥Kxi,
where β represents the inter-temporal discount factor. The condition above denes, in equality(∗
xjis= [1− β]Kxi
)
, the deterministic productivity threshold
aDis =
[
Kxi (1− β)
Ais
] 1
σs−1 (
ex,i
) σs
σs−1 .
All rms with productivity above aDis enter the export market. Note that, given σs > 1, a currency
x appreciation (depreciation) ex,i ↑ (↓) induces exit (entry)17. The underlying intuition is simple:
a currency x appreciation (depreciation) produces an increase (decrease) in the optimum foreign
output price p∗iv = p
∗
xive
x,i, which, in turn, leads to a decrease (increase) in demand qiv and a
consequent decrease (increase) in optimum prots ∗xjiv = (p
∗
xiv − cj) qiv, making the prots' present
discounted value smaller, relative the constant sunk cost Kxi, for any rm j with a given produc-
tivity aj. The magnitude of this exchange rate impact on the entry threshold is also sector-specic,
as shown by the elasticity of the threshold to a denitive change in ex,i is
∂ ln aDis
∂ ln ex,i
=
σs
σs − 1
.
The deterministic productivity entry-threshold is the same for all rms exporting a product
from the same sector to the same foreign market  it's value is sector- and market-specic. The
marginal entrant is the least productive exporting rm18.
17Detailed proof in Appendix B, Appreciation-/depreciation-induced entry/exit.
18If one assumes aDis is positively correlated with capital and labor stocks it is also the smallest exporting rm.
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4 Exchange rate motion
To introduce exchange rate dynamics, we consider a process according to which Eit+1 := ln e
x,i
t+1
will remain xed at the current level Eit := ln e
x,i
t with some probability (1− γ) , 0 < γ < 1; with
probability γ, Eit+1 6= Eit and EiT , T > t, follows a discrete Markov process, characterized by two
states, Low (L) and High (H), and the following transition probabilities piIJ , I, J ∈ {L,H}:
EiT+1
EiL E
i
H
EiT E
i
L p
i
LL p
i
LH
EiH p
i
HL p
i
HH
where EiH > E
i
L and Σ
J=L,H
piIJ = 1, I = L,H.
19 Once having switched to this discrete Markov
process, EiT never returns to E
i
t .
As shown by Kopecky and Suen (2010), the Rouwenhorst method (distinctively) allows this
type of discrete processes to approximate the AR(1) continuous stochastic process, often pointed
as the best framework to model the behavior of the (logarithm of the) exchange rate - see Meese
and Rogo (1983a, 1983b), Balke et al (2011) and Bekaert and Gray (1998) (the latter regarding
target-zone regimes)20. In order to attain clear comparative statics and closed form solutions, we
consider the simple 2-state discrete process above.
Under a xed-exchange regime, γ < 1 represents the probability of regime change (towards a
free-oat or a target-zone) and, under a free-oat or a target-zone, γ = 1 and the exchange rate
follows the Markov process above21.
For the transition towards the Markov process, we dene the probabilities
piEtI = Pr
(
Eit+1 = E
i
I |Eit 6= EiL, Eit 6= EiH
)
, I = L,H.
19For simplicity, we abandon the superscript x. In its absence, all the analysis refers to the same source country
x.
20More specically, Kopecky and Suen (2010) prove that the Rouwenhorst method matches the conditional and
unconditional mean and variance and the rst-order autocorrelation of any stationary AR(1) process, showing also
that this method is distinctively accurate in replicating the parameters/observations of that continuous process and
is distinctively robust with respect to variation in the persistence of the process, the number of points used in the
discrete approximation and the procedure used to generate model statistics.
21Note that the assumption of γ = 1 under a free-oat/target-zone implies the allocation of probability zero to
the event of returning to a xed-exchange regime.
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5 Entry setup with uncertainty
This section describes the entry setup, under the uncertainty originated by the exchange-rate
motion process described in the previous section. Dene Vo (.) , o = e, w, as the value of an
exporting (o = e) or a non-exporting (o = w) rm - for a non-exporting rm, these value functions
may be interpreted as the value of the real options of entering and waiting in the next period,
respectively. Assuming Vo(.) to be continuous in the exchange rate, ∃EiUj (exchange rate threshold)
such that rm j is indierent between exporting and non-exporting:
Ve(E
iU
j , aj)−Kxi = Vw(EiUj , aj).
By denition, the rm that is indierent between exporting and non-exporting given the current
(log) exchange rate Eit - the cuto rm -, is that for which E
iU
j = E
i
t . We shall assume E
i
L < E
i
t <
EiH , ∀t, and, thus, the cuto rm enters (waits) whenever ET = EiL (ET = EiH).
The productivity threshold under uncertainty aUist (separating exporters from non-exporters)
shall be precisely the productivity held by the cuto rm. In order to determine it's value, we
consider the following system of value functions describing the cuto rm, still out of the export
market at the beginning of period t and (alternatively) facing a (log) exchange rate of Eit (the
current exchange rate), EiL or E
i
H :
22
22Eit 6= EiL and Eit 6= EiH . The exit option is not analyzed nor modeled.
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Ve(E
i
t , a
U
ist) = xjis(E
i
t , a
U
ist) + (1− γ) βVe(Eit , aUist) + γβ
[
ΣI=L,H
{
piEtI .Ṽe(E
i
I , a
U
ist)
}]
(5.1)
Vw(E
i
t , a
U
ist) = (1− γ) βVw(Eit , aUist) + γβ
[
piEtL
(
Ṽe(E
i
L, a
U
ist)−Kxi
)
+ piEtH .Ṽw(E
i
H , a
U
ist)
]
(5.2)
Ṽe(E
i
I , a
U
ist) = πxjis(E
i
I , a
U
ist) + β
[
ΣJ=L,H
{
piIJ .Ṽe(E
i
J , a
U
ist)
}]
, I = L,H (5.3)
Ṽw(E
i
I , a
U
ist) = β
[
piIL.
(
Ṽe(E
i
L, a
U
ist)−Kxi
)
+ piIH .Ṽw(E
i
H , a
U
ist)
]
, I = L,H , (5.4)
Ve(E
i
t , a
U
ist)−Kxi = Vw(Eit , aUist), (5.5)
where xjis(.) represents the optimal prot function
23 and Ṽo(.) describe the value of the rm
when the exchange rate follows the Markov process described in Section 4. Note that, in the
sub-problem dened by this discrete Markov process, we assume that rms enter if Eit+1 = E
i
L and
wait if Eit+1 = E
i
H - see equations (5.2) and (5.4). The optimality of such strategy is ensured by the
conditions EiUj = E
i
t , E
i
L < E
i
t < E
i
H and γp
i
EtH
> piLH , which we take henceforth as assumptions
(see Appendix C for details on the determination of these sucient conditions).
Using (5.1)-(5.5), we attain the uncertainty threshold24
aUist = a
D
ist
[
1− βpiHH + βγpiEtH
1− βpiHH + βγpiEtH . exp {σs [E
i
t − EiH ]}
] 1
σs−1
. (5.6)
23Asterisk is dropped for notation simplicity.
24See Appendix A for further details on this threshold determination.
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This productivity threshold under uncertainty consists of a transformation of the deterministic
threshold25. Note that
1− exp
{
σs
[
Eit − EiH
]}
= 1− xjis (E
i
H)
xjis (Eit)
represents the percentage loss in prots from a potential jump from the current exchange rate Eit
to the worst case scenario EiH . By assumption, E
i
H (E
i
L) may assume any value higher (lower)
than Eit , implying that E
i
t − EiH < 0 and aUist > aDist: the prot loss from a jump to the exchange
rate worst scenario produces an hysteresis gap between the deterministic and the uncertainty
thresholds, and this gap is increasing in that prot loss. In spite of the optimal-prot function
convexity in the exchange rate (lowering risk aversion), uncertainty induces an increase in the
productivity threshold the rms must overcome in order to rationally decide entering the export
market - due to uncertainty, some rms that would otherwise enter, now choose to wait26:
aDist = a
U
ist |γ=0, aDist < aUist |γ 6=0,
∂aUist
∂γ
> 0.
Moreover, the sensitivity of the ratio
aUist
aDist
with respect to the worst-scenario potential shock, Eit−
EiH , depends on σs, meaning that this uncertainty-driven threshold amplication is heterogeneous
across sectors.
25Note that aUist = a
D
ist when γ = 0.
26Note that only bad news impact the decision.
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6 Exchange rate policy
We dene as exchange rate policy intervention an isolated change in the value of the exchange
rate, induced by the monetary authority (e.g. an isolated depreciation), and as exchange rate
policy regime an intended exchange rate agenda to be pursued by the monetary authority (e.g.
xed exchange rate).
We assume that a policy intervention induces a change in the current (log) exchange rate Eit
and that the introduction of a new exchange rate policy regime induces both a change in Eit and
a change in the probability of regime shift, as follows
γit = γfree + (γeuro − γfree) euroit + (γfix − γfree) fixit + (γtarget − γfree) targetit,
where euroit represents a dummy signaling the Eurozone membership by both countries x and i
(at period t), fixit represents a dummy signaling the presence, in period t, of a xed-exchange
regime (other than the Euro) between the currencies of those two countries, and targetit represents
the presence in t of a target zone constraining the exchange rate between x and i.
Although the Euro may be considered a special case of a xed-exchange regime, the extremely
low reversibility associated to a currency unication may grant this policy a distinctively higher
commitment credibility than that of any xed-exchange regime.
In the context of a free-oat regime (euroit = fixit = targetit = 0), the probability of regime
shift is γfree, but, with the introduction of an exchange-rate-constraining policy regime, this prob-
ability shifts to: (a) γeuro if both countries belong to the Eurozone, (b) γfix if a xed-exchange
regime dierent than the Euro is implemented in the exchange between x and i, or (c) γtarget if a
target zone is implemented between x and i.
An empirical test to the model may use a set of exporting and non-exporting rms and the
uncertainty-threshold specication (5.6) to test hypotheses (i) γeuro < γfix < γtarget < γfree, (ii)
γeuro = 0 and (iii) γfree = 1. Note that, under a xed-exchange or the Euro, we interpret γ exactly
as the probability of regime shift; under a target-zone, this parameter may be interpreted instead
as a moderator of transition probabilities towards EiH and E
i
L (γp
i
EtH
and γpiEtH , respectively).
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Conclusion
Exchange rate risk is crucial to international economic policy and its elimination is one of the
benets attributed to the European currency union project. The introduction of the Euro produced
a distinctive exchange uncertainty reduction, due to the extraordinary credibility associated to such
policy action.
This study presents a theoretical model using the real options approach to understand how
exchange rate volatility may induce hysteresis in export-market entry. The model combines (i)
uncertainty around future exchange rates, (ii) sunk entry costs, (iii) entry decision preceding the
realization of the future exchange rates, and (iv) irreversibility of the entry decision. Its monopo-
listic competition setting and the productivity-driven rm heterogeneity produce a market entry
threshold representing the productivity level below which rms rationally decide not to enter the
export market. The sunk cost of entry and the vulnerability of rms to potential unfavorable
exchange rate scenarios assign value to the real option of waiting before entering, as defensive
strategy. Therefore, the market entry threshold is multiplied under uncertainty, raising the pro-
ductivity level that rms must overcome before beneting from entry.
The stochastic process designed to represent exchange rate motion mimics empirically observed
exchange rate dynamics and isolates the probability of exchange rate change over time. The entry
threshold under uncertainty is increasing in this exchange rate change probability. Moreover, the
closed form derived for the entry threshold allows the empirical estimation of this probability
and, more specically, allows to test its reduction after the introduction of target-zone, xed or
common-currency exchange rate regimes. A negative impact by such regimes on the probability
of exchange rate change is equivalent to threshold reduction and, thus, export-market entry.
The impact of the Euro on entry via uncertainty reduction may, thus, be tested by analyzing
the evolution of the estimated probability of exchange rate change around the introduction of the
European common currency. Data on the number of exporting and non-exporting rms in any
Eurozone economy may allow this empirical assessment. Destination country identication shall
allow the use of non-Eurozone economies as an important comparison group; business sector iden-
tication may be used to test the impact heterogeneity predicted in the entry threshold closed
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form. There are general equilibrium eects not acknowledged by our model - e.g. the enhanced
competition in intra-Euro international trade, due to simultaneous adhesion by several countries
- which could counter and potentially oset the entry-promotion impact through reduced uncer-
tainty. One way to overcome such caveat is to assess the adhesion to the Euro by an isolated
country or by a limited set of countries.
The distinctive power of the Euro, associated to its credibility and to its irreversibility stance,
may also be tested by replicating that probability estimation around other exchange rate regimes.
A post-Euro especially intense decline in the probability of exchange rate change (compared to
the probability decline after a target-zone or a xed-exchange regime) shall provide empirical
support for the extraordinary uncertainty-reduction impact by the European currency union. More
specically, a null probability of exchange rate change after the Euro introduction represents
evidence of exchange uncertainty elimination.
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APPENDIX
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A. Uncertainty threshold determination in detail
For notation simplicity, dene π (.) as the optimal prot function, Ek = E
i
k, k = L, t,H, and
pmn ≡ pimn, m = EL, Et, EH and n = EL, EH . Using equations (5.3) and (5.4) we attain
Ve(EI , a
U
ist) =
(1− βpJJ) π(EI , aUist) + βpIJπ(EJ , aUist)
(1− βpHH) (1− βpLL)− β2pLH .pHL
, I 6= J, I, J ∈ {L,H} (6.1)
Vw(EH , a
U
ist) =
βpHL
(1− βpHH) (1− βpLL)− β2pLH .pHL
π(EL, a
U
ist)+
+
β2pLH .pHL
(1− βpHH) [(1− βpHH) (1− βpLL)− β2pLH .pHL]
π(EH , a
U
ist)−
βpHL
1− βpHH
K (6.2)
Using (5.1), (5.2), (6.1) and (6.2), we attain
Ve(Et, a
U
ist) =
1
1− (1− γ) β
π(Et, a
U
ist)+
+
γβ
1− (1− γ) β
1
(1− βpHH) (1− βpLL)− β2pLH .pHL
.
.

∑
I, J ∈ {L,H}
I 6= J
{
pEtI
[
(1− βpJJ) π(EI , aUist) + βpIJπ(EJ , aUist)
]}

(6.3)
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Vw(Et, a
U
ist) =
γβ
1− (1− γ) β
(1− β) pEtL + βpHL
(1− βpHH) (1− βpLL)− β2pLH .pHL
.[
π(EL, a
U
ist) +
βpLH
1− βpHH
π(EH , a
U
ist)
]
−
− γβ
1− (1− γ) β
(
pEtL +
βpEtHpHL
1− βpHH
)
K (6.4)
We then determine the productivity threshold under uncertainty aUist by applying (6.3) and (6.4)
to (5.5).
B. Derivations and proofs
Maximizing prots to reach optimal pricing strategy
∂∗jiv
∂piv
= 0 ⇔ ∂
∂piv
( piv
ex,i
− cj
)
qiv = 0 ⇔
⇔ ∂
∂piv
( piv
ex,i
− cj
) µsYi
Pis
(
piv
Pis
)−σs
= 0 ⇔
⇔ 1
ex,i
µsYi
Pis
(
piv
Pis
)−σs
− σs
( piv
ex,i
− cj
) µsYi
P 1−σsis
p−σs−1iv = 0 ⇔
⇔ 1− σs
ex,i
µsYi
P 1−σsis
p−σsiv + σscj
µsYi
P 1−σsis
p−σs−1iv = 0 ⇔
piv 6=0
⇔
piv 6=0
1− σs
ex,i
piv = −σscj ⇔
⇔ piv = −
σscje
x,i
1− σs
⇔
ρs=1− 1σs
p∗iv =
cje
x,i
ρs
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Optimal prots
∗
xjiv =
(
p∗iv
ex,i
− cj
)
qiv =
(
cj
ρs
− cj
)
µsYi
Pis
(
p∗iv
Pis
)−σs
=
=
(
σs
σs − 1
− 1
)
cj
µsYi
Pis
(
cj
ρs
ex,i
Pis
)−σs
=
=
(
ρσss
σs − 1
)
µsYi(Pis)
σS−1c1−σS︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Ais
aσs−1j
(ex,i)σs
Deterministic entry threshold
∗
xjis
1− β
= Kxi ⇔ Ais
aσs−1j
(ex,i)σs
= (1− β)Kxi ⇔ aj =
[
(1− β)Kxi
Ais
]1/σs−1 (
ex,i
) σs
σs−1
Appreciation-/depreciation-induced entry/exit
∂aDis
∂ex,i
= σs
σs−1
[
Kxi(1−β)
Ais
]1/σs−1
(ex,i)
1
σs−1 > 0. Thus, an increase (decrease) in ex,i produces an increase
(decrease) in aDis and a consequent decrease (increase) in the number of rms that export (rms
with productivity aj such that aj > a
D
is) - rm exit (entry).
Elasticity of the threshold w.r.t. ex,i
∂ ln aDis
∂ ln ex,i
=
∂
∂ ln ex,i
{
1
σs − 1
ln
[
Kxi (1− β)
Ais
]}
+
σs
σs − 1
∂
∂ ln ex,i
ln ex,i =
σs
σs − 1
Prot loss under EiH
1−xjis
(
EiH
)
xjis
(
Eit
) = 1−Aisaσs−1j (exp{EiH})−σs
Aisa
σs−1
j
(
exp
{
Eit
})−σs = 1−
(
exp
{
Eit
})σs(
exp
{
EiH
})σs = 1−(exp {Eit − EiH})σs = 1−exp {σS [Eit − EiH ]}
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Uncertainty impact:∂a
U
ist
∂γ > 0
∂aUist
∂γ
=
aDist
σs − 1
∂
∂γ
[
1− βpiHH + βγpiEtH
1− βpiHH + βγpiEtH . exp {σs [E
i
t − EiH ]}
]
=
=
aDist
σs − 1
[
βpiEtH
(
1− βpiHH + βγpiEtH . exp {σs [E
i
t − EiH ]}
)(
1− βpiHH + βγpiEtH . exp {σs [E
i
t − EiH ]}
)2
]
−
− a
D
ist
σs − 1
[(
1− βpiHH + βγpiEtH
)
βpiEtH . exp {σs [E
i
t − EiH ]}(
1− βpiHH + βγpiEtH . exp {σs [E
i
t − EiH ]}
)2
]
=
=
aDist
σs − 1
[
(1− βpiHH) βpiEtH . (1− exp {σs [E
i
t − EiH ]})(
1− βpiHH + βγpiEtH . exp {σs [E
i
t − EiH ]}
)2
]
> 0
C. Sub-problem optimality consistency
Below we determine the conditions under which we can consistently focus on the decision strategy
assumed in Section 5 for the sub-problem originated by the event Eit+1 6= Eit (exchange rate starts
following a discrete Markov process). Note that, for this sub-problem, we assume, in equations
(5.2) and (5.4), that a rm waiting in period t shall, in period t+1, enter if Eit+1 = E
i
L and wait if
Eit+1 = E
i
H . Below, we show that, if E
i
L < E
i
t < E
i
H and γp
i
EtH
> piLH , rms to which that strategy
is sub-optimal have trivial solutions for the full-problem characterized by equations (5.1)-(5.4)
(rms that always enter in the sub-problem will always enter in the full-problem and rms that
never enter in the sub-problem never enter in the full-problem). Thus, under those conditions, the
only set of rms to which the productivity threshold under uncertainty aUis is relevant is the set of
rms to which that sub-problem strategy is optimal.
In this exercise, we follow Dixit (1989), using a slightly dierent notation27. Ṽw(e)(.) and
Vw(e)(.) shall now denote the value of a rm that was outside (inside) the export market before
the current period started. This value will already be the outcome of the optimal decision between
entering and waiting in the current period, whereas in equations (5.1)-(5.4), Ṽw(e)(.) and Vw(e)(.)
represent the value of a rm, should it wait (enter) during the current period - the value of
each specic option, instead of the value of the optimal choice. The results are the same to those
27See the appendixes of this study, available at
http://www4.ncsu.edu/~jjseater/PDF/Classes/784Dixit_Entry&Exit_Appendices_JPE_Jun1989.pdf
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attained through the setup used in (5.1)-(5.4), as shown, for instance, by the full match between
the uncertainty threshold obtained in (5.6) and that attained in the very last result of this section.
Other notation changes are adopted, for simplicity (e.g. Ei ≡ Eit and piH ≡ piEtH).
We start by exploring the sub-problem setup and determine the thresholds delimiting the sets of
rms that have distinct optimal strategies; afterwards, we move to the full-problem and determine
the productivity threshold under uncertainty aUis for each of those types of rms, determining also
the conditions under which aUis becomes irrelevant to the rms that never (always) enter in the
sub-problem.
Sub-Problem Setup
The exchange rate can only assume one of two possible values, EiL and E
i
H . The transition
probabilities are pLL, pLH , pHH , and pHL. There are two state variables, the exchange rate and a
discrete variable equal to w when the rm is not exporting and to e when the rm is exporting.
Becoming an exporter entails the payment of a sunk cost Kxi and a ow of prots πe (ais, E
i
L)
or πe (ais, E
i
H), where ais is the productivity of the rm. Not exporting implies a ow of prots
πw (ais). The decision problem consists of optimally choosing the trade status; the resulting value
functions are Ṽw(.) and Ṽe(.). If the rm is not exporting and chooses to start exporting, it acquires
the value corresponding to the exporting status (and vice-versa). The value function in each status,
net of the switching cost, is the terminal payo function for the other status. Note that, in the
absence of per-period costs of exporting: (i) there is no reason to stop exporting once you have
started, (ii) the only reason why a rm might not start exporting is that the associated expected
prots ow, once the discount rate β has been taken into account, is not sucient to cover the
export sunk entry cost Kxi. Note that (ii) bites less for more productive rms.
The intuition is that very productive rms (a > agis) will prefer to start exporting both at E
i
L
and at EiH , rms with an intermediate productivity level
(
abis < a < a
g
is
)
prefer to start exporting
at EiL but not at E
i
H , and less productive rms
(
a < abis
)
will never choose to start exporting. We
can dene three productivity intervals, described by the two cutos abis and a
g
is, with a
b
is ≤ a
g
is.
Next, we determine these cutos.
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The Problem of a Non-exporter
Consider a non-exporting rm with productivity ais and facing the current exchange rate E
i
L. The
value of the rm is Ṽw(E
i
L, ais). The rm optimally chooses if to become an exporter or not as
follows. If the rm enters into the export market its value switches to Ṽe(E
i
L, ais) but the rm has
to pay Kxi. Alternatively, the rm could stay out of the export market for one more period, get
πwxis in the current period, and start the new period with the exchange rate E
i
H with probability
pLH or E
i
L with probability pLL. The expected continuation value is
E
[
Ṽw(E
i
L + dE
i
L, ais)
]
= piLLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
LH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais).
By Bellman's Principle of Optimality, Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) must be the better of the two alternatives, that
is,
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) = max
{
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais)−Kxi, πwxis (ais) + β
[
piLLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
LH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]}
.
Following similar steps, the Bellman equation when the current exchange rate is EiH is,
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) = max
{
Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)−Kxi, πwxis (ais) + β
[
piHLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
HH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]}
.
Such equations produce the following conditions.
1. ∀ais ≤ abis
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) = πwxis (ais) + β
[
piLLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
LH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]
(6.5)
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) = πwxis (ais) + β
[
piHLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
HH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]
(6.6)
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) ≥ Ṽe(EiL, ais)−Kxi
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) ≥ Ṽe(EiH , ais)−Kxi
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2. ∀ais ≥ agis
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) = Ṽe(E
i
L, ais)−Kxi
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) = Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)−Kxi (6.7)
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) ≥ πwxis (ais) + β
[
piLLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
LH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) ≥ πwxis (ais) + β
[
piHLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
HH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]
3. ∀ais ∈
(
abis, a
g
is
)
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) = Ṽe(E
i
L, ais)−Kxi (6.8)
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) = πwxis (ais) + β
[
piHLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
HH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]
(6.9)
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) ≥ πwxis (ais) + β
[
piLLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
LH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) ≥ Ṽe(EiH , ais)−Kxi
The Problem of an Exporter
In the case of an exporting rm we do not need to distinguish between the three cases above.
Consider an exporting rm with productivity ais when the current exchange rate is E
i
L. The value
of the rm is Ṽe(E
i
L, ais). The rm has no reason to choose to stop exporting. Its value is equal
to the cash ow from selling in the domestic and foreign markets plus the expected continuation
value, i.e.
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais) = πwxis (ais) + πexis
(
ais, E
i
L
)
+ β
[
piLLṼe(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
LH Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)
]
, (6.10)
and
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais) ≥ Ṽw(EiL, ais).
If the current exchange rate is EiH instead,
Ṽe(E
i
H , ais) = πwxis (ais) + πexis
(
ais, E
i
H
)
+ β
[
piHLṼe(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
HH Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)
]
, (6.11)
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and
Ṽe(E
i
H , ais) ≥ Ṽw(EiH , ais).
Solution
The goal is to solve for the two cuto values abis and a
g
is.
First, consider the two equalities (6.5) and (6.6) in the
(
−∞, abis
)
region. We can use them to
solve for Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) and Ṽw(E
i
H , ais).
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) =
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiLL
+ β
piLH
1− βpiLL
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) =
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiHH
+ β
piHL
1− βpiHH
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais)
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) = ν
i
[
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiLL
+ β
piLH
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais)
]
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) = ν
i
[
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiHH
+ β
piHL
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais)
]
where νi = (1− β2piLHpiHL/ [(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)])
−1
.
Similarly, consider the two equalities (6.10) and (6.11) in the whole support (−∞,+∞). We
can use them to solve for Ṽe(E
i
L, ais) and Ṽe(E
i
H , ais).
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais) =
πwxis (ais) + πexis (ais, E
i
L)
1− βpiLL
+ β
piLH
1− βpiLL
Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)
Ṽe(E
i
H , ais) =
πwxis (ais) + πexis (ais, E
i
H)
1− βpiHH
+ β
piHL
1− βpiHH
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais)
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais) = ν
i
[
(1− βpiHH) + β (1− piLL)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais) +
πexis (ais, E
i
L)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiLHπexis (ais, E
i
H)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
(6.12)
Ṽe(E
i
H , ais) = ν
i
[
(1− βpiLL) + β (1− piHH)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais) +
πexis (ais, E
i
H)
1− βpiHH
+
βpiHLπexis (ais, E
i
L)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
.
(6.13)
We shall now solve for abis. Using the expressions above for Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) and Ṽe(E
i
L, ais) and
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equation (6.8) evaluated at the abis cuto, we can solve for a
b
is,
Ṽw(E
i
L, a
b
is) = Ṽe(E
i
L, a
b
is)−Kxi
νi
[
πwxis
(
abis
)
1− βpiLL
+ β
piLH
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis
(
abis
)]
=
= νi
[
(1− βpiHH) + β (1− piLL)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis
(
abis
)
+
πexis
(
abis, E
i
L
)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiLHπexis
(
abis, E
i
H
)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
−Kxi
πwxis
(
abis
)
+ β
piLH
(1− βpiHH)
πwxis
(
abis
)
=
=
(1− βpiHH) + β (1− piLL)
(1− βpiHH)
πwxis
(
abis
)
+ πexis
(
abis, E
i
L
)
+
βpiLHπexis
(
abis, E
i
H
)
(1− βpiHH)
−
(
1− βpiLL
) Kxi
νi
πexis
(
abis, E
i
L
)
+
βpiLH
(1− βpiHH)
πexis
(
abis, E
i
H
)
=
(
1− βpiLL
) Kxi
νi
Ais
(
abis
)σs−1(
ex,iL
)σs + βpiLH(1− βpiHH)Ais
(
abis
)σs−1(
ex,iH
)σs = (1− βpiLL) Kxiνi
abis =
(
1− βpiLL
) 1
σs−1
[
1(
ex,iL
)σs + βpiLH
(1− βpiHH)
(
ex,iH
)σs
]− 1
σs−1 ( Kxi
Aisνi
) 1
σs−1
⇔
⇔ abis =
([(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2piLHpiHL
] Kxi
Ais
) 1
σs−1
[
1− βpiHH
exp {σsEiL}
+
βpiLH
exp {σsEiH}
]− 1
σs−1
Similarly, we now solve for the agis cuto. First, though, we need to nd an expression for
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) valid at a
g
is. We can use (6.8), (6.9), and (6.12)
98
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) =
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiHH
+
β
1− βpiHH
piHLṼw(E
i
L, ais)
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) =
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiHH
+
β
1− βpiHH
piHL
[
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais)−Kxi
]
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) =
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiHH
+
β
1− βpiHH
piHL
{
νi
[
(1− βpiHH) + β (1− piLL)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais)
]}
+
+
β
1− βpiHH
piHL
{
νi
[
πexis (ais, E
i
L)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiLHπexis (ais, E
i
H)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
−Kxi
}
Now, using the expression above for Ṽe(E
i
H , ais) and equation (6.7) evaluated at the a
g
is cuto, we
can solve for agis,
πwxis (a
g
is)
1− βpiHH
+
+
β
1− βpiHH
piHL
{
νi
[
(1− βpiHH) + β (1− piLL)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (a
g
is)
]}
+
+
β
1− βpiHH
piHL
{
νi
[
πexis (a
g
is, E
i
L)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiLHπexis (a
g
is, E
i
H)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
−Kxi
}
=
= νi
[
(1− βpiLL) + β (1− piHH)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (a
g
is) +
πexis (a
g
is, E
i
H)
1− βpiHH
+
βpiHLπexis (a
g
is, E
i
L)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
−Kxi[
1
νi
+
βpiHL (1− βpiHH) + ββpiHL (1− piLL)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
πwxis (a
g
is)+
+
βpiHLπexis (a
g
is, E
i
L)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiHLβp
i
LHπexis (a
g
is, E
i
H)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
− βpiHL
Kxi
νi
=
=
(1− βpiLL) + β (1− piHH)
(1− βpiLL)
πwxis (a
g
is) + πexis
(
agis, E
i
H
)
+
βpiHLπexis (a
g
is, E
i
L)
(1− βpiLL)
−
(
1− βpiHH
) Kxi
νi
βpiHLπexis (a
g
is, E
i
L)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiHLβp
i
LHπexis (a
g
is, E
i
H)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
− βpiHL
Kxi
νi
=
= πexis
(
agis, E
i
H
)
+
βpiHLπexis (a
g
is, E
i
L)
(1− βpiLL)
−
(
1− βpiHH
) Kxi
νi[
1− βp
i
HLβp
i
LH
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
πexis
(
agis, E
i
H
)
= (1− β) Kxi
νi
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πexis
(
agis, E
i
H
)
= (1− β)Kxi,
since
νi =
(
1− β
2 (1− piLL) (1− piHH)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
)−1
.
Finally, using the prot function,
πexis
(
ais, E
i
)
= Ais
(ais)
σs−1
(ex,i)σs
.
we have
agis =
[
(1− β) Kxi
Ais
(
ex,iH
)σs] 1σs−1
where ex,iH = expE
i
H and Ais ≡
(
ρσss
σs−1
)
µsYi(Pis)
σS−1c1−σS .
Full Problem
We can now solve the full problem. The current exchange rate is Ei. The exchange rate in the
next period changes with probability γ. If it changes, it becomes EiL with probability p
i
L and E
i
H
with probability piH . After that, it evolves according to the transition matrix dened previously.
Just like above, an exporter has no incentive to stop exporting, while a non-exporter will start
exporting only if it expects to be able to cover the sunk cost Kxi. This is more likely the more
productive the rm is.
The intuition is that there will be a productivity cuto above which a rm decides to start
exporting. This cuto is a function of several parameters, including the size of the sunk cost,
the current exchange rate, the probability of switching to the sub-problem, and the sub-problem
cutos. We can dene two productivity intervals, described by the cuto aUis.
The Problem of a Non-exporter
Let's consider a non-exporting rm with productivity ais. The value of the rm is Vw(E
i, ais).
28
The rm optimally chooses if to become an exporter or not as follows. If the rm enters into the
28Note the dierence in notation: the value of the rm is Vw(E
i, ais) and not Ṽw(E
i, ais).
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export market its value switches to Ve(E
i, ais) but the rm has to pay Kxi. Alternatively, the rm
could stay out of the export market for one more period, when the exchange rate will have changed
to EiL with probability γp
i
L or to E
i
H with probability γp
i
H or stayed the same with probability
1 − γ. The payo from this strategy is the sum of domestic ow prots πwxis(ais) in the current
period and the expected continuation value,
E
[
Vw(E
i + dEi, ais)
]
= γpiLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + γp
i
H Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) + (1− γ)Vw(Ei, ais)
By Bellman's Principle of Optimality, Vw(E
i, ais) must be the better of the two alternatives, that
is,
Vw(E
i, ais) =
= max
{
Ve(E
i, ais)−Kxi, πwxis(ais) + β
[
γpiLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + γp
i
H Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) + (1− γ)Vw(Ei, ais)
]}
The intuition is that there is a productivity cuto value, aUis, above which the rm prefers to export.
This gives the following conditions.
• At all productivity levels at which it is optimal to stay as a non exporter, i.e. ∀ais ≤ aUis, two
conditions apply. First, we have the Bellman equation
β−1Vw(E
i, ais) = β
−1πwxis(ais) + γp
i
LṼw(E
i
L, ais) + γp
i
H Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) + (1− γ)Vw(Ei, ais).
(6.14)
The Bellman equation (6.14) makes it clear that the entitlement to the continuation value is
an asset, and that Vw(E
i, ais) is its value. On the left-hand side we have the normal return
per period of time that a decision maker (i.e. the rm's owner), using β as the discount rate,
would require for holding this asset. On the right-hand side, there is the expected rate of
capital gain (or loss), i.e. the expected total return per unit time from holding the asset. The
equality becomes a no-arbitrage or equilibrium condition, expressing the investors willingness
to hold the asset, i.e. the willingness to stay as a non exporter. The second condition is the
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inequality
Vw(E
i, ais) ≥ Ve(Ei, ais)−Kxi,
which implies that the second term in (6.14) is larger than the rst one.
• Similarly, at all ais where switching to export is optimal, i.e. ∀ais ≥ aUis, we have two
conditions. First, the inequality
β−1Vw(E
i, ais) ≥ β−1πwxis(ais) + γpiLṼw(EiL, ais) + γpiH Ṽw(EiH , ais) + (1− γ)Vw(Ei, ais),
which shows that, using again the no-arbitrage interpretation introduced above, the normal
return per period of time required for holding the "non-exporting" asset is higher than its
expected total return. Therefore, an investor would prefer not to hold the asset anymore,
i.e. to pay the cost Kxi, exercise the option right, and receive in return a new asset (i.e.
"being an exporter") whose value is Ve(E
i, ais). The second condition (often called "the
value-matching condition") implies that, over the range (aUis,+∞), the rst term in (6.14) is
the largest one,
Vw(E
i, ais) = Ve(E
i, ais)−Kxi. (6.15)
The Problem of an Exporter
Consider an exporting rm with productivity ais when the current exchange rate is E
i. The value
of the rm is Ve(E
i, ais). The rm has no reason to choose to stop exporting. Its value is equal to
the cash ow from selling in the foreign market plus the expected continuation value, i.e.
Ve(E
i, ais) = πwxis (ais)+πexis
(
ais, E
i
)
+β
[
(1− γ)Ve(Ei, ais) + γpiLṼe(EiL, ais) + γpiH Ṽe(EiH , ais)
]
,
(6.16)
and
Ve(E
i, ais) ≥ Vw(Ei, ais).
Using (6.14) and (6.16) we can solve for Vw(E
i, ais) and Ve(E
i, ais), respectively, has a function
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of the ˜V (.)s found in the sub-problem.
Vw(E
i, ais) =
πwxis(ais)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
[
γpiLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + γp
i
H Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]
Ve(E
i, ais) =
πwxis (ais) + πexis (ais, E
i)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
[
γpiLṼe(E
i
L, ais) + γp
i
H Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)
]
.
Note that the expected continuation value for a non exporter assumes a dierent form according
to the rm's current productivity level. In particular, we have to distinguish three cases on the
basis of the productivity cutos, abis and a
g
is, found in the sub-problem.
Vw(E
i, ais) =

πwxis(ais)
1−β(1−γ) +
β
1−β(1−γ)
[
γpiLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + γp
i
H Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]
, ∀ais ≤ abis
πwxis(ais)
1−β(1−γ) +
β
1−β(1−γ)
{
γpiL
[
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais)−Kxi
]
+ γpiH
[
Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)−Kxi
]}
, ∀ais ≥ agis
πwxis(ais)
1−β(1−γ) +
β
1−β(1−γ)
{
γpiL
[
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais)−Kxi
]
+ γpiH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
}
, ∀ais ∈
(
abis, a
g
is
)
We can then use equation (6.15), evaluated at aUis, to solve for a
U
is.
πwxis(a
U
is)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
[
γpiLṼw(E
i
L, a
U
is) + γp
i
H Ṽw(E
i
H , a
U
is)
]
=
=
πwxis
(
aUis
)
+ πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
[
γpiLṼe(E
i
L, a
U
is) + γp
i
H Ṽe(E
i
H , a
U
is)
]
−Kxi
Again, there are three dierent cases we should consider according to where aUis stands with respect
to abis and a
g
is. Of course, at this point we do not know which case is valid. We are going to solve
for aUis in each case and check if the value of a
U
is that we nd belongs to the assumed region of the
productivity space.
Case 1: aUis ≤ abis Here, we have
Vw(E
i, ais) =
πwxis(ais)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
[
γpiLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + γp
i
H Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]
(6.17)
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and
Ve(E
i, ais) =
πwxis (ais) + πexis (ais, E
i)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
[
γpiLṼe(E
i
L, ais) + γp
i
H Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)
]
.
(6.18)
Recall that, in the region ais < a
b
is,
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) = ν
i
[
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiLL
+ β
piLH
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais)
]
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) = ν
i
[
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiHH
+ β
piHL
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais)
]
.
Using the two equations above as well as (6.12) and (6.13), we can rewrite (6.17)
Vw(E
i, ais) =
πwxis(ais)
1− β (1− γ)
+
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
γpiLν
i
[
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiLL
+ β
piLH
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais)
]
+
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
γpiHν
i
[
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiHH
+ β
piHL
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais)
]
⇔
⇔ Vw(Ei, ais) =
[
1 + βγνi
(
piL
1− βpiLL
+
piH
1− βpiHH
+ β
piLp
i
LH + p
i
Hp
i
HL
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
)]
πwxis(ais)
1− β (1− γ)
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and (6.18)
Ve(E
i, ais) =
πwxis (ais) + πexis (ais, E
i)
1− β (1− γ)
+
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
γpiL
[
νi
(
(1− βpiHH) + β (1− piLL)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais)
)]
+
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
γpiL
[
νi
(
πexis (ais, E
i
L)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiLHπexis (ais, E
i
H)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
)]
+
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
γpiH
[
νi
(
(1− βpiLL) + β (1− piHH)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais)
)]
+
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
γpiH
[
νi
(
πexis (ais, E
i
H)
1− βpiHH
+
βpiHLπexis (ais, E
i
L)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
)]
⇔
⇔ Ve(Ei, ais) =
[
1 + βγνi
(
piL
1− βpiLL
+
piH
1− βpiHH
+ β
piLp
i
LH + p
i
Hp
i
HL
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
)]
πwxis(ais)
1− β (1− γ)
+
+
πexis (ais, E
i)
1− β (1− γ)
+
βγνi
1− β (1− γ)
[(
piL
1− βpiLL
+
βpiHp
i
HL
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
)
πexis
(
ais, E
i
L
)]
+
+
βγνi
1− β (1− γ)
[(
piH
1− βpiHH
+
βpiLp
i
LH
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
)
πexis
(
ais, E
i
H
)]
.
105
Determining aUis for Case 1
Vw(E
i, aUis) = Ve(E
i, aUis)−Kxi ⇔
⇔ Kxi =
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
1− β (1− γ)
+
βγνi
1− β (1− γ)
(
piL
1− βpiLL
+
βpiHp
i
HL(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
))πexis (aUis, EiL)+
+
βγνi
1− β (1− γ)
(
piH
1− βpiHH
+
βpiLp
i
LH(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
))πexis (aUis, EiH)⇔
⇔
(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
[1− β (1− γ)]
βγ
Kxi =
(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
βγ
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
+
+
[(
1− βpiHH
)
piL + βp
i
Hp
i
HL
]
νiπexis
(
aUis, E
i
L
)
+
[(
1− βpiLL
)
piH + βp
i
Lp
i
LH
]
νiπexis
(
aUis, E
i
H
)
⇔
⇔
[(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2
(
1− piLL
) (
1− piHH
)]
[1− β (1− γ)]
βγ
Kxi
Ais
=
=
[(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2
(
1− piLL
) (
1− piHH
)]
βγ
(
aUis
)σs−1
exp {σsEi}
+
+
[(
1− βpiHH
)
piL + βp
i
Hp
i
HL
] (aUis)σs−1
exp
{
σsEiL
} + [(1− βpiLL) piH + βpiLpiLH] (aUis)σs−1exp{σsEiH} ⇔
⇔ aUis =
[[(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2
(
1− piLL
) (
1− piHH
)]
[1− β (1− γ)]
βγ
Kxi
Ais
] 1
σs−1
.
.
[(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2piLHpiHL
βγ exp {σsEi}
+
(
1− βpiHH
)
piL + βp
i
Hp
i
HL
exp
{
σsEiL
} + (1− βpiLL) piH + βpiLpiLH
exp
{
σsEiH
} ]− 1σs−1 ⇔
⇔ aUis =
[[(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2
(
1− piLL
) (
1− piHH
)]
[1− β (1− γ)]
βγ
Kxi
Ais
] 1
σs−1
.
.
[
1− β + β − β2 − βpiHH (1− β)− βpiLL (1− β)
βγ exp {σsEi}
+
(
1− βpiHH
)
− piH (1− β)
exp
{
σsEiL
} + (1− β) piH + βpiLH
exp
{
σsEiH
} ]− 1σs−1 ⇔
⇔ aUis =
[[(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2
(
1− piLL
) (
1− piHH
)] 1− β + βγ
βγ
Kxi
Ais
] 1
σs−1
.
.
[
(1− β)
(
1 + β
[
1− piHH − piLL
])
βγ exp {σsEi}
+
(
1− βpiHH
)
− piH (1− β)
exp
{
σsEiL
} + (1− β) piH + β (1− piLL)
exp
{
σsEiH
} ]− 1σs−1 ⇔
⇔ aUis =
[[(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2
(
1− piLL
) (
1− piHH
)] 1− β + βγ
βγ
Kxi
Ais
] 1
σs−1
.
.
[
(1− β)
(
1 + β
[
1− piHH − piLL
]
βγ exp {σsEi}
+ piH
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}])+ (1− βpiHH)
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL)
exp
{
σsEiH
}]− 1σs−1
In order to compare aUis for Case 1 with the upper threshold of this region
abis =
([(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2
(
1− piLL
) (
1− piHH
)] Kxi
Ais
) 1
σs−1
[
1− βpiHH
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL)
exp
{
σsEiH
}]− 1σs−1 ,
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we build the following the ratio
aUis
abis
=
([(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2
(
1− piLL
) (
1− piHH
)]
1−β+βγ
βγ
Kxi
Ais[(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)
− β2
(
1− piLL
) (
1− piHH
)]
Kxi
Ais
) 1
σs−1
+
+
(
1− βpiHH
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL)
exp
{
σsEiH
}) 1σs−1 .
.
[
(1− β)
(
1 + β
[
1− piHH − piLL
]
βγ exp {σsEi}
+ piH
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}])+ (1− βpiHH)
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL)
exp
{
σsEiH
}]− 1σs−1 =
=
(
1− β + βγ
βγ
) 1
σs−1
+
+
(1− β) 1+β
[
1−piHH−p
i
LL
]
βγ exp{σsEi} + p
i
H
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}](
1−βpiHH
)
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β(1−piLL)
exp
{
σsEiH
} + 1
−
1
σs−1
=
=
(
1− β + βγ
βγ
) 1
σs−1
+
+
(1− β) 1+β
[
1−piHH−p
i
LL
]
βγ exp{σsEi} + p
i
H
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}](
1−βpiHH
)
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β(1−piLL)
exp
{
σsEiH
} − β(1−piLL)
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β(1−piLL)
exp
{
σsEiL
} + 1
−
1
σs−1
=
=
(
1− β + βγ
βγ
) 1
σs−1
+
+
(1− β) 1+β
[
1−piHH−p
i
LL
]
βγ exp{σsEi} + p
i
H
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}]
1+β−βpiHH−βpiLL
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL) [ 1exp{σsEiH} − 1exp{σsEiL}] + 1
−
1
σs−1
=
=
(
1− β + βγ
βγ
) 1
σs−1
+
+
1− β
βγ
1+β
[
1−piHH−p
i
LL
]
exp{σsEi} + βγp
i
H
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}]
1+β
[
1−piHH−piLL
]
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL) [ 1exp{σsEiH} − 1exp{σsEiL}] + 1
−
1
σs−1
.
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Note that, if Ei > EiL and γp
i
H > 1− piLL,
1+β
[
1−piHH−p
i
LL
]
exp{σsEi} + βγp
i
H
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}]
1+β
[
1−piHH−piLL
]
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL) [ 1exp{σsEiH} − 1exp{σsEiL}] < 1 ⇔
⇔ 1− β
βγ
1+β
[
1−piHH−p
i
LL
]
exp{σsEi} + βγp
i
H
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}]
1+β
[
1−piHH−piLL
]
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL) [ 1exp{σsEiH} − 1exp{σsEiL}] <
1− β
βγ
⇔
⇔ 1− β
βγ
1+β
[
1−piHH−p
i
LL
]
exp{σsEi} + βγp
i
H
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}]
1+β
[
1−piHH−piLL
]
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL) [ 1exp{σsEiH} − 1exp{σsEiL}] + 1 <
1− β + βγ
βγ
⇔
⇔ 1 < 1− β + βγ
βγ
1− β
βγ
1+β
[
1−piHH−p
i
LL
]
exp{σsEi} + βγp
i
H
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}]
1+β
[
1−piHH−piLL
]
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL) [ 1exp{σsEiH} − 1exp{σsEiL}] + 1
−1 ⇔
⇔ 1 <
(
1− β + βγ
βγ
) 1
σs−1
1− β
βγ
1+β
[
1−piHH−p
i
LL
]
exp{σsEi} + βγp
i
H
[
1
exp
{
σsEiH
} − 1
exp
{
σsEiL
}]
1+β
[
1−piHH−piLL
]
exp
{
σsEiL
} + β (1− piLL) [ 1exp{σsEiH} − 1exp{σsEiL}] + 1
−
1
σs−1
⇔
⇔ 1 < a
U
is
abis
⇔ abis < aUis.
Thus, it is sucient that Ei > EiL and γp
i
H > 1− piLL for the full-problem cuto faced by rms
in region b to fall out of this region, making the subset of least ecient rms become irrelevant to
the full problem cuto determination - all of them wait, even when facing the full problem.
Case 2: aUis ≥ a
g
is Here we have
Vw(E
i, ais) =
πwxis(ais)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
{
γpiL
[
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais)−Kxi
]
+ γpiH
[
Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)−Kxi
]}
(6.19)
and
Ve(E
i, ais) =
πwxis (ais) + πexis (ais, E
i)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
[
γpiLṼe(E
i
L, ais) + γp
i
H Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)
]
.
(6.20)
Recall that
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais) = ν
i
[(
1− βpiHH
)
+ β
(
1− piLL
)(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
) πwxis (ais) + πexis (ais, EiL)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiLHπexis
(
ais, E
i
H
)(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)] ,
Ṽe(E
i
H , ais) = ν
i
[(
1− βpiLL
)
+ β
(
1− piHH
)(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
) πwxis (ais) + πexis (ais, EiH)
1− βpiHH
+
βpiHLπexis
(
ais, E
i
L
)(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)] .
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Determining aUis for Case 2
Vw(E
i, aUis) = Ve(E
i, aUis)−K ⇔
⇔ πwxis(a
U
is)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
{
γpiL
[
Ṽe(E
i
L, a
U
is)−Kxi
]
+ γpiH
[
Ṽe(E
i
H , a
U
is)−Kxi
]}
=
=
πwxis
(
aUis
)
+ πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
[
γpiLṼe(E
i
L, a
U
is) + γp
i
H Ṽe(E
i
H , a
U
is)
]
−Kxi ⇔
⇔ − βγ
1− β (1− γ)
Kxi =
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
1− β (1− γ)
−Kxi ⇔
⇔ πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
= [1− β]Kxi ⇔
⇔ aUis =
(
[1− β] Kxi
Ais
) 1
σs−1
exp
{
σs
σs − 1
Ei
}
.
Comparing with the threshold
agis =
[
(1− β) Kxi
Ais
exp
{
σsE
i
H
}] 1σs−1
,
we can see that if EiH > E
i, agis > a
U
is; thus, it's sucient that E
i
H > E
i for the full-problem
cuto faced by rms in region g to fall out of this region, making the subset of most ecient rms
become irrelevant to the full problem cuto determination - all of them enter, even when facing
the full problem.
Case 3: aUis ∈
(
abis, a
g
is
)
Here we have
Vw(E
i, ais) =
πwxis(ais)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
{
γpiL
[
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais)−Kxi
]
+ γpiH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
}
(6.21)
and
Ve(E
i, ais) =
πwxis (ais) + πexis
(
ais, E
i
)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
[
γpiLṼe(E
i
L, ais) + γp
i
H Ṽe(E
i
H , ais)
]
. (6.22)
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Recall that
Ṽw(E
i
L, ais) = Ṽe(E
i
L, ais)−Kxi,
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) = πwxis (ais) + β
[
piHLṼw(E
i
L, ais) + p
i
HH Ṽw(E
i
H , ais)
]
,
Ṽe(E
i
L, ais) = ν
i
[(
1− βpiHH
)
+ β
(
1− piLL
)(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
) πwxis (ais) + πexis (ais, EiL)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiLHπexis
(
ais, E
i
H
)(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)] , (6.23)
Ṽe(E
i
H , ais) = ν
i
[(
1− βpiLL
)
+ β
(
1− piHH
)(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
) πwxis (ais) + πexis (ais, EiH)
1− βpiHH
+
βpiHLπexis
(
ais, E
i
L
)(
1− βpiLL
) (
1− βpiHH
)] . (6.24)
Using three of the equations above, we get
Ṽw(E
i
H , ais) =
πwxis (ais)
1− βpiHH
+
+
βpiHLν
i
1− βpiHH
(
(1− βpiHH) + β (1− piLL)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis (ais) +
πexis (ais, E
i
L)
1− βpiLL
)
+
+
βpiHL
1− βpiHH
(
νi
[
βpiLHπexis (ais, E
i
H)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
−Kxi
)
. (6.25)
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Using (6.21)-(6.25) we determine aUis as follows
Vw(E
i, aUis) = Ve(E
i, aUis)−Kxi ⇔
⇔ πwxis(a
U
is)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
{
γpiL
[
Ṽe(E
i
L, a
U
is)−Kxi
]
+ γpiH Ṽw(E
i
H , a
U
is)
}
=
=
πwxis
(
aUis
)
+ πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
1− β (1− γ)
+
β
1− β (1− γ)
[
γpiLṼe(E
i
L, a
U
is) + γp
i
H Ṽe(E
i
H , a
U
is)
]
−Kxi ⇔
⇔
[
1− β + βγpiH
]
Kxi = πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
+ βγpiH
[
Ṽe(E
i
H , a
U
is)− Ṽw(EiH , aUis)
]
⇔
⇔
(
1− βpiHH
) [
1− β + βγpiH
]
Kxi =
(
1− βpiHH
)
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
+
+ βγpiHν
i
[
(1− βpiLL) + β (1− piHH)
(1− βpiLL)
πwxis
(
aUis
)
+ πexis
(
aUis, E
i
H
)
+
βpiHLπexis
(
aUis, E
i
L
)
(1− βpiLL)
]
+
− βγpiH
[
πwxis
(
aUis
)
+ βpiHL
(
νi
[
(1− βpiHH) + β (1− piLL)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
πwxis
(
aUis
)])]
+
− βγpiH
[
βpiHL
(
νi
[
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
L
)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiLHπexis
(
aUis, E
i
H
)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
−Kxi
)]
⇔
⇔
(
1− βpiHH
) [
1− β + βγpiH
]
Kxi =
(
1− βpiHH
)
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
+
+ βγpiH
(
1− βpiHH
) (1− βpiLL) + β (1− piHH)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)− β2 (1− piLL) (1− piHH)
πwxis
(
aUis
)
+
+ βγpiHν
i
[
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
H
)
+
βpiHLπexis
(
aUis, E
i
L
)
(1− βpiLL)
]
+
− βγpiH
[
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH) + β (1− piHH) (1− βpiHH)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)− β2 (1− piLL) (1− piHH)
πwxis
(
aUis
)]
+
− β2γpiHpiHL
(
νi
[
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
L
)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiLHπexis
(
aUis, E
i
H
)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
−Kxi
)
⇔
⇔
(
1− βpiHH
) [
1− β + βγpiH
]
Kxi =
(
1− βpiHH
)
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
+
+ βγpiHν
i
[
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
H
)
+
βpiHLπexis
(
aUis, E
i
L
)
(1− βpiLL)
]
+
− β2γpiHpiHL
(
νi
[
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
L
)
1− βpiLL
+
βpiLHπexis
(
aUis, E
i
H
)
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
−Kxi
)
⇔
⇔
(
1− βpiHH
) [
1− β + βγpiH
]
Kxi =
(
1− βpiHH
)
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
+
+
[
βγpiHν
i − β
2γpiHp
i
HLν
iβpiLH
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)
]
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
H
)
+
+
[
βγpiHν
iβpiHL
1− βpiLL
− β
2γpiHp
i
HLν
i
1− βpiLL
]
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
L
)
+ β2γpiH
(
1− piHH
)
Kxi ⇔
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⇔
[(
1− βpiHH
) [
1− β + βγpiH
]
− β2γpiH
(
1− piHH
)]
Kxi =
(
1− βpiHH
)
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
+
+
[
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH) βγpiH − β2γpiHpiHLβpiLH
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)− β2 (1− piLL) (1− piHH)
]
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
H
)
+
+
(
1− βpiHH
) [ βγpiHβpiHL − β2γpiHpiHL
(1− βpiLL) (1− βpiHH)− β2 (1− piLL) (1− piHH)
]
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
L
)
⇔
⇔
[(
1− βpiHH
) [
1− β + βγpiH
]
− β2γpiH
(
1− piHH
)]
Kxi =
=
(
1− βpiHH
)
πexis
(
aUis, E
i
)
+ βγpiHπexis
(
aUis, E
i
H
)
⇔
⇔
[(
1− βpiHH
) [
1− β + βγpiH
]
− β2γpiH
(
1− piHH
)] Kxi
Ais
=
=
(
aUis
)σs−1 [(1− βpiHH)
exp {σsEi}
+
βγpiH
exp {σsEiH}
]
⇔
⇔
[(
1− βpiHH
) [
1− β + βγpiH
]
− β2γpiH
(
1− piHH
)] Kxi
Ais
exp
{
σsE
i
}
=
=
(
aUis
)σs−1 [
1− βpiHH + βγpiH exp
{
σs
(
Ei − EiH
)}]
⇔
⇔
[
(1− βpiHH) (1− β) + (1− β) βγpiH
1− β
] 1
σs−1
aDis =
= aUis
[
1− βpiHH + βγpiH exp
{
σs
(
Ei − EiH
)}] 1
σs−1 ⇔
⇔
[
1− βpiHH + βγpiH
] 1
σs−1 aDis = a
U
is
[
1− βpiHH + βγpiH exp
{
σs
(
Ei − EiH
)}] 1
σs−1 ⇔
⇔ aUis = aDis
[
1− βpiHH + βγpiH
1− βpiHH + βγpiH exp {σs (Ei − EiH)}
] 1
σs−1
.
This corresponds to the threshold presented in Section 5.
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Financial regimes and political events: stock
markets volatility around cabinet elections
Rúben Branco
Abstract
Stock market returns volatility varies considerably overtime, showing periods of persistent
and constant pattern - volatility regimes. This study analyzes the stock market volatility
behavior around cabinet elections. Three OECD countries are studied - Japan, U.K. and Ger-
many - in the period 1960-2008. In order to identify potential regime changes, the SWARCH
model developed in Hamilton and Susmel (1994) is used. Estimates show signicant impacts
on stock market volatility in the periods before elections, after the new cabinet takes oce
and between those two events - the government formation period. These impacts operate both
directly through the ARCH process determining daily volatility and by originating volatility
regime shifts. One specic pattern is common to all the countries studied: stock markets
volatility is higher during government formation periods than in periods far from elections,
before elections or after newly-elected cabinets take oce. During government formation pe-
riods, estimated stock-returns standard error increases by 14%-271%, relative to its average
far from elections.
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Part I
Introduction
1 Financial volatility and political events
Stock market returns volatility varies considerably overtime, showing periods of persistent and
constant pattern - volatility regimes. This volatility reacts intensely to major economic and political
events, either through sudden variations or by shifting towards a dierent regime. This study
analyzes the stock market volatility behavior around a regular political event, pivotal to democracy:
the cabinet election.
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the 1-month standard deviation of stock market index
returns, for 23 OECD countries1, in the 1989-2009 period. Figure 1 presents each country's time
series, whereas Figure 2 presents the time series of the cross-section simple average. Both Fig-
ures show a clear, temporary and isolated volatility increase subsequent to the 2008-crisis. This
volatility increase is general to all the countries plotted.
There seems to be also a generalized volatility regimes, particularly evident in Figure 2: the
(average) standard deviation is almost always below 1 in 1993-1997 and 2003-2007, being almost
always above 1 in 1998-2002 and 2008-2009.
Besides globalized macroeconomic crises like the one occurred in 2008, stock market volatility
also reacts to intense political events, like the one that took place in Italy, 1998. On October 9,
the Government headed by Romano Prodi collapsed after losing a condence motion in Parliament
by one vote. Prime-minister Prodi called this motion after the Communist Refoundation (CR)
party had withdrawn its parliamentary support to the Government, due to disagreements over the
1999 Government budget. CR did not integrate the cabinet, but its support granted the cabinet
a parliamentary majority. After a failed and turmoil-generating attempt by Prodi to form a new
cabinet, a new Government took oce on October 28, under Presidential invitation and Massimo
1These countries are Countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK and USA.
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D'Alema's leadership. In spite of the early signs of inexperience by the new cabinet and some
additional political unrest in the following period, the fall of Prodi's Government ended a coalition
Government whose parliamentary majority was supported by an outside-cabinet agreement with
the CR. The same event gave rise to an executive that proved capable of eectively ending the
budget deadlock2.
Figure 3 shows the reaction by stock market returns to this episode. During the turmoil period
mediating Prodi's cabinet collapse (09-10-1998) and D'Alema's Government rise (28-10-1998),
Italian stock market returns seem to transition to a lower-volatility regime3. Comparing the
month preceding 09-10-1998 to the one succeeding 28-10-1998, the stock returns' standard deviation
decreases by 56%, from 3.2 to 1.4 percentage points. This strong decrease signals a positive reaction
to the rise of the new cabinet and consequent budget-crisis resolution.
This study tests potential reactions by stock market volatility to regular democratic elections.
Three OECD countries are studied - Japan, U.K. and Germany - considering the period 1960-2008.
The elections targeted are those determining the choice of a new cabinet4. Three political periods
around elections are assessed: the period preceding the election day; the period succeeding the
day in which the newly-elected cabinet takes oce; and the period mediating these two days -
government formation period.
Two types of impact from these political periods are tested: direct impact on daily volatility
and potential shift in volatility regime. In order to identify both these impact channels, the
methodology developed in Hamilton and Susmel (1994) is used. These authors introduce a class
of Markov-switching ARCH models describing stock prices - the SWARCH model - and attain
improved statistical t and forecasts. The SWARCH model allows testing for direct impacts
on volatility through the ARCH process, but allows also the identication of low-, moderate-
and high-volatility regimes, which typically last for several years. Examples of studies using or
extending this model are: Cai (1994), Gray (1996) and Klaasen (2002), developing extensions of
2Sources for the political episode described are Keesing's World News Archives (www.keesings.com) and the
European Journal of Political Research 36: 317325, 1999.
3Standard deviation of 2.73 percentage points between 08-08-1998 and 08-10-1998 and 1.55 percentage points
between 29-10-1998 and 29-12-1998. Standard deviation for the whole 1998 year is 1.60.
4This choice may be done either through the selection of Parliament representatives or through the direct choice
of the cabinet leader, as in the case of the U.S.A. (not directly analyzed in this study).
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the model; Hamilton and Lin (1996) and Baele (2005), assessing stock market returns; and Fong
(1998), an application to the study of the evolution of volatility in the DM/¿ exchange rates.
Part II describes the methodology used, Part III presents the results and Part IV discusses the
results and concludes.
Figure 1. 1-month moving standard deviation of stock market index return,
percentage points, daily, 23 OECD countries, 1989-2009
Notes: Countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. For each country, the daily return of the
stock market index is computed and, subsequently, a daily series is built containing the standard
deviation of the last 22 business days, [t− 21, t]. Stock market index prices from Datastream.
Appendix F presents further details on the data used.
117
Figure 2. 1-month moving standard deviation of stock market index return,
percentage points, daily, simple average across 23 OECD countries, 1989-2009
Notes: Countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. For each country, the daily return of the
stock market index is computed and, subsequently, a daily series is built containing the standard
deviation of the last 22 business days, [t− 21, t]. Stock market index prices from Datastream.
Appendix F presents further details on the data used.
Figure 3. Stock market index return, percentage points, daily, Italy, 1998-1999
Notes: Stock market index built by Datastream for the Italian market. Appendix F presents
further details on the data used. Figures in blue circles denote 1-month standard deviation for
the period indicated by the arrows, in stock returns' units (percentage points).
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Part II
Methodology
2 The SWARCH process
Hamilton and Susmel (1994) introduce an innovative ARCH process, in which parameters assume
dierent discrete states - regimes -, with transitions between these states being governed by an
unobserved Markov chain. This process is named SWARCH. The authors test it using U.S. weekly
stock returns attaining improved statistical t and forecasts.
The SWARCH process may be described as follows5. Let yt be the stock market return following
the AR(1) process
yt = α + φyt−1 + ut, α ∈ R
and st ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} an unobserved random variable, described by the following Markov chain
Prob (st = j|st−1 = i, st−2 = k, ..., yt−1, yt−2, ...) = Prob (st = j|st−1 = i) = pij (1)
for i, j = 1, 2, ..., K. stshall denote the regime the process is in at date t, governing the size of the
stock-returns auto-regression residual
ut =
√
gstũt
where ũt follows the standard ARCH(2) process
ũt = htνt,
with νt a zero mean, unit variance i.i.d. sequence and
h2t = a0 + a1ũ
2
t−1 + a2ũ
2
t−2. (2)
5This study uses the parsimonious version of the SWARCH process empirically tested in Hamilton and Susmel
(1994).
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Equation (2) shall be denoted as ARCH equation. Furthermore, 2 and 3 regimes shall be alter-
natively considered for st, always normalizing the rst regime to unity (g1 = 1) and assigning it
to the lowest volatility states (gj ≥ 1, j 6= 1). We adapt the authors' algorithm6 to evaluate and
maximize the sample log-likelihood function
L =
T∑
t=1
ln f (yt|yt−1, yt−2, ..., y1)
subject to the constraints g1 = 1,
∑K
j=1 pij = 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., K, and 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1 for i, j =
1, 2, ..., K. The algorithm also produces the series of smoothed probabilities
pit = Prob (st = i|yT , yT−1, ..., y1) ,
denoting the estimated probability that we are in regime i at date t, given the whole-sample
information. There will be K smoothed probabilities for each date t, all summing to unity for each
t.
6Available online at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/software.htm#Markov.
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3 Controlling for U.S. stock market volatility
The international correlation between stock market returns7 implies that a large portion of the
volatility in a national stock market index may be determined by the volatility of other stock
markets - contagion. Given that the focus of this study is to isolate national causes of volatility
- specically those linked to national political events - an important extension of the SWARCH
process consists of controlling for the volatility of global stock markets.
To this purpose, the ARCH specication of h2t - equation (2) above - is augmented with a
measure of the U.S. stock market volatility. This control variable is built by the author and
consists of a daily series measuring, for each date t, the standard deviation of the S&P500 daily
returns8, for the 3-month (66-business-days) period [t− 56, t+ 10]. This variable replicates closely
the CBOE S&P500 3-Month Volatility Index (VIX), an actual nancial index designed as a daily
measure of the 3-month implied volatility of the S&P500 - see Appendix G for further details on
the VIX replication. The VIX is available9 only from 02-01-2002 onwards, whereas the computed
S&P500 standard deviation starts from 19-03-1964.
The latter shall henceforth be named vix and used to control for the U.S. stock market volatility,
by augmenting the ARCH specication as follows
h2t = a0 + a1ũ
2
t−1 + a2ũ
2
t−2 + b0vix
2
t . (3)
7See Figure 1 and Appendix E for empirical evidence.
8From Datastream database. See Appendix F for details on data source and denitions.
9In Bloomberg database.
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4 Introducing and analyzing political periods
The impact of political events on stock market's volatility shall be measured in three ways: (i)
by augmenting the ARCH specication of h2t with dummies signaling periods preceding elections,
succeeding changes or mediating both; (ii) by analyzing the emergence of particular volatility
regimes (st) around elections and subsequent cabinet changes (the latter correspond to the days
in which a newly-elected cabinet takes oce) ; (iii) by estimating the impact of political periods
on the daily series of estimated stock-returns standard errors.
In order to implement all these analyses, the following dummy variables are built, signaling
political periods : (a) gfp (government formation period), taking value 1 for the dates between
an election and the change originated by that same election (and zero otherwise)10; (b) belect22,
belect10 and belect5, taking value 1 for the dates within a 22-, 10- or 5-days window preceding an
election (and zero otherwise)11, and (c) achange22, achange10 and achange5, taking value 1 for
the dates within a 22-, 10- or 5-days window succeeding a cabinet change (and zero otherwise)12.
The impact tested in (i) is directly assessed through the estimated coecients of these political-
period dummies in the augmented ARCH equation
h2t = a0 + a1ũ
2
t−1 + a2ũ
2
t−2 + b0vix
2
t + b1belectNt + b2gfpt + b3achangeNt, Nt ∈ {5, 10, 22} . (4)
Using the smoothed probabilities produced by the 2-regimes SWARCH model estimation, a
dummy variable hight is built, taking value 1 for the dates in which the probability of being
in the high-volatility regime is greater than 0.5 (Prob (st = 2|yT , yT−1, ..., y1) > 0.5); this dummy
is zero otherwise. From the 3-regimes SWARCH, two dummies are built, middlet and hight,
taking value 1 for the dates in which the highest smoothed probability is the probability of
being, respectively, in the middle- or in the high-volatility regime (Prob (st = 2|yT , yT−1, ..., y1)
and Prob (st = 3|yT , yT−1, ..., y1), respectively) - being zero otherwise. Analysis (ii) above is per-
formed by regressing these regime dummies and the underlying smoothed probability series pit, i =
10The dummy gfp takes value 0 (zero) for election and change days.
11The belect dummies take value 0 (zero) for the election day.
12The achange dummies take value 0 (zero) for the change day.
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1, 2, ..., K, on the political-period dummies.
Only elections (changes) followed (preceded) by a government formation period are considered.
The periods for which political dummies assume value zero (one) shall be referred to as outside
(inside) political periods. Note that the smoothed probabilities used to perform analysis (ii) may
be estimated through a SWARCH process with any of the three ARCH equations presented -
equations (2)-(4).
Signicant impacts in the ARCH equation - analysis (i) - represent certain increases/decreases
in volatility around political events, as opposed to impacts on the regimes' smoothed probabilities
in analysis (ii). Given the basic structure of the SWARCH process, exposed in Section 2, both
these impacts are complementary.
Analysis (iii) assesses the total impact of each political dummy, at the standard error dimension
(enhancing comparability with average stock returns). The estimated variance daily series is
retrieved from the optimization of the SWARCH process, transposed to standard errors, and
regressed on the political variables (and on the squared-vix). This series of variances consists of
the daily estimates for
E
[
û2t
]
=
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
K∑
l=1
[
f̂ijlE
[
u2t |st, st−1, st−2, ut, ut−1, ut−2
]]
=
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
K∑
l=1
[
f̂ijlν
2
t ĥ
2
t
]
=
=
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
K∑
l=1
[
f̂ijlĝiν
2
t
(
â0 +
â1
ĝj
ˆ̃u
2
t−1 +
â2
ĝl
ˆ̃u
2
t−2 + b̂0vix
2
t + b̂1belectNt + b̂2gfpt + b̂3achangeNt
)]
,
(5)
where f̂ijl represents the estimate for Prob (st = i, st−1 = j, st−2 = l|yt, yt−1, ..., y1)13.
Note that only analysis (i) is embedded in the estimation of the SWARCH process, whereas
both analysis (i) and (iii) consist of post-estimation assessments14. Figures 4 and 5 represent,
respectively, the empirical methodology followed and the conceptual impact channels tested. In
both Figures, the specic stages at which analyses (i)-(iii) take eect.
13In the case at hand, i, j, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Hamilton and Susmel (1994) name f̂ijl ltered probability.
14A potential improvement consists of augmenting the SWARCH process by allowing the regime-transition prob-
abilities in the Markov chain - equation (1) - to be a function of the political-period dummies. This way, the
regimes' smoothed probabilities are already estimated under the assumption of potential impact by the proximity
to political events.
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Part III presents and discusses the results from the application of the model exposed in Sections
2-4 to three OECD countries - Japan, U.K. and Germany - for the period 1960-200815. This
discussion shall focus on the results from analysis (i)-(iii), using the results from the estimation of
a SWARCH process containing the vix and political periods in the ARCH specication - equation
(4). The number of volatility regimes is set to three (K = 3) and the set of political periods lengths
is restricted to {10, 22}16.
Daily stock market returns come from Datastream database and political events' dates are
collected by the author from Woldendorp et al (1998) and a set of political compendiums and
archives. Only business days are considered. Appendix F presents sources, denitions and sum-
mary statistics of the data used.
15Due to missing values, the most extended series used for U.K. and Germany start in 1968 and 1965, respectively.
16Results using 5-days political periods consistently lack robustness
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Figure 4. Sequential estimation methodology
Figure 5. Impact channels linking political periods to stock market returns volatility
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Part III
Results
5 Japan
This section discusses the application of the SWARCH model to the Japanese stock market index
NIKKEI225.
After tting the SWARCH process to the data, the dummies middlet and hight and the corre-
spondent smoothed probabilities, smiddlet := p2t and shight := p3t are regressed on the political-
period dummies, in order to search for signicantly dierent volatility regimes around political
events. Given that the dummies (middlet and hight) represent discrete transformations of the
smoothed probabilities, the analysis shall focus on the latter.
Tables 1-3 report the results of analyses (i)-(iii) from Section 417. The table reporting the
results from the smoothed probabilities' regressions - Table 2 - includes the estimates for gi, the
variance multipliers associated to middle- and high-volatility regimes. These estimates result from
the SWARCH process estimation - not from the smoothed probabilities' regressions - and each
estimate is reported in the column associated to the respective combination of volatility regime
and political-period window (e.g. in the rst column with results, Table 2 reports the estimate
for g2, the middle-regime multiplier, attained when the SWARCH optimization framework used
22-days political dummies in the ARCH equation). Appendixes A-D provide the full set of results
for Japan exploring all the potential methodological frameworks, including ARCH specications
of equations (2)-(4)18.
These results may be summarized as follows:
1. Outside political periods, the average estimated conditional19 standard error of the daily
stock market return is 1.07 percentage points (see the intercept of regressions excluding
thevix in Table 24, Appendix D).
17Using the specic framework indicated in the end of Section 4.
18Including also an ARCH specication without the vix and with the political periods.
19
√
E [û2t ]
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2. The days preceding elections are associated to a standard error decrease in 0.17-0.19 per-
centage points (16-17% of its average outside political periods) - Table 3. This reduction
is driven by a (certain) decrease in the mean-reversion term of the variance auto-regressive
component (Table 1) and, in the 10 days preceding elections, a decrease in the probability of
high-volatility regimes (Table 2). There is an increase in the probability of middle-volatility
regimes during the days preceding elections (Table 2), which, nevertheless, does not compen-
sate the other volatility-reducing eects.
3. During gfp's, the standard error increases in 0.15 percentage points (14%) relative to days
outside political periods (Table 3). This volatility increase is driven by a (certain) positive
impact in the mean-reversion term of the variance auto-regressive component (Table 1) and
an increase in the probability of middle-volatility regimes (Table 2). There is a decrease in
the probability of high volatility regimes during these periods, which does not compensate
the other volatility-increasing impacts.
4. The days succeeding cabinet changes are associated to a standard error decrease in 0.12-0.13
percentage points (11-12%) with respect to days outside political periods (Table 3); such
impact is driven by a (certain) decrease in the mean-reversion term of the variance auto-
regressive component (Table 1), not compensated by the increase in the probabilities of
middle- and high-volatility regimes (Table 2).
It can be seen in Appendixes A-C that results attained using the 3-regimes SWARCH evolve as the
vix and the political dummies are progressively included in the ARCH specication, underlining
the relevance of these variables to a correct understanding of the impact channels under study.
Appendix D shows that the vix is also crucial to a correct accounting of the global impact of
political periods on the stock market volatility, given the changes in the political estimates produced
by the removal of this control.
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Table 1. ARCH equation, 3-regimes, with vix (estimated within
SWARCH optimization), Japan
dep. var. variance auto-regressive component, h2
indep. var.
vix2 0.139*** 0.139***
(0.013) (0.013)
gfp 0.000009** 0.000010***
(0.000004) (0.000004)
belect 22 -0.000007***
(0.000002)
10 -0.000006*
(0.000003)
achange 22 -0.000010***
(0.000002)
10 -0.000009***
(0.000003)
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, ***
Signicant at 1% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2. Regimes' smoothed probabilities regressed on political dummies
(sequentially estimated, after SWARCH optimization, 3-regimes, with vix and
political dummies in ARCH), Japan
dep. var. smiddle shigh
indep. var.
gfp 0.278*** 0.260*** -0.038*** -0.048***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014)
belect 22 0.083*** -0.027
(0.026) (0.017)
10 0.107*** -0.075***
(0.038) (0.021)
achange 22 0.113*** 0.040*
(0.027) (0.022)
10 0.103** 0.010
(0.041) (0.033)
Intercept 0.466*** 0.470*** 0.151*** 0.158***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ĝi 3.497*** 3.450*** 13.723*** 13.403***
(0.140) (0.139) (0.659) (0.639)
N 10,579 10,591 10,579 10,591
R2 0.018 0.015 0.001 0.001
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated
otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance
in corresponding robust OLS and tobit regressions, including specications with
each explanatory variable isolated. (a)Non-signicant when isolated, both in robust
OLS and tobit.
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Table 3. Estimated standard errors regressed on political dummies (sequentially
estimated, after SWARCH optimization, 3-regimes, with vix and political dummies in
ARCH), Japan
dep. variable
√
E [û2t ]
indep.
variables
vix 0.71663*** 0.71669***
(0.02430) (0.02240)
gfp 0.00145*** 0.00154***
(0.00021) (0.00021)
belect 22 -0.00173***
(0.00020)
10 -0.00187***
(0.00028)
achange 22 -0.00125***
(0.00020)
10 -0.00115***
(0.00030)
Intercept 0.00457*** 0.00452***
(0.00020) (0.00018)
N 10,579 10,591
R2 0.334 0.349
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all
(non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding
specications with each explanatory variable isolated.
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6 U.K.
The stock market index used for the U.K. case is the FTSE All-Share. Tables 4-6 report the results
from analyses (i)-(iii) described in Section 420. Appendix I replicates those analysis removing the
vix from the ARCH specication and from the regressions of estimated standard errors on political
periods.
The results for the U.K. show that:
1. Outside political periods, the average estimated conditional21 standard error of the daily
stock market return is 0.95-0.96 percentage points (see the intercept of regressions excluding
thevix in Table 35, Appendix I).
2. Days before elections are associated to a standard error decrease in 0.06-0.16 percentage
points (6-17% of its average outside political periods) - Table 6. This decrease is driven
by a (certain) negative impact in the mean-reversion term of the variance auto-regressive
component (Table 4), which is not compensated by the increase in the probability of middle-
volatility regimes (Table 5).
3. During gfp's, the standard error increases in 2.56-2.59 percentage points (267-271%) rela-
tive to its average outside political periods (Table 6). This volatility increase is driven by a
positive impact in the probability of middle-volatility regimes (Table 5), which is not com-
pensated by the (certain) decrease in the mean-reversion term of the variance auto-regressive
component (Table 4). Note that the increase in the estimated standard error during gfp's
in U.K. is much larger than that occurring in Japanese gfp's, in spite of the larger nega-
tive impact through the ARCH equation in the case of the U.K.. This is partly due to the
larger positive impact on E [g] =
∑K
i=1 pigi in the U.K. case versus the Japanese case; the
absence of impact from the high-regime probability in the U.K. is the key factor unbalancing
∆E [g]22. Note that U.K. gfp's have, on average, 1.2 days of duration (there are 12 gfp days
20Using the specic framework indicated in the end of Section 4.
21
√
E [û2t ]
22Note that, considering the 22-days window, in the U.K. case 4gfpE [g] =
∑K
i=1 (4pi) gi = −0.393×1+0.393×
2.345+ 0× 8.229 = 0.529, whereas, in the Japanese case, 4gfpE [g] =
∑K
i=1 (4pi) gi = −0.24× 1+ 0.278× 3.497−
0.038 × 13.723 = 0.211. The high-volatility regime is responsible for a divergence larger than the nal dierence
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to 10 elections)23. Such feature implies that the lagged-variances in the ARCH component
of gfp-variances include before-election days for a large portion of the U.K. gfp's. Given
the standard-error decrease associated to days before elections, this lower duration by U.K.
gfp's may generate a downward bias in the (already large) estimated impact of gfp days on
volatility, relative to other countries estimates.
4. Days succeeding cabinet changes are associated to a standard error decrease in 0.15-0.17
percentage points (15-18%) relative to its average outside political periods (Table 6). This
decrease is driven by a (certain) negative impact in the mean-reversion term of the variance
auto-regressive component (Table 4), not compensated by the increase in the probability of
middle-volatility regimes in the 22-days window (Table 5).
Appendix I shows that, similarly to the Japanese case, the political impacts on the ARCH equa-
tion, on the smoothed probabilities, and on the estimated standard errors change prole with
the removal of the vix. This conrms that this control, besides statistically signicant, is crucial
to a correct understanding of the mechanics and magnitude of political events' impacts on stock
markets volatility.
(0.038× 13.723 = 0.521 > 0.318 = 0.529− 0.211), being compensated by contrary divergences in the other regimes.
23In Japan there is an average of 26 gfp days per election (364 gfp days to 14 elections). See Table 28, Appendix
F.
132
Table 4. ARCH equation, 3-regimes, with vix (estimated within
SWARCH optimization), U.K.
dep. var. variance auto-regressive component, h2
indep. var.
vix2 0.324*** 0.322***
(0.024) (0.024)
gfp -0.000632** -0.000635**
(0.000275) (0.000279)
belect 22 -0.000009**
(0.000004)
10 -0.000011**
(0.000005)
achange 22 -0.000011***
(0.000004)
10 -0.000010*
(0.000006)
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, ***
Signicant at 1% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 5. Regimes' smoothed probabilities regressed on political dummies (sequentially
estimated, after SWARCH optimization, 3-regimes, with vix and political dummies in
ARCH), U.K.
dep. var. smiddle shigh
indep. var.
gfp 0.393*** 0.361*** 0.008 0.007
(0.079) (0.084) (0.078) (0.078)
belect 22 0.157*** 0.011
(0.029) (0.018)
10 0.123*** 0.008
(0.044) (0.029)
achange 22 0.068** 0.018
(0.027) (0.020)
10 0.007 0.014
(0.038) (0.030)
Intercept 0.416*** 0.417*** 0.083*** 0.083***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ĝi 2.345*** 2.350*** 8.229*** 8.233***
(0.108) (0.108) (0.607) (0.603)
N 9,665 9,677 9,665 9,677
R2 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.000
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all
(non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding
robust OLS and tobit regressions, including specications with each explanatory
variable isolated.
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Table 6. Estimated standard errors regressed on political dummies (sequentially
estimated, after SWARCH optimization, 3-regimes, with vix and political dummies in
ARCH), U.K.
dep. variable
√
E [û2t ]
indep.
variables
vix 0.86475*** 0.85377***
(0.02011) (0.01881)
gfp 0.02560*** 0.02586***
(0.00279) (0.00291)
belect 22 -0.00062***
(0.00020)
10 -0.00164***
(0.00021)
achange 22 -0.00172***
(0.00018)
10 -0.00146***
(0.00027)
Intercept 0.00173*** 0.00180***
(0.00017) (0.00016)
N 9,665 9,677
R2 0.595 0.605
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all
(non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding
specications with each explanatory variable isolated.
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7 Germany
The analysis developed for the U.K. is replicated for Germany, using the DAX 30 Performance
stock market index. Tables 7-9 report the results of analyses (i)-(iii) from Section 424. Appendix J
replicates those analyses removing the vix from the ARCH specication and from the regressions
of estimated standard errors on political periods.
The results are summarized below:
1. Outside political periods, the average estimated conditional25 standard error of the daily
stock market return is 1.07 percentage points (see the intercept of regressions excluding
thevix in Table 38, Appendix J).
2. Days before elections are associated to a standard error increase in 0.06-0.10 percentage
points (5-9% of its average outside political periods) - Table 9. This increase is driven by a
positive impact in the probability of high-volatility regimes, which is not compensated by the
decrease in the probability of middle-regimes (22-days window) - Table 8. As the election
approaches and we enter the 10-days window, the negative impact on the middle-regime
probability disappears, yielding a higher impact on the estimated s.e..
3. During gfp's, the standard error increases in 0.25-0.33 percentage points (24-31%) relative
to its average outside political periods (Table 6). This volatility increase is also driven by
an increase in the probability of high-volatility regimes (Table 8), which is not compensated
by the decrease in the probability of middle-regimes (Table 8). Note that the gfp-impacts
through ARCH and on the middle-regime probabilities are not robust to the several time
spans in the before-election and after-change periods. Moreover, the gfp-impact on high-
regime probability is also very sensitive to the political periods span.
4. Days succeeding cabinet changes are associated to a standard error increase in 0.17-0.21
percentage points (16-20%) relative to its average outside political periods (Table 9). Tables
7 and 8 present no specic source for such impact, though.
24Using the specic framework indicated in the end of Section 4.
25
√
E [û2t ]
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According to Appendix J, the removal of the vix changes the prole of the political impacts on stock
returns' volatility. As in the cases of Japan and U.K., the vix proves pivotal to a correct description
of channels and magnitudes associated to the impacts of political events in stock markets volatility.
Table 7. ARCH equation, 3-regimes, with vix (estimated within
SWARCH optimization), Germany
dep. var. variance auto-regressive component, h2
indep. var.
vix2 0.425*** 0.402***
(0.026) (0.026)
gfp -0.000090*** 0.000014*
(0.000006) (0.000008)
belect 22 -0.000001
(0.000004)
10 0.000000
(0.000006)
achange 22 0.000007
(0.000005)
10 0.000012
(0.000009)
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, ***
Signicant at 1% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 8. Regimes' smoothed probabilities regressed on political dummies
(sequentially estimated, after SWARCH optimization, 3-regimes, with vix and
political dummies in ARCH), Germany
dep. var. smiddle shigh
indep. var.
gfp -0.138*** -0.018 0.147*** 0.060***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021)
belect 22 -0.075*** 0.107***
(0.024) (0.024)
10 -0.043 0.109***
(0.037) (0.035)
achange 22 0.030 -0.009
(0.023) (0.017)
10 0.016 -0.016
(0.037) (0.029)
Intercept 0.473*** 0.473*** 0.196*** 0.203***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ĝi 2.319*** 2.305*** 6.313*** 6.116***
(0.109) (0.108) (0.306) (0.297)
N 10,667 10,679 10,667 10,679
R2 0.005 0.000 0.008 0.002
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated
otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance
in corresponding robust OLS and tobit regressions, including specications with
each explanatory variable isolated.
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Table 9. Estimated standard errors regressed on political dummies (sequentially
estimated, after SWARCH optimization, 3-regimes, with vix and political dummies in
ARCH), Germany
dep. variable
√
E [û2t ]
indep.
variables
vix 1.00261*** 1.00516***
(0.01509) (0.01406)
gfp 0.00252*** 0.00333***
(0.00020) (0.00021)
belect 22 0.00056**
(0.00026)
10 0.00095***
(0.00036)
achange 22 0.00168***
(0.00024)
10 0.00210***
(0.00035)
Intercept 0.00196*** 0.00190***
(0.00012) (0.00011)
N 10,667 10,679
R2 0.660 0.687
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all
(non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding
specications with each explanatory variable isolated.
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Part IV
Conclusion
8 Government formation periods ignite volatility
Periods around democratic elections and subsequent cabinet changes are associated to signicant
impacts on the volatility of stock markets returns. Such impacts operate both directly through
the ARCH process determining daily volatility and by originating volatility regime shifts. The
three countries studied - Japan, U.K. and Germany - show heterogeneous proles with respect to
those impacts, but one specic pattern is common to all the countries: stock markets volatility
is higher during government formation periods than outside political periods, before elections or
after newly-elected cabinets take oce. This result is particularly surprising given that the election
eliminates a large part of the uncertainty associated to the new cabinet's identity, especially when
producing a single-party majority in Parliament26. Figures 6-11 plot the impacts of political periods
(a) on the estimated standard errors of stock market returns and (b) on the probabilities of being
under each volatility regime (3-regimes framework)27.
In all the countries studied the estimated stock-returns' standard error increases during gov-
ernment formation periods, relative to its average outside political periods (far from elections or
subsequent cabinet changes). This standard-error increase measures, relative to the average out-
side political periods, 14% in the case of Japan, 24-31% in the case of Germany, and 267-271% in
the case of the U.K. (the results for the U.K. gfp's shall be read carefully, given the low average
duration of these periods, 1.2 days). Also in all the countries, stock-returns' standard errors are
clearly higher during government formation periods than during the periods preceding elections or
26Between 1960 and 2008, Japan is governed by majoritarian cabinets in 86% of the business days and by
single-party cabinets in 70% of those days. In the case of the U.K. and Germany, those percentages are, for the
same period, 99%/100% and 96%/4%. Except for Germany, the vast majority of elected Governments in the sample
studied are, thus, single-party cabinets holding majoritarian support in Parliament. In such cases, the elected party
has no need to negotiate with other parties in order to ensure cabinet formation/stability and the election should
determine with strong certainty the prole of the coming Government. See Appendix F for sources of the political
data mentioned.
27These Figures are based on the results presented in Part III.
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after the new cabinet takes oce.
In terms of the impact on volatility regimes, the three countries analyzed are much more
heterogeneous. In Japan, the middle-volatility regime becomes more probable both before elections
and after cabinet changes (8-11 percentage points increase), relative to its average probability
outside political periods; but it's maximum average probability is attained during government
formation periods: 74%, meaning that in almost 3 fourths of the gfp days, Japanese stock market
is under a middle-volatility regime. The high-volatility regime loses probability during the 10
days preceding elections, relative to its average probability outside political periods. During gfp's,
the high-regime probability increases relative to the days before the election, remaining below
the average outside political periods. After the cabinet takes oce, though, the high-volatility
regime becomes more probable than outside political periods, reaching 20% (one in each ve
days). Thus, in Japan, the day in which the newly-elected cabinet takes oce determines a shift in
volatility-regime trends. As the election approaches and takes place, moderate volatility becomes
increasingly frequent, but extreme-volatility episodes lose frequency. As the new cabinet takes
oce, moderate volatility loses frequency and extreme volatility becomes more frequent.
An opposite prole is found in Germany. Extreme volatility becomes more frequent before
elections and during the gfp (probability around 30% in both periods), returning to the average
probability outside political events (20%), after the new cabinet takes oce.
In the case of the U.K., the high-volatility regime is very infrequent, especially if compared
to the other two countries. Moreover, this low frequency by the high-regime (8%) is not changed
throughout political periods - all the action takes place between the low- and middle-volatility
regimes. Note that the low-volatility regime is the most frequent outside political events, with
an average probability of 50% (= 100− 42− 8). Oppositely, during all the political periods stud-
ied, the middle-volatility regime becomes the most probable, with maximum probability attained
during the government formation periods: 80%, almost doubling its average probability outside
political periods. As in Japan and Germany, the day in which the new cabinet takes oce plays a
pivotal role in volatility regime trends. Until that day, moderate volatility episodes show increasing
frequency, experiencing afterwards a downturn towards the average outside political periods.
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Figure 6. Stock market returns' volatility during political periods: estimated
standard errors (in percentage points), Japan, Tables 3 and 24
Notes: Vertical axis denotes dierence with respect to the average outside political periods, in
stock returns units (percentage points). Horizontal axis represents political events and number of
days before(-)/after(+).
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Figure 7. Stock market returns' volatility during political periods: probability of
being at middle-/high-volatility regime (%), Japan, Table 2
Notes: Estimates for the same political period were averaged when divergent. Vertical axis
denotes probability of being under a volatility regime, in percentage (%). Horizontal axis
represents political events and number of days before(-)/after(+).
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Figure 8. Stock market returns' volatility during political periods: estimated
standard errors (in percentage points), U.K., Tables 6 and 35
Notes: Vertical axis denotes dierence with respect to the average outside political periods, in
stock returns units (percentage points). Horizontal axis represents political events and number of
days before(-)/after(+).
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Figure 9. Stock market returns' volatility during political periods: probability of
being at middle-/high-volatility regime (%), U.K., Table 5
Notes: Estimates for the same political period were averaged when divergent. Vertical axis
denotes probability of being under a volatility regime, in percentage (%). Horizontal axis
represents political events and number of days before(-)/after(+).
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Figure 10. Stock market returns' volatility during political periods: estimated
standard errors (in percentage points), Germany, Tables 9 and 38
Notes: Vertical axis denotes dierence with respect to the average outside political periods, in
stock returns units (percentage points). Horizontal axis represents political events and number of
days before(-)/after(+).
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Figure 11. Stock market returns' volatility during political periods: probability of
being at middle-/high-volatility regime (%), Germany, Table 8
Notes: Estimates for the same political period were averaged when divergent. Vertical axis
denotes probability of being under a volatility regime, in percentage (%). Gfp-impact on
middle-regime probability not plotted due to lack of robustness to political period spans;
gfp-impact on high-volatility regime shall be read with caution, due to its high sensitivity to the
political periods span (See Section 7). Horizontal axis represents political events and number of
days before(-)/after(+).
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APPENDIX
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A. Results for Japan, without vix nor political periods in ARCH
The framework applied in this section consists of the SWARCH process without the vix control
nor any political-period dummy in the ARCH specication - equation (2). This model is run alter-
natively with K=2 (2 volatility regimes) and K=3 (3 volatility regimes), producing (a) estimates
for the values of g2 and, in the 3-regimes framework, g3 - the highest-regimes of the multiplicative
factors in the stock-returns' variance - and (b) a daily series for the (smoothed) probability of
having been at each of these regimes, at each date t.
The 2-regimes estimation yields ĝ2 = 6.06 (signicant at 1% level, with a s.e. of 0.21) and the
3-regimes estimation yields ĝ2 = 3.94 and ĝ3 = 15.74 (s.e. estimation unfeasible
28).
The detailed results from analysis (ii) described in Section 4 are provided in Tables 10-12 and
can be summarized as follows:
1. using 2 regimes...
(a) outside political periods, the average probability of being at the high-volatility regime
at date t is about 42% - on average, stock returns are under the low-volatility regime,
or, on another perspective, stock returns are at the low-volatility regime 42% of the
times;
(b) the days preceding elections show a signicantly lower probability of high-volatility
regime in 12-13 percentage points (p.p.), reaching a high-regime probability of about
30%;
(c) government formation periods (gfp's) show a signicantly higher probability of high-
volatility regime in 28 p.p., reaching an average high-regime probability of 70% (during
these periods we are on average, or, in other words, 70% of the times at the high-
volatility regime); this represents a sizable volatility increase around the election, from
30% of high-volatility probability to the exact complement with respect to the certain
event.
28Estimated variance-covariance matrix not positive denite, either through the Hessian of the log likelihood or
through the outer product of the score.
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2. using 3 regimes...
(a) outside political periods, the average probability of being at the middle-volatility regime
is about 40-41% and the average probability of being at the high-volatility regime is
about 12% - low-volatility remains the most probable regime;
(b) preceding elections, there is a signicant decrease in the high-regime probability in 6-7
p.p.; this represents a reduction in about one half of it's average value, in favor of the
low-regime probability (the middle-regime probability is not signicantly dierent);
(c) during gfp's, the middle-regime probability signicantly increases in 26 p.p., to a smoothed
probability of 66-67%, and the high-regime probability signicantly increases in 3 p.p.,
to a smoothed probability of about 15%; the middle regime becomes, thus, the most
probable regime during gfp's.
The estimated regime parameters and the impacts on the smoothed probabilities show that: in
the days preceding elections, the expected multiplicative coecient in returns' variance, E [g] =∑K
i=1 p̂iĝi decreases in about 0.66 units
29 according to the 2-regimes framework, and in 1.03 units30
according to the 3-regime framework; in gfp days, the expected multiplicative coecient increases
in 1.42 units31 according to the 2-regime framework, and in 1.21 units32 in the 3-regimes version;
in the days after cabinet changes, there is no signicant change in the expected multiplicative
coecient33. All these impacts in E [g] are relative to its average value outside political periods.
Note that introducing the third regime produces a sizable impact on the decrease in E [g]
associated to days preceding elections - from 0.66 to 1.03 - adding also information on the prole
of the volatility changes occurred in each political period: the 3-regimes framework shows that the
decrease in volatility before elections is associated to a decrease in the probability of more extreme
and infrequent volatility states, while the increase in volatility during gfp days is mostly due to
the increase in the probability of moderate and more frequent volatility states. With a smoothed
29−0.66 = −0.13× 6.06 + 0.13× 1
30−1.03 = −0.07× 15.74 + 0× 3.94 + 0.07× 1
311.42 = 0.28× 6.06− 0.28× 1
321.21 = 0.03× 15.74 + 0.26× 3.94− 0.29× 1
33General formula for the computation of the impact on E [g] is ∆E [g] =
∑K
i=1 (∆pi) gi, where ∆pi represents
the estimated coecient of a given political-period dummy in the smoothed probabilities regression.
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probability of 12%, the third and most extreme regime seems non-negligible, suggesting that the
3-regimes approach provides a more reliable analysis of the stock-returns' volatility prole.
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Table 10. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies, after SWARCH model estimation (vix
and political periods excluded from ARCH, 2-regimes), Japan, 1960-2008
dependent variable: high-regime
shigh high
indep. var.
gfp 0.281*** 0.276*** 0.279*** 0.280*** 0.291*** 0.287*** 0.289*** 0.290***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
belect 22 -0.133*** -0.151***
(0.022) (0.025)
10 -0.120*** -0.150***
(0.032) (0.037)
5 -0.116**(a) -0.158***
(0.052) (0.050)
achange 22 -0.026 -0.005
(0.024) (0.029)
10 -0.027 -0.003
(0.035) (0.043)
5 -0.011 0.057
(0.050) (0.063)
Intercept 0.416*** 0.420*** 0.417*** 0.416*** 0.411*** 0.416*** 0.413*** 0.412***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
N 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596
R2 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.012
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients
in the table maintain (non-)signicance in respective robust-probit and tobit regressions, including
specications with each explanatory variable isolated (the latter also run using robust OLS). (a)
Signicant at 1% level in robust OLS, but only at 5% level in corresponding tobit.
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Table 11. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies, after SWARCH model estimation (vix
and political periods excluded from ARCH, 3-regimes), Japan, 1960-2008. Assessing the
middle-regime.
dependent variable: middle-regime
smiddle middle
indep. var.
gfp 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.274*** 0.272*** 0.274*** 0.274***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
belect 22 -0.034(a) -0.052*
(0.022) (0.027)
10 -0.009 -0.015
(0.033) (0.040)
5 0.004 -0.007
(0.045) (0.057)
achange 22 -0.001 -0.018
(0.025) (0.028)
10 0.022 -0.004
(0.037) (0.043)
5 0.041 -0.001
(0.053) (0.062)
Intercept 0.404*** 0.405*** 0.404*** 0.404*** 0.407*** 0.409*** 0.407*** 0.407***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
N 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596
R2 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients
in the table maintain (non-)signicance in respective robust OLS, robust probit and tobit
regressions, including specications with each explanatory variable isolated.(a) Signicant at 10%
level when isolated, in robust OLS and tobit.
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Table 12. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies, after SWARCH model estimation (vix
and political periods excluded from ARCH, 3-regimes), Japan, 1960-2008. Assessing the
high-regime.
dependent variable: high-regime
shigh high
indep. var.
gfp 0.031** 0.029* 0.030* 0.031** 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.022
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
belect 22 -0.063*** -0.050***
(0.010) (0.013)
10 -0.061*** -0.051***
(0.017) (0.019)
5 -0.071*** -0.065***
(0.020) (0.023)
achange 22 -0.001 0.017
(0.017) (0.019)
10 0.002 0.030
(0.025) (0.030)
5 -0.004 0.020
(0.036) (0.041)
Intercept 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.105***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596 11,596
R2 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients
in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding robust OLS, robust probit and tobit
regressions, including specications with each explanatory variable isolated.
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B. Results for Japan, with vix and without political periods in ARCH
The ARCH specication now follows equation (3). The 2-regimes estimation yields ĝ2 = 5.68
(signicant at 1% level, with a s.e. of 0.22) and an estimated coecient for the squared-vix in the
ARCH equation of b0 = 0.074, with an estimated standard error (s.e.) of 0.010, yielding statistical
signicance at 1% level.
The 3-regimes version produces an estimated coecient for the squared-vix of b0 = 0.126 and
the following estimates for the regimes' multiplicative eects: ĝ2 = 3.58 and ĝ3 = 13.48 (s.e.
estimation unfeasible for all these coecients34).
Tables 13-15 provide detailed results from the regressions of smoothed probabilities and regime
dummies on the political periods. Results from the 2-regimes framework are not very distant from
those attained without controlling for the vix, but, in the 3-regimes framework, there are two
novelties: (a) the middle-regime probability signicantly increases before elections, in 6-11 p.p. (6,
10 and 11 p.p. in the 22-, 10- and 5-days window, respectively) - there was no signicant change
in this regime, when not controlling for the vix - and (b) there is no signicant change in the
high-regime probability during gfp's - there was a signicant increase without the vix.
Still according to the 3-regimes framework, E [g] decreases, relative to its average outside po-
litical periods, in 0.72, 0.74 and 0.84 units35 in the 22-, 10- and 5-days periods before elections,
respectively - this decrease measured around 1.03 units, without controlling for the vix. In gfp
periods, E [g] increases, relative to its average outside political periods, in 0.72 units, when con-
trolling for the vix - this impact compares to the 1.21-units increase implied by the results without
the vix.
34Estimated variance-covariance matrix not positive denite, either through the Hessian of the log likelihood or
through the outer product of the score.
35Similar computations to those applied to the results from the framework without controlling for the vix; these
computations use two-decimal-places rounded numbers.
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Table 13. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies, after SWARCH model estimation (vix
included in ARCH, political periods excluded from ARCH, 2-regimes), Japan, 1960-2008
dependent variable: high-regime
shigh high
indep. var.
gfp 0.278*** 0.274*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.281*** 0.278*** 0.280*** 0.280***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
belect 22 -0.112*** -0.081***
(0.025) (0.029)
10 -0.098*** -0.068(a)
(0.035) (0.043)
5 -0.096* -0.070
(0.048) (0.060)
achange 22 -0.031 -0.014
(0.027) (0.031)
10 -0.046 -0.037
(0.040) (0.046)
5 -0.040 -0.014
(0.058) (0.067)
Intercept 0.442*** 0.446*** 0.443*** 0.443*** 0.439*** 0.442*** 0.440*** 0.439***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
N 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579
R2 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients
in the table maintain (non-)signicance in respective robust-probit and tobit regressions, including
specications with each explanatory variable isolated (the latter also run using robust OLS). (a)
Signicant at 10% level when isolated, both in robust OLS and probit.
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Table 14. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies, after SWARCH model estimation (vix
included in ARCH, political periods excluded from ARCH, 3-regimes), Japan, 1960-2008.
Assessing the middle-regime.
dependent variable: middle-regime
smiddle middle
indep. var.
gfp 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.309*** 0.311*** 0.310*** 0.310***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
belect 22 0.063** 0.103***
(0.025) (0.030)
10 0.099*** 0.125***
(0.037) (0.044)
5 0.105** 0.113*(a)
(0.051) (0.062)
achange 22 -0.029 -0.043(a)
(0.025) (0.030)
10 -0.021 -0.061
(0.038) (0.046)
5 0.011 -0.031
(0.055) (0.067)
Intercept 0.452*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 0.457*** 0.455*** 0.456*** 0.457***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
N 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579
R2 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients
in the table maintain (non-)signicance in respective robust OLS, robust probit and tobit
regressions, including specications with each explanatory variable isolated.(a) Signicant at 10%
level when isolated, in robust OLS and probit. (a)Non-signicant when isolated, in probit.
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Table 15. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies, after SWARCH model estimation (vix included
in ARCH, political periods excluded from ARCH, 3-regimes), Japan, 1960-2008. Assessing the high-regime.
dependent variable: high-regime
shigh high
indep. var.
gfp -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
belect 22 -0.071*** -0.074***
(0.014) (0.015)
10 -0.075*** -0.075***
(0.021) (0.022)(a)
5 -0.086*** -0.090***
(0.025)(b) (0.026)(a)
achange 22 0.013 0.019
(0.021) (0.022)
10 0.009 0.021
(0.033) (0.034)
5 -0.002 0.012
(0.046) (0.048)
Intercept 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.136***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
N 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579
R2 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis.Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients in the table
maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding robust OLS, robust probit and tobit regressions, including
specications with each explanatory variable isolated. (a)Signicant only at 5% level in respective probit.
(b)Signicant only at 5% level in respective tobit.
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C. Results for Japan, with political periods in ARCH
The tables below report the estimated coecients for the vix and the political dummies in the
ARCH equation.
Table 16. Estimation of coecients in ARCH equation including political periods, within
2-regimes SWARCH model estimation
dependent variable: h2t
indep. var.
vix2 - - - 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.078***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
gfp 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.00006***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.000009) (0.000009) (0.000009) (0.000009)
belect 22 -0.000003 0.000002
(0.000004) (0.000005)
10 -0.0000008 0.000004
(0.000006) (0.000007)
5 -0.000001 0.000002
(0.000008) (0.000009)
achange 22 -0.000005 -0.000002
(0.000005) (0.000004)
10 -0.000003 -0.000002
(0.000007) (0.000006)
5 0.000006 0.000005
(0.00001) (0.00001)
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
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Table 17. Estimation of coecients in ARCH equation including political periods, within
3-regimes SWARCH model estimation
dependent variable: h2t
indep. var.
vix2 - - - 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.133***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
gfp 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.000009** 0.00001*** 0.00001***
(0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000004)
belect 22 -0.000008*** -0.000007***
(0.000002) (0.000002)
10 -0.000007* -0.000006*
(0.000004) (0.000003)
5 -0.000007 -0.000006
(0.000005) (0.000004)
achange 22 -0.00001*** -0.00001***
(0.000002) (0.000002)
10 -0.00001*** -0.000009***
(0.000003) (0.000003)
5 -0.000007 -0.000004
(0.000005) (0.000005)
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
It is still possible to regress the regime dummies/probabilities on the political dummies, in order
to capture the regime-impacts of political periods. The table below reports the results attained
using 22-days windows for the political dummies.
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Table 18. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies on 22-days political periods, after
SWARCH model estimation (political periods included in ARCH, 2-regimes), Japan,
1960-2008
SWARCH estimated... ... without vix in ARCH ... with vix in ARCH
dep. variable: high-regime dep. variable: high-regime
shigh high shigh high
indep. variables
gfp -0.233*** -0.222*** -0.283*** -0.285***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019)
belect22 -0.153*** -0.164*** -0.208*** -0.221***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025)
achange22 -0.056**(b) -0.049*(a) -0.098*** -0.095***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029)
Intercept 0.421*** 0.416*** 0.439*** 0.437***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
N 11,592 11,592 10,579 10,579
R2 0.012 0.009 0.019 0.016
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all
(non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding
robust OLS, robust probit and tobit regressions, including specications with each
explanatory variable isolated. (a)Non-signicant when isolated, both in robust OLS and
probit. (b)When isolated, signicant at 10% level in robust OLS and attaining p-value of
0.1006 in respective tobit.
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Table 19. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummieson 22-days political periods, after
SWARCH model estimation (political periods included in ARCH, 3-regimes), Japan,
1960-2008
SWARCH
estimated...
... without vix in ARCH ... with vix in ARCH
dep. var.
middle-regime high-regime middle-regime high-regime
smiddle middle shigh high smiddle middle shigh high
indep. var.
gfp 0.259*** 0.292*** -0.006 -0.005 0.278*** 0.303*** -0.038*** -0.033**(a)
(0.020) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.014) (0.017)
belect22 0.054** 0.065** -0.048*** -0.051*** 0.083*** 0.095*** -0.027 -0.034*
(0.022) (0.028) (0.013) (0.014) (0.026) (0.030) (0.017) (0.019)
achange22 0.042*(d) 0.052*(c) 0.027 0.021 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.040* 0.038(b)
(0.025) (0.029) (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.030) (0.022) (0.024)
Intercept 0.404*** 0.405*** 0.128*** 0.119*** 0.466*** 0.477*** 0.151*** 0.140***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
N 11,592 11,592 11,592 11,592 10,579 10,579 10,579 10,579
R2 0.013 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.014 0.001 0.001
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all
(non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding
robust OLS, robust probit and tobit regressions, including specications with each
explanatory variable isolated. (a)Signicant at 10% level only in respective probit.
(b)Signicant at 10% level in respective probit and, when isolated, in robust OLS and
probit. (c)Non-signicant when isolated, both in robust OLS and probit. (d)Non-signicant
when isolated, both in robust OLS and tobit.
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The next tables report the results attained for the regime-impacts, when using the 10-days
windows for the political dummies.
Table 20. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies on 10-days political periods, after
SWARCH model estimation (political periods included in ARCH, 2-regimes), Japan,
1960-2008
SWARCH estimated... ... without vix in ARCH ... with vix in ARCH
dep. variable: high-regime dep. variable: high-regime
shigh high shigh high
indep. variables
gfp -0.240*** -0.245*** -0.281*** -0.283***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
belect10 -0.192*** -0.201*** -0.254*** -0.279***
(0.028) (0.034) (0.026) (0.032)
achange10 -0.161*** -0.239*** -0.169*** -0.198***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.040)
Intercept 0.415*** 0.411*** 0.436*** 0.434***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
N 11,613 11,613 10,591 10,591
R2 0.013 0.012 0.018 0.016
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all
(non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding
robust OLS, robust probit and tobit regressions, including specications with each
explanatory variable isolated.
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Table 21. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies on 10-days political periods, after
SWARCH model estimation (political periods included in ARCH, 3-regimes), Japan,
1960-2008
SWARCH
estimated...
... without vix in ARCH ... with vix in ARCH
dep. var.
middle-regime high-regime middle-regime high-regime
smiddle middle shigh high smiddle middle shigh high
indep.
variables
gfp 0.237*** 0.230*** -0.011 -0.008 0.260*** 0.263*** -0.048*** -0.041**
(0.020) (0.025) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.014) (0.016)
belect10 0.035 0.014 -0.067*** -0.062*** 0.107*** 0.097** -0.075*** -0.083***
(0.034) (0.041) (0.018) (0.019) (0.038) (0.044) (0.021) (0.022)
achange10 0.039 0.035 0.007 0.018 0.103** 0.112** 0.010 0.013
(0.038) (0.043) (0.028) (0.030) (0.041) (0.046) (0.033) (0.034)
Intercept 0.404*** 0.405*** 0.126*** 0.116*** 0.470*** 0.485*** 0.158*** 0.145***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
N 11,613 11,613 11,613 11,613 10,591 10,591 10,591 10,591
R2 0.011 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.015 0.010 0.001 0.001
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all
(non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding
robust OLS, robust probit and tobit regressions, including specications with each
explanatory variable isolated.
Finally, the tables below present the results for the political impacts on regime dummies and
probabilities, when using 5-days windows for the political dummies.
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Table 22. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies on 5-days political periods, after
SWARCH model estimation (political periods included in ARCH, 2-regimes), Japan,
1960-2008
SWARCH estimated... ... without vix in ARCH ... with vix in ARCH
dep. variable: high-regime dep. variable: high-regime
shigh high shigh high
indep. variables
gfp -0.246*** -0.250*** -0.279*** -0.280***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
belect5 -0.210*** -0.221*** -0.258*** -0.262***
(0.036) (0.045) (0.035) (0.047)
achange5 -0.219*** -0.252*** -0.214*** -0.246***
(0.043) (0.046) (0.049) (0.053)
Intercept 0.413*** 0.408*** 0.433*** 0.432***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
N 11,622 11,622 10,595 10,595
R2 0.012 0.011 0.016 0.011
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all
(non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding
robust OLS, robust probit and tobit regressions, including specications with each
explanatory variable isolated.
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Table 23. Regressing regimes' probabilities and dummies on 5-days political periods, after
SWARCH model estimation (political periods included in ARCH, 3-regimes), Japan,
1960-2008
SWARCH
estimated...
... without vix in ARCH ... with vix in ARCH
dep. var.
middle-regime high-regime middle-regime high-regime
smiddle middle shigh high smiddle middle shigh high
indep.
variables
gfp 0.226*** 0.220*** -0.017 -0.011 0.244*** 0.249*** -0.051*** -0.042**
(0.020) (0.025) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016)
belect5 0.024 -0.005 -0.082*** -0.080*** 0.090*(a) 0.092 -0.092*** -0.100***
(0.049) (0.057) (0.021) (0.023) (0.054) (0.062) (0.026) (0.026)
achange5 0.049 -0.064 -0.016 0.005 0.018 -0.032 -0.009 0.002
(0.053) (0.063) (0.036) (0.041) (0.054) (0.068) (0.046) (0.048)
Intercept 0.403*** 0.405*** 0.129*** 0.120*** 0.462*** 0.477*** 0.158*** 0.146***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
N 11,622 11,622 11,622 11,622 10,595 10,595 10,595 10,595
R2 0.010 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.008 0.001 0.001
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all
(non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in corresponding
robust OLS, robust probit and tobit regressions, including specications with each
explanatory variable isolated. (a)Non-signicant when isolated, both in robust OLS and
tobit.
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D. Results for Japan, with political periods in ARCH - estimated stan-
dard errors regressed on political period dummies
Table 24. Estimated standard errors regressed on political dummies (sequentially estimated, after SWARCH
optimization, 3-regimes, with political dummies in ARCH)
dep. variable:
√
E [û2t ]
vix in ARCH? No Yes
indep. var.
vix - - - - 0.71663*** 0.71669*** 0.70450***
(0.02430) (0.02240) (0.02156)
gfp 0.00262*** 0.00256*** 0.00264*** 0.00272*** 0.00145*** 0.00154*** 0.00164***
(0.00023) (0.00025) (0.00025) (0.00025) (0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00021)
belect 22 -0.00206*** -0.00226*** -0.00173***
(0.00020) (0.00022) (0.00020)
10 -0.00252*** -0.00187***
(0.00029) (0.00028)
5 -0.00295*** -0.00229***
(0.00035) (0.00032)
achange 22 -0.00150*** -0.00206*** -0.00125***
(0.00022) (0.00023) (0.00020)
10 -0.00203*** -0.00115***
(0.00033) (0.00030)
5 -0.00083(a) 0.00007
(0.00054) (0.00051)
Intercept 0.01071*** 0.01073*** 0.01070*** 0.01066*** 0.00457*** 0.00452*** 0.00459***
(0.000) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00020) (0.00018) (0.00018)
N 11,592 10,579 10,591 10,595 10,579 10,591 10,595
R2 0.018 0.016 0.012 0.010 0.334 0.349 0.347
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain
(non-)signicance in corresponding specications with each explanatory variable isolated. (a) Signicant at
10% level when isolated in robust OLS.
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E. International contagion
The table below shows the correlation between each national stock market index return with the
U.S.A. stock market index return (S&P500). Note that all national stock market indexes are
signicantly correlated with the U.S.A. stock market index.
Table 25. National stock market index return regressed on U.S.A. stock market index
return (S&P500)
Dep.
variable:daily
return of. . .
Coecient of USA
return(a)
Constant Number
of obs.
R-sq
estimate robust s. e. estimate robust s. e.
UK 0.353*** (0.018) 0.024** (0.011) 9,394 0.117
Canada 0.610*** (0.012) 0.002 (0.007) 9,407 0.492
Germany 0.442*** (0.020) 0.008 (0.011) 10,220 0.142
France 0.544*** (0.026) 0.002 (0.017) 5,195 0.219
Spain 0.334*** (0.026) 0.013 (0.014) 6,993 0.100
Switzerland 0.312*** (0.021) 0.012 (0.010) 8,513 0.131
Italy 0.306*** (0.020) 0.027* (0.014) 8,521 0.062
Portugal 0.253*** (0.024) 0.004 (0.014) 4,533 0.095
Ireland 0.226*** (0.025) 0.025* (0.014) 8,824 0.035
Iceland 0.058** (0.025) 0.046*** (0.017) 3,606 0.005
Netherlands 0.408*** (0.020) 0.010 (0.011) 8,650 0.165
Belgium 0.291*** (0.020) 0.015 (0.010) 8,440 0.113
Luxembourg 0.076*** (0.021) 0.035** (0.016) 4,137 0.008
Denmark 0.227*** (0.023) 0.033** (0.014) 6,845 0.050
Finland 0.425*** (0.033) 0.012 (0.023) 5,276 0.089
Norway 0.332*** (0.029) 0.023 (0.017) 6,940 0.063
Sweden 0.415*** (0.025) 0.027 (0.017) 6,428 0.112
Austria 0.196*** (0.022) 0.021* (0.012) 7,160 0.048
Greece 0.251*** (0.027) 0.040* (0.024) 4,963 0.028
Japan 0.389*** (0.026) 0.024** (0.012) 8,081 0.121
Australia 0.464*** (0.045) 0.012 (0.012) 5,552 0.309
New Zealand 0.341*** (0.015) 0.027* (0.014) 4,053 0.165
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1%
level.(a)1-day-lagged U.S.A. return, in the case of Japan, Australia and New Zealand. See
Appendix F for details on data source and denitions.
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F. Data
Stock market indexes
Prices of stock market indexes are obtained from Datastream for the period 1960-2008, in
daily frequency and expressed in local currency units (except for the Irish index, expressed in US
dollars). The table below details the designation for each national index. Some series used are
computed by Datastream (DS) - for each of them, the table presents also an alternative actual
series present in the database.
Table 26. Datastream designations for national stock market indexes
Country Datastream designation of chosen index(a)
Designation of actual index also
present in Datastream database
USA S&P 500 COMPOSITE -
UK FTSE ALL SHARE -
Canada S&P/TSX COMPOSITE INDEX -
Germany DAX 30 PERFORMANCE -
France FRANCE CAC 40 -
Spain MADRID SE GENERAL -
Switzerland SWITZ-DS Market SWISS MARKET
Italy ITALY-DS Market MILAN MIB 30
Portugal PORTUGAL-DS Market PSI 20
Ireland IRELAND-DS MARKET $ IRELAND SE OVERALL (ISEQ)
Iceland OMX ICELAND ALL SHARE -
Netherlands NETHERLAND-DS Market AEX INDEX (AEX)
Belgium BELGIUM-DS Market BEL 20
Luxembourg LUXEMBURG-DS Market LUXEMBOURG SE GENERAL
Denmark COPENHAGEN KFX DS-CALCULATED OMX COPENHAGEN (OMXC20)
Finland OMX HELSINKI (OMXH) -
Norway NORWAY-DS Market OSLO SE OBX
Sweden SWEDEN-DS Market OMX STOCKHOLM 30 (OMXS30)
Austria AUSTRIA-DS Market ATX - AUSTRIAN TRADED INDEX
Greece GREECE-DS Market ATHEX ALL SHARE
Japan NIKKEI 225 STOCK AVERAGE -
Australia ASX ALL ORDINARIES 1971 > -
New Zealand NEW ZEALAN-DS Market NZX 50
(a)DS denotes extended series, computed by Datastream.
The next table presents some summary statistics for each stock market index daily returns.
These returns are expressed in percentage points and are attained by computing the daily variation
of each index price, after removing repeated successive values.
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Table 27. Summary statistics for Stock Market Indices
returns, 1960-2008 (percentage points)
Country Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Australia 7,293 0.029 0.994 -24.995 6.850
Austria 7,534 0.030 1.004 -8.835 10.154
Belgium 8,907 0.024 0.961 -12.186 8.290
Canada 9,805 0.023 0.933 -11.316 9.032
Denmark 7,209 0.045 1.157 -10.995 12.054
Finland 5,557 0.031 1.716 -15.973 15.677
France 5,470 0.017 1.410 -9.641 11.176
Germany 10,836 0.020 1.228 -12.812 11.402
Greece 5,250 0.047 1.699 -13.612 16.545
Iceland 3793 0.044 1.027 -30.670 5.269
Ireland 9,294 0.031 1.327 -15.494 15.892
Italy 9,008 0.036 1.358 -9.374 11.051
Japan 12,036 0.021 1.196 -14.901 13.236
Luxembourg 4,349 0.036 1.043 -6.596 10.672
Netherlands 9,112 0.023 1.106 -10.446 9.745
Norway 7,295 0.033 1.502 -19.012 10.872
New Zealand 5,311 0.014 0.983 -8.705 9.585
Portugal 4,782 0.011 0.969 -10.022 9.966
Spain 7,346 0.030 1.201 -10.661 10.374
Sweden 6,773 0.044 1.431 -8.146 11.475
Switzerland 8,970 0.022 0.952 -11.583 10.313
UK 9,847 0.030 1.089 -11.412 9.356
USA 11,076 0.029 1.030 -20.414 11.580
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Political data
Dates in which cabinets took oce were collected from Woldendorp et al (1998). The author
extends the data in time span (to include the period from mid 90's to 2008) and adds dates of
elections, based on the Political Data Yearbooks (1995-2009)  published by the European Journal
of Political Research36 , the Keesing's Contemporary Archives37, the Comparative Political Data
Set (CPDS), 1960-200638, and several institutional and research websites39.
The table below presents the election and change dates in the sample under study - note
that, among these, the analysis focus only on elections and subsequent changes, mediated by a
government formation period.
36See EJPR Vol. 48, no. 7-8 (2009), Vol. 47, no. 7-8 (2008) and Vol. 46, no. 7-8 (2007) for examples.
37www.keesings.com
38See Armingeon et al (2008).
39Examples are the US House of Representatives (Oce of the Clerk), US Senate (archives), Parties and elections
in Europe (www.parties-and-elections.de), Zaraté's Political Collections.
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Table 28. Election and change dates in Japan, U.K. and Germany, 1960-2008
Japan U.K. Germany
election change election change
18-11-1960 19-07-1960 21-10-1963 01-07-1960
08-12-1960 15-10-1964 19-10-1964 15-09-1961 14-11-1961
21-11-1963 09-12-1963 31-03-1966 06-04-1966 19-11-1962
09-11-1964 18-06-1970 22-06-1970 14-12-1962
27-01-1967 17-02-1967 28-02-1974 05-03-1974 16-10-1963
26-12-1969 14-01-1970 10-10-1974 18-10-1974 17-09-1965 26-10-1965
07-07-1972 06-04-1976 28-10-1966
08-12-1972 22-12-1972 03-05-1979 07-05-1979 01-12-1966
09-12-1974 09-06-1983 13-06-1983 26-09-1969 22-10-1969
03-12-1976 24-12-1976 11-06-1987 15-06-1987 17-05-1972
08-12-1978 28-11-1990 17-11-1972 15-12-1972
05-10-1979 08-11-1979 09-04-1992 13-04-1992 16-05-1974
20-06-1980 17-07-1980 01-05-1997 02-05-1997 29-10-1976 15-12-1976
26-11-1982 07-06-2001 08-06-2001 09-10-1980 04-11-1980
16-12-1983 26-12-1983 05-05-2005 06-05-2005 17-09-1982
01-11-1984 27-06-2007 04-10-1982
04-07-1986 22-07-1986 04-03-1983 30-03-1983
06-11-1987 23-01-1987 11-03-1987
05-06-1989 04-10-1990
09-08-1989 30-11-1990 17-01-1991
16-02-1990 28-02-1990 14-10-1994 17-11-1994
05-11-1991 25-09-1998 27-10-1998
16-07-1993 09-08-1993 20-09-2002 22-10-2002
28-04-1994 16-09-2005 22-11-2005
30-06-1994
11-01-1996
18-10-1996 07-11-1996
12-01-1998
30-07-1998
14-01-1999
05-04-2000
23-06-2000 04-07-2000
26-04-2001
07-11-2003 19-11-2003
09-09-2005 31-10-2005
26-09-2006
26-09-2007
24-09-2008
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G. Replicating the VIX
The span limitation of the original VIX imposes a considerable sample constraint, given that,
for instance, the stock markets index for Japan, NIKKEI225, is available starting 06-01-1959.
Sample restrictions are minimized by using instead the series on S&P500 daily returns, which
starts from 01-01-1964. Daily series are built containing the daily backward/forward 3-month
standard deviation of the S&P500 returns. The VIX is alternatively regressed on a set of lags
and forwards of these backward/forward standard deviation series. The two regressions providing
highest R2 are
Table 29. VIX regressed on...
...backward 3-month ...forward 3-month
S&P st.dev. S&P st.dev.
F10.bS&Psd
1143.998*** -
(15.66)
L56.fS&Psd
- 1137.743***
(15.01)
R2 0.9077 0.9076
*** signicant at 1% level. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. F10.bS&Psd and
L56.fS&Psd denote a 10-days forward of the
backward-standard-deviation series and a 56-days
lag of the forward-standard-deviation series,
respectively.
Note that, given 3 months correspond to 66 business days, a backward 3-month st. dev. starting
at t+10, F10.bS&Psd, is equivalent to a forward 3-month st. dev. starting in at t−56, L56.fS&Psd
- both measures cover the period [t− 56, t+ 10]. This is the period chosen to replicate the VIX.
The tables below present the results from all the alternative regressions of the original VIX
on the forwards and lags of the replicating standard deviation series (both backward and forward
s.d.). The selected variables (isolated in the table above) are in bold.
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Table 30. Regressing VIX on S&P500 standard deviation series, lags/forwards 1-33
VIX regressed on...
lag/
forward
#...
...of backward 3-month S&P st.dev.... ...forward 3-month S&P st.dev....
...lagged ...forwarded ...lagged ...forwarded
estimate sd R-sq estimate sd R-sq estimate sd R-sq estimate sd R-sq
0 1,162.164*** 24.767 0.878 1,162.164*** 24.767 0.878 753.279*** 44.603 0.457 753.279*** 44.603 0.457
1 1,163.881*** 25.684 0.873 1,161.393*** 23.793 0.883 761.510*** 44.669 0.466 744.921*** 44.451 0.448
2 1,164.898*** 26.726 0.868 1,161.355*** 22.740 0.889 769.906*** 44.702 0.475 737.274*** 44.393 0.440
3 1,166.720*** 27.678 0.862 1,160.492*** 21.788 0.893 778.568*** 44.674 0.485 729.634*** 44.346 0.431
4 1,168.439*** 28.597 0.856 1,159.357*** 20.788 0.897 786.700*** 44.585 0.494 722.208*** 44.295 0.423
5 1,170.697*** 29.492 0.851 1,157.069*** 19.861 0.900 794.653*** 44.419 0.504 715.094*** 44.241 0.416
6 1,173.078*** 30.429 0.845 1,154.435*** 19.018 0.902 802.408*** 44.300 0.513 708.953*** 44.253 0.409
7 1,175.053*** 31.440 0.838 1,152.263*** 18.047 0.904 810.520*** 44.144 0.522 702.110*** 44.120 0.402
8 1,177.192*** 32.349 0.832 1,149.535*** 17.203 0.906 819.037*** 43.929 0.533 695.570*** 44.005 0.395
9 1,179.304*** 33.246 0.825 1,147.351*** 16.207 0.907 827.593*** 43.682 0.543 689.183*** 43.875 0.388
10 1,180.707*** 34.008 0.817 1,143.998*** 15.668 0.908 836.528*** 43.416 0.554 682.637*** 43.758 0.381
11 1,182.854*** 34.793 0.811 1,141.001*** 15.234 0.908 845.398*** 43.154 0.565 677.061*** 43.631 0.376
12 1,184.527*** 35.648 0.803 1,137.122*** 15.041 0.906 854.290*** 42.868 0.575 671.071*** 43.514 0.370
13 1,187.555*** 36.409 0.796 1,133.060*** 14.977 0.905 862.685*** 42.502 0.586 665.604*** 43.399 0.364
14 1,190.559*** 37.078 0.789 1,129.982*** 14.863 0.904 871.295*** 42.111 0.597 660.136*** 43.266 0.359
15 1,194.351*** 37.773 0.783 1,125.037*** 15.033 0.901 879.760*** 41.619 0.607 655.010*** 43.153 0.354
16 1,198.033*** 38.459 0.777 1,121.047*** 15.126 0.899 887.914*** 41.146 0.617 650.128*** 43.033 0.350
17 1,201.244*** 39.074 0.771 1,115.943*** 15.415 0.895 896.171*** 40.674 0.628 645.352*** 42.898 0.344
18 1,204.051*** 39.791 0.763 1,111.547*** 15.658 0.892 904.385*** 40.155 0.638 640.413*** 42.728 0.340
19 1,207.647*** 40.342 0.756 1,107.220*** 15.993 0.889 912.450*** 39.612 0.649 635.867*** 42.557 0.335
20 1,211.787*** 40.743 0.749 1,102.220*** 16.640 0.885 920.732*** 38.991 0.659 630.719*** 42.385 0.331
21 1,217.033*** 41.166 0.743 1,097.240*** 17.292 0.880 928.772*** 38.308 0.670 626.379*** 42.226 0.327
22 1,220.375*** 41.312 0.736 1,092.339*** 18.094 0.875 936.675*** 37.595 0.680 622.398*** 42.098 0.323
23 1,224.373*** 41.745 0.729 1,086.504*** 19.165 0.869 944.828*** 36.896 0.691 618.497*** 41.959 0.319
24 1,228.264*** 41.984 0.722 1,080.880*** 20.156 0.863 952.565*** 36.175 0.701 614.643*** 41.790 0.316
25 1,232.576*** 42.161 0.714 1,074.922*** 21.021 0.857 959.609*** 35.501 0.710 610.679*** 41.599 0.312
26 1,236.583*** 42.228 0.707 1,068.841*** 21.773 0.851 967.526*** 34.760 0.720 606.721*** 41.408 0.308
27 1,241.154*** 42.210 0.699 1,063.346*** 22.603 0.844 975.317*** 33.982 0.730 603.019*** 41.233 0.305
28 1,244.894*** 42.157 0.691 1,057.327*** 23.526 0.837 982.938*** 33.114 0.741 599.272*** 41.045 0.302
29 1,249.111*** 42.124 0.683 1,051.799*** 24.462 0.829 990.465*** 32.345 0.751 596.074*** 40.881 0.299
30 1,252.605*** 42.032 0.675 1,045.640*** 25.410 0.821 997.930*** 31.485 0.761 591.870*** 40.663 0.295
31 1,256.562*** 41.815 0.668 1,040.133*** 26.322 0.813 1,005.237*** 30.608 0.771 588.431*** 40.483 0.292
32 1,262.163*** 41.729 0.661 1,033.623*** 27.186 0.805 1,012.694*** 29.719 0.780 584.510*** 40.271 0.288
33 1,267.380*** 41.457 0.655 1,027.150*** 28.012 0.797 1,019.022*** 28.816 0.789 581.527*** 40.102 0.286
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Table 31. Regressing VIX on S&P500 standard deviation series, lags/forwards 34-66
VIX regressed on...
lag/
forward
#...
...backward 3-month S&P st.dev.... ...forward 3-month S&P st.dev....
...lagged ...forwarded ...lagged ...forwarded
estimate sd R-sq estimate sd R-sq estimate sd R-sq estimate sd R-sq
0 1,162.164*** 24.767 0.878 1,162.164*** 24.767 0.878 753.279*** 44.603 0.457 753.279*** 44.603 0.457
34 1,272.336*** 41.333 0.647 1,020.893*** 28.911 0.788 1,025.553*** 28.035 0.797 578.335*** 39.918 0.283
35 1,275.226*** 41.261 0.639 1,013.554*** 29.750 0.779 1,031.843*** 27.157 0.806 575.746*** 39.788 0.280
36 1,278.608*** 41.167 0.631 1,006.962*** 30.649 0.770 1,037.644*** 26.280 0.814 572.938*** 39.582 0.277
37 1,282.563*** 40.909 0.623 999.600*** 31.449 0.761 1,044.017*** 25.328 0.822 569.830*** 39.403 0.274
38 1,286.160*** 40.492 0.614 992.475*** 32.211 0.752 1,049.994*** 24.380 0.830 567.053*** 39.239 0.272
39 1,290.074*** 40.187 0.606 985.069*** 33.085 0.742 1,056.170*** 23.415 0.838 564.003*** 39.080 0.269
40 1,294.244*** 40.020 0.598 977.225*** 33.910 0.732 1,061.723*** 22.507 0.845 561.157*** 38.951 0.267
41 1,297.209*** 39.887 0.590 969.404*** 34.706 0.721 1,067.201*** 21.653 0.852 558.176*** 38.768 0.264
42 1,296.673*** 39.735 0.581 962.489*** 35.349 0.712 1,072.880*** 20.742 0.859 555.591*** 38.632 0.262
43 1,299.895*** 39.656 0.574 954.699*** 36.068 0.702 1,079.189*** 19.803 0.865 553.013*** 38.473 0.259
44 1,301.470*** 39.483 0.565 946.728*** 36.803 0.691 1,085.284*** 18.809 0.871 550.356*** 38.307 0.257
45 1,302.709*** 39.118 0.556 938.824*** 37.494 0.681 1,090.290*** 17.952 0.876 547.817*** 38.150 0.255
46 1,304.062*** 38.752 0.547 930.871*** 38.137 0.671 1,094.827*** 17.080 0.881 545.493*** 38.017 0.252
47 1,302.181*** 38.497 0.538 923.239*** 38.774 0.661 1,099.735*** 16.244 0.886 542.422*** 37.817 0.250
48 1,303.286*** 38.066 0.530 915.478*** 39.399 0.651 1,104.946*** 15.640 0.890 539.721*** 37.644 0.247
49 1,305.370*** 37.681 0.523 907.474*** 40.009 0.641 1,109.737*** 15.135 0.894 536.593*** 37.444 0.245
50 1,307.262*** 37.226 0.516 899.320*** 40.507 0.630 1,114.142*** 14.803 0.897 533.516*** 37.259 0.242
51 1,307.601*** 36.926 0.509 891.177*** 40.989 0.620 1,118.359*** 14.652 0.900 530.578*** 37.101 0.239
52 1,309.506*** 36.558 0.501 882.937*** 41.462 0.610 1,122.856*** 14.498 0.903 527.558*** 36.944 0.237
53 1,308.956*** 36.058 0.494 874.920*** 41.875 0.600 1,125.899*** 14.568 0.904 524.721*** 36.769 0.234
54 1,309.869*** 35.809 0.487 867.055*** 42.303 0.590 1,130.653*** 14.562 0.906 521.725*** 36.616 0.232
55 1,309.624*** 35.446 0.479 858.443*** 42.660 0.579 1,134.039*** 14.765 0.907 518.975*** 36.463 0.230
56 1,308.993*** 35.317 0.471 849.904*** 43.001 0.569 1,137.743*** 15.014 0.908 516.297*** 36.318 0.227
57 1,310.209*** 35.211 0.464 841.125*** 43.274 0.558 1,140.837*** 15.547 0.908 513.544*** 36.128 0.225
58 1,310.224*** 34.798 0.458 832.628*** 43.514 0.548 1,143.277*** 16.226 0.907 511.194*** 35.935 0.223
59 1,310.394*** 34.613 0.451 824.199*** 43.777 0.537 1,146.126*** 16.882 0.905 508.167*** 35.719 0.220
60 1,309.709*** 34.502 0.445 815.914*** 43.976 0.527 1,148.112*** 17.921 0.903 504.895*** 35.503 0.218
61 1,309.859*** 34.370 0.438 807.855*** 44.140 0.518 1,150.779*** 18.846 0.901 501.499*** 35.277 0.215
62 1,309.186*** 34.380 0.432 799.958*** 44.324 0.508 1,152.188*** 20.051 0.898 498.628*** 35.099 0.213
63 1,308.212*** 34.356 0.426 792.045*** 44.442 0.499 1,153.876*** 21.031 0.894 495.754*** 34.918 0.210
64 1,307.979*** 34.578 0.419 783.837*** 44.529 0.490 1,155.070*** 21.990 0.890 492.636*** 34.702 0.207
65 1,306.058*** 34.912 0.413 775.879*** 44.576 0.481 1,155.022*** 23.072 0.885 489.720*** 34.490 0.205
66 1,304.709*** 35.403 0.406 767.849*** 44.568 0.472 1,155.745*** 24.099 0.880 486.239*** 34.288 0.202
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H. Correlations between vix and political periods
The table below displays the correlation vector assessing the bilateral correlation between the vix
and each political-period dummy, for each country under study.
Table 32. Correlation between vix and
political-period dummies of...
...Japan ...U.K. ...Germany
belect 22 -0.0295 0.0233 0.0302
10 -0.0218 0.0166 0.0217
5 -0.0153 0.0107 0.0162
gfp 0.0298 0.017 0.024
achange 22 -0.0336 0.0137 0.014
10 -0.022 0.0124 0.0122
5 -0.0153 0.0098 0.0094
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I. Results for U.K., removing vix
Table 33. ARCH equation, 3-regimes, without vix
(estimated within SWARCH optimization), U.K.
dep. var. variance auto-regressive component, h2
indep. var.
vix2 -
gfp 0.000480**
(0.000245)
belect22 -0.000073***
(0.000005)
achange22 -0.000003
(0.000005)
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level,
*** Signicant at 1% level. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
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Table 34. Regimes' smoothed probabilities regressed on political
dummies (sequentially estimated after SWARCH optimization
with 3-regimes, ARCH excluding vix and including 22-days
political periods in ARCH), U.K.
dep. var. smiddle shigh
indep. var.
gfp 0.390*** 0.031
(0.083) (0.036)
belect22 0.139*** 0.041**
(0.031) (0.020)
achange22 0.159*** -0.028**
(0.028) (0.011)
Intercept 0.330*** 0.071***
(0.004) (0.002)
ĝi 2.958*** 14.911***
(0.127) (0.940)
N 9,665 9,665
R2 0.007 0.001
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, ***
Signicant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all (non-)signicant
coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in
corresponding robust OLS and tobit regressions, including
specications with each explanatory variable isolated.
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Table 35. Estimated standard errors regressed on political dummies, 3-regimes
(sequentially estimated after SWARCH optimization), U.K.
dep. variable
√
E [û2t ]
ARCH framework
(within SWARCH
process)
without vix, with
22-days political
periods
with vix, with
22-days political
periods
with vix, with
10-days political
periods
indep. variables
vix - - -
gfp 0.044*** 0.02951*** 0.02965***
(0.006) (0.00217) (0.00233)
belect22 0.001*** 0.00117***
(0.000) (0.00030)
belect10 0.00023
(0.00040)
achange22 -0.000 -0.00024
(0.000) (0.00024)
achange10 0.00010
(0.00036)
Intercept 0.010*** 0.00954*** 0.00958***
(0.000) (0.00005) (0.00005)
N 9,665 9,665 9,677
R2 0.112 0.043 0.041
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated
otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance
in corresponding specications with each explanatory variable isolated.
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J. Results for Germany, removing vix
Table 36. ARCH equation, 3-regimes, without vix
(estimated within SWARCH optimization), Germany
dep. var. variance auto-regressive component, h2
indep. var.
vix2 -
gfp 0.000015**
(0.000006)
belect22 -0.000087***
(0.000005)
achange22 -0.0000002
(0.000005)
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level,
*** Signicant at 1% level. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
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Table 37. Regimes' smoothed probabilities regressed on political
dummies (sequentially estimated after SWARCH optimization
with 3-regimes, ARCH excluding vix and including 22-days
political periods in ARCH), Germany
dep. var. smiddle shigh
indep. var.
gfp -0.031 0.104***
(0.025) (0.021)
belect22 -0.061** 0.120***
(0.026) (0.024)
achange22 -0.098*** 0.126***
(0.027) (0.024)
Intercept 0.406*** 0.056***
(0.004) (0.002)
ĝi 3.196*** 17.847***
(0.115) (1.029)
N 10,667 10,667
R2 0.002 0.018
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, ***
Signicant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Except where explicitly indicated otherwise, all (non-)signicant
coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance in
corresponding robust OLS and tobit regressions, including
specications with each explanatory variable isolated.
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Table 38. Estimated standard errors regressed on political dummies (sequentially
estimated, after SWARCH optimization with 3 regimes), Germany
dep. variable
√
E [û2t ]
ARCH framework
(within SWARCH
process)
without vix, with
22-days political
periods
with vix, with
22-days political
periods
with vix, with
10-days political
periods
indep. variables
vix - - -
gfp 0.004*** 0.00330*** 0.00403***
(0.000) (0.00032) (0.00047)
belect22 0.001*** 0.00183***
(0.000) (0.00052)
belect10 0.00215***
(0.00077)
achange22 0.002*** 0.00243***
(0.000) (0.00048)
achange10 0.00287***
(0.00072)
Intercept 0.011*** 0.01066*** 0.01070***
(0.000) (0.00005) (0.00005)
N 10,667 10,667 10,679
R2 0.022 0.016 0.018
* Signicant at 10% level, ** Signicant at 5% level, *** Signicant at 1% level.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Except where explicitly indicated
otherwise, all (non-)signicant coecients in the table maintain (non-)signicance
in corresponding specications with each explanatory variable isolated.
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Epilogue 
 
The three studies presented in this thesis produce very interesting results. Capital flows indeed react to 
some political profiles held by the cabinet in office or recently elected. Moreover, these flows adapt 
their reaction to policy according to who is the policymaker. Regarding the Euro impact on export 
market entry, the real options approach allows to develop of a clear argument in favor of firm-entry 
promotion through exchange volatility reduction. More specifically, the intensity of this entry-
promotion effect shall depend on how credible the volatility reduction is. Finally, stock market returns 
show a clear volatility surge during the period mediating the day of a democratic election and the 
subsequent day in which the elected cabinet takes office. In spite of knowing the election winners, stock 
markets experience extraordinary volatility before knowing precisely who the next policymaker will be. 
In the first chapter, the hypothesis that left-leaning cabinets set higher taxes finds empirical 
support, especially in the context of single-party. Equity inflows react positively to single-party right 
cabinets. FDI net flows react negatively to majoritarian cabinets and positively to budget deficits, 
signaling sensitivity to environment stability and fiscal stimulus. Oppositely, equity inflows react 
positively to majoritarian cabinets (potentially more active in countering negative GDP shocks) and 
negatively to budget deficits and public expenditure (potentially anticipating higher taxes). The 
magnitude of the direct impacts of political profiles on capital flows range from 0.3 to 4.7 GDP 
percentage points. Reactions to fiscal policy are attenuated when left or right cabinets are in office.         
According to the model developed in the second chapter, the exchange rate uncertainty 
associated to the Euro contributed to export market entry by firms that would, otherwise, remain as 
non-exporters. The model produces a closed-form market-entry threshold clearly related to exchange 
rate volatility. This threshold specification allows for objective hypotheses, paving the way for 
promising empirical research. 
The estimates produced in the third chapter show significant impacts on stock market volatility 
around democratic elections, with one pattern common to all countries studied: volatility rises during 
government formation periods (between election day and the day in which the elected cabinet takes 
office). Volatility is higher during this period than in periods far from elections, before elections or 
after newly-elected cabinets take office. These impacts operate both through the ARCH process guiding 
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daily volatility and through volatility regime shifts. During government formation periods, estimated 
stock-returns standard error increases by 14%-271%, relative to its average far from elections. 
 
The three essays integrating this thesis represent the foundation of several future research 
streams. More specifically, the theoretical cornerstone laid in the second chapter and the innovative 
dataset used in the first and third chapters open very interesting research avenues towards a better 
understanding of the Macroeconomic impacts of politics and policy. 
 
 
 
What is past is prologue  
– U.S. National Archives, Washington DC 
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